The Sherlock Dossier
Exposed · Documented · On record · Exposed · Documented · On record · Exposed, documented, on record.

01Charities Act 1992 s.63Operating as a charity shop without registration

Social media posts, Facebook descriptions, video content, and physical signage have described the operation as a "charity shop," "charity boutique," and "food bank charity" across multiple premises for years. The primary brand logo — used continuously across all platforms, printed drop-off signs, and internal shop signage until the Facebook ban — explicitly names the operation Jayne's Baby Bank & Charity Shops. Internal shop premises additionally displayed permanent painted and applied signage reading "Charity SHOP" and "Jarmani's Charity Boutique". These physical displays confirm that the charitable branding extended into the permanent fixtures of the physical shops, not only to online platforms and advertising. A post dated 10 May 2023 states: “Just spent £1,018 of our aspiring charity money on two Disney Princess castles for the children to play in.” The operator’s own description of £1,018 as “aspiring charity money” confirms that donated funds were treated as charitable income and spent on soft play installations — a use not disclosable as a charitable purpose under either Charity Commission application, and not reflected in any CIC filing or annual return. The original Facebook profile bio for the operation read: “I have ovarian cancer, I launched a food bank, womens aid and baby bank to help as people in 2020” — embedding a health claim directly into the permanent public-facing identity of the operation from launch. A Facebook group was created on 21 May 2022 under the name "Jayne's Baby Bank & Charity Shop Newport Free Page" — using the word "charity" from day one, before being renamed "Jayne's Baby Bank SOUTH WALES Free Page" on 27 July 2022.

Private written admission of charitable status — Facebook Messenger. A Facebook Messenger exchange between the operator and a contact (referred to here as S##### Alice###) captures the operator responding to a challenge about unregistered shops. In the exchange the operator states in her own outgoing message: “Now we are a charity. Foodbank. Baby bank. And foodbank fundraising shop!” The message is private, not a public post — making it an unguarded written admission of the charitable claim rather than a public-facing marketing statement. In a private context, with no audience to perform for, the operator characterises the operation as a charity in plain terms. This is consistent with the broader pattern of using charitable language across all contexts — public posts, physical signage, logos, and private correspondence — while maintaining that the operation is not legally a charity when challenged by regulatory bodies. The exchange is archived as primary evidence.

In May 2026 — under the confirmed KnowledgeableEagle3954 alias, the operator made a series of statements reframing the operation's identity in direct response to public scrutiny. These include: “They are not charity shops they are not baby bank shops the sign is on the front in big letters 'Foodbank Fundraising Shops' run by Jaynes Baby Bank”; “We provide pantry food bags £5 the same as thousands of other pantry outlets in the UK AND we provide free foodbanks to relevant criteria”; and “We provide free items via request of letter not walk ins to relevant criteria.” These statements directly contradict: five years of documented "charity shop" signage, trading descriptions, and public representations; the documented policy of advertising items as free while restricting access to paying customers and donators; and the FSA food business registration declaring the operation as "A charity." The claim that signage has always read "Foodbank Fundraising Shops" is inconsistent with photographic evidence, inspection records, council enforcement notices, and the operation's own archived Facebook descriptions. The £5 food pantry bag admission further contradicts the repeated claim that all food is provided free of charge.

Contradiction — “free for the first year” claim. In a broadcast dated 12 September 2025, the operator stated: “for the first year we gave everything out for free, but we were fleeced and we were ripped off and people were selling it on left, right and centre. So that's when we said we need a better system.” This account directly contradicts the documented evidence: the "free items for customers and donators only" policy is recorded across 105 unique source documents spanning from April 2023 back to the earliest archived trading period — well within what the operator describes as the original "free" phase. The policy of restricting free items to paying customers was not introduced as a response to being "ripped off". It is the foundational operating model documented from the operation's earliest archived records. The same broadcast was the operator's first public disclosure of an autism diagnosis, and frames the move to shops and paid access as a natural operational evolution — a reframing inconsistent with the documented regulatory and enforcement history.

In the 6 October 2025 broadcast, the operator confirmed the restricted access model in her own words while simultaneously defending it:

This admission — made by the operator herself in the same broadcast as the decoy admission. Confirms that access to the operation requires either a cash payment or a physical donation of goods. The framing of a minimum card payment as simply "all a card machine will take" does not negate the documented payment requirement: the effect is identical regardless of the framing. This directly contradicts the operation's public positioning as a free service for families in need.

No Charity Commission registration has ever existed. Both formal applications failed — the full registration history, application reference numbers, refusal dates, and correspondence is documented in Finding 02. Despite formal notification of refusal in October 2023, the operation continued to use "charity" in its branding, signage, and online presence.

In February 2024, the operator submitted an official food business registration at Risca falsely declaring herself "CEO/trustee" of a "charity" with registration "Awaiting". The registration, submitted 24 February 2024, records the operator type as “A charity (registered by a representative)”, the charity name as “Jayne’s Mother and Baby Bank and Foodbank Fundraising Shop”, the charity number as “Awaiting” and the contact representative as “Jayne Price”, role “Ceo/trustee”, above a declaration that the information given is correct and complete.

“Charity pending shop“ — trading descriptor used after both Charity Commission applications failed, 26 October 2023. In a public broadcast dated 26 October 2023, the operator described the operation's donation processing procedures while referring to the premises as “our shop, charity pending shop.” This is significant for two reasons. First, the phrase "charity pending" was being used as a live trading descriptor six days after the operator received formal written notification of the second Charity Commission refusal (20 October 2023) — meaning she was publicly describing the operation as a charity-in-waiting on her follower platform at the precise moment she had just been told, in writing, that it would not be registered. Second, the same language — "charity pending" — appears across multiple other archived broadcasts as a standard descriptor for the operation, confirming it was a deliberate and sustained framing choice rather than a one-off slip. The Charity Commission had by this date refused both applications. No third application has been made.

March 2025 — attempted rebranding and physical sign cover-up. On 18 March 2025, the operation publicly declared: “We are not a charity shop. We are a non-profit vintage, antique, and collectable shop.” This statement directly contradicts years of documented "charity shop" branding, signage, and trading descriptions. In the same period, a post from the JBB account stated: “Before any conspiracy theory's start — signs are down because I'm adding our trade mark to our signage by hand not to have to order more signage.” Photographic evidence documents Daniel physically covering existing "charity shop" signage at the premises. The registered trademark at this date remained “JAYNE'S BABY BANK & CHARITY SHOP” (UK00003910000, Class 36 — charitable fundraising), meaning the operation was physically removing charity shop signage while the registered trademark continued to explicitly reference a charity shop. The Blackwood premises was simultaneously officially classified as “Type of Premises: Charity shop” in Caerphilly County Borough Council's food hygiene inspection records dated October 2023, an independent regulatory classification the operator had no means to retroactively alter. The March 2025 rebranding therefore does not extinguish the documented history: it represents a reactive attempt to distance the operation from its established identity in anticipation of regulatory and legal consequences, not a genuine change in its foundational operating model.

Third charity registration attempt — “Jayne’s FREE Pet Cafe.” A screenshot of a charity registration portal records a third charitable registration attempt under the name “Jayne’s FREE Pet Cafe”, operator address 6 Commercial Street, Pontypool, Torfaen NP4 6JJ — the Pontypool shop address — with charity number listed as PENDING and designated contact recorded as Jayne price, Owner. The portal and framework are consistent with a local authority or sector-specific registration scheme rather than the Charity Commission for England and Wales. No registration number has been confirmed as issued for this application, and no entry appears in Charity Commission records. Its existence confirms that charitable registration continued to be actively pursued at the same premises and under the same operator following both Charity Commission refusals, and for an operation entirely separate from the stated baby bank and food bank purposes of the CIC.

"Like a charity shop but not a charity shop" — operator awareness of charitable misrepresentation, 6 July 2025. A public Facebook post dated 6 July 2025 states: "We are thinking of a rebrand to annoy the haters: 'Like a charity shop but not a charity shop!'" The framing as deliberate provocation of critics does not diminish the disclosure. It is a direct public acknowledgement that the operation was presenting as a charity shop in appearance while knowing it was not a charity shop in status. Published to tens of thousands of followers on the operation's primary platform.

"We tried doing it for free for the 1st year" — commercial reframing, 1 May 2025. A Facebook post dated 1 May 2025 states: "We tried doing it for free for the 1st year and people were just greedy and sold stuff straight on." The adjacent context is equally significant. The same post describes the operation as requiring "skill to sell vintage and antique and vintage designer items," states Dan "sold 1 book for £50 on Monday," and describes training volunteers in "transferable skills for employment" via "sales skills." This framing — vintage retail, high-value individual sales, commercial skills training, which directly contradicts the public presentation of the operation as a charitable food bank and baby bank. The post simultaneously refers to training mothers for employment through sales work while appealing to the public on a charitable welfare basis.

"It's my job, right, as the trustee of the charity" — self-identification as charity trustee while unregistered, 10 May 2024. In a broadcast dated 10 May 2024, the operator stated: "it's my job, right, as the trustee of the charity, right, and the owner of the charity to do the right, the best thing possible for the charity pending, or the course that I'm in charge of." This statement was made in the context of justifying commercial pricing decisions — framing the setting of retail prices as a fiduciary duty owed to the "charity pending." By 10 May 2024, both Charity Commission applications had been refused (the second formally rejected in October 2023). Self-identification as "trustee" and "owner" of a charity the Charity Commission had confirmed did not exist, and using that framing to govern commercial retail pricing, directly relevant to the false representation analysis under the Fraud Act 2006 s.2.

"See all the money we make from the charity pending. I spend it all on luxury goods" — 30 January 2024. In a broadcast dated 30 January 2024, three months after the Charity Commission formally refused the second application. The operator stated, in sequence: "I spend all my money on my luxury goods", followed by: "See all the money we make from the charity pending", followed by: "I spend it all on luxury goods." The charity pending framing was used as an active commercial trading description months after it was legally foreclosed. The surrounding statements explicitly link the revenue generated under that framing to personal expenditure on luxury items, in the operator's own words, on a public broadcast.

“Under #SarahsLaw and #ClairesLaw we have been permitted to request such information by Gwent Police due to the nature of our aspiring charity and community group” — 8 May 2022. A public post on 8 May 2022, within weeks of the operation’s earliest documented activity — claims police authorisation under two specific safeguarding disclosure laws to conduct background checks on individuals associated with the operation. The claim deploys “aspiring charity and community group” as justification for access to information ordinarily reserved for regulated safeguarding organisations. Sarah’s Law (Child Sex Offender Disclosure Scheme) and Clare’s Law (Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme) are formal police processes operated by Gwent Police. No charity registration, CIC, or formal safeguarding body status existed at this date. The post constitutes a false public claim of police-authorised safeguarding powers deployed to solicit volunteers under a regulated-body framing.

“Thanks everyone for supporting our aspiring charity over the last 2 years” — 14 July 2022. A public Facebook post uses the phrase “aspiring charity” in a donor-facing context, framing followers’ contributions as support for a charitable purpose in progress. No registration was in place at this date and none was ever successfully completed.

“We are a family run charity and me and my son do not take a wage” — 22 November 2022. Identical language to the TikTok description documented in Finding 03. Published simultaneously across two separate platforms. The Facebook post version is independently dated as post ID 145262481595179 and forms part of boilerplate used across multiple posts. The no-wage claim and the family-run charity description appear together as a single standardised public statement deployed to solicit donations under a claimed charitable framing that no registration supports.

“We are non-profit even though we are classed as a business until we register as a charity” — 20 July 2024. A broadcast dated 20 July 2024 includes the admission: “So they know, the public know, your businesses, other organisations know that we are non-profit even though we are classed as a business until we register as a charity.” The statement was made to a public audience of 71,000+ followers over a year after both Charity Commission applications had failed — while continuing to present the operation as non-profit on a charitable registration path. The admission that the operation is “classed as a business” contradicts the non-profit framing in the same sentence.

02DeliberateRegistration avoided and applications failed

Two formal applications to the Charity Commission were made and both failed. The first, under "Jayne's Mother and Baby Bank, Food Bank & Charity Shop" (org. 5223055), did not proceed due to incomplete information. The second, under "Jayne's Baby Bank" (org. 5223411), was formally refused in August 2023 for failing to meet the threshold of being a charity — with declared income of £3,000 and £500 respectively, both below the registration threshold. Jayne Price was notified of the refusal on 20 October 2023. Nothing prevents a further application.

The Charity Commission correspondence also directly addresses the FCA authorisation claim, stating: “In regards to the claim that the Commission had provided authorisation to use 'charity' in the business names… I think this is unlikely, but in any case I would have thought the onus would be on the person making the claim to demonstrate that had been the case.” This official response predates the FCA's own July 2025 confirmation and represents a second statutory body dismissing the same false claim.

In a video recorded 13 February 2024 and subsequently deleted, the operator explicitly stated that charity registration was being avoided so that critics could not report the organisation to regulators. When the CIC was incorporated in November 2025, the operator immediately and falsely claimed it conferred registered charity status.

CIC and charity registration claimed publicly — September 2022, three years before incorporation. A public Facebook post dated 28 September 2022, two years and ten months before the CIC was incorporated — states: "Just to remind all our followers that we are a community group going through the CIC and Charity Registration process which can take up to a year." The same post adds: "you do not need to be a registered charity to be charitable or kind." By September 2022, no CIC application had been made and no Charity Commission application had yet been submitted. The post claims an active registration process for both structures simultaneously. The CIC was not incorporated until 7 November 2025, and both Charity Commission applications were refused (the second formally in October 2023). The qualifier that you do not need to be registered to be "charitable or kind" directly pre-adapts the defence deployed across the subsequent three years of regulatory correspondence and public challenge.

Public denial of ever having claimed charity status — SAR broadcast, January 2025. In a broadcast from the Subject Access Request material (believed January 2025), the operator stated directly: "Well, number one, we're not a charity and we've never said we are." In the same broadcast she added: "We're not one of these charities to get thousands and thousands of pounds, because we're not a charity." Both statements were made to a public audience. The first is directly contradicted by thousands of archived posts, broadcasts, and official documents in which the operation is described as a charity, a registered charity, a charity shop, or a charity pending. The second is contradicted by the PayPal accounts carrying "100% of profit goes towards the charity" descriptions, the documented public funding receipts totalling at least £10,528 in confirmed grants, and the wider pattern of charitable framing deployed to solicit donations from the public.

“CCBC are aware we have submitted CIC application, and awaiting to submit full charity registration” — 9 July 2022. A public Facebook post states: “CCBC are aware we are running a non profit shop and they are aware we have submitted CIC application, and awaiting to submit full charity registration but are waiting on 2 items from DVLA for identification, (DVLA have been in contact with me), all applications have been completed.” No CIC application had been filed by July 2022 — the CIC was not incorporated until November 2025. The DVLA identification excuse is unverifiable. The specific claim that CCBC was “aware” of an active CIC application constitutes a false representation to the public about council endorsement of the registration process.

“The Charity Commission and the CIC Governing bodies have decided to investigate the bullying we have received” — 19 October 2022. A public post states: “The Charity Commission and the CIC Governing bodies have decided the investigate the bullying we have received over the last 12 months plus by the two registered charities and the CIC charity.” The Charity Commission does not investigate inter-organisational disputes of this type. No such investigation was ever confirmed by either regulatory body. The post deploys the names of two statutory regulators as apparent endorsements of the operator’s position in a commercial dispute with competitors.

“Once we are a charity and CIC both of which have been applied for we will change our name accordingly” — 24 October 2022. A public post states: “Once we are a charity and CIC both of which have been applied for we will change our name accordingly.” As of 24 October 2022, only the first Charity Commission application had been submitted (and it did not proceed due to incomplete information). No CIC application had been made at this date. The post simultaneously misrepresents both registration processes as simultaneously active. The name-change commitment was never honoured.

“We are currently awaiting Charity registration and started the Baby Bank during the pandemic” — 22 November 2022. The same post as the F01 “family run charity” entry above contains a second false representation: “We are currently awaiting Charity registration and started the Baby Bank during the pandemic to help families and keyworkers.” No successful registration was ever obtained. The pandemic-origin framing was deployed in November 2022 to anchor the charitable narrative in a period of public goodwill, four months after the Facebook group’s creation and well before any formal registration attempt succeeded.

22Charities Act 1992 s.63 / Fraud Act 2006 s.2Charitable framing deployed from operational launch — July 2022 — predating both charity commission applications and both refusals

A post dated 25 July 2022, within weeks of the Facebook group creation on 21 May 2022. The post states in plain terms: “We are a family run charity that empowers women.” This is an unambiguous public claim of charitable status made before any registration application had been submitted or considered. The phrase is used in a post to the full audience of the nascent operation, deploying the word “charity” as a descriptor of the organisation, not as an aspiration or a future goal. The earliest recoverable dated public posts from Jayne’s Baby Bank. Confirmed from July 2022 across multiple independently dated post IDs at the Aberbargoed single-premises operation — use the following standard boilerplate in post footers: “Our aim is to help families by being cheaper than charity shops. All proceeds go towards running costs, nappies and formula, foodbanks and things specific families may need.” The same posts claim the operation "helped with several Ukraine appeals" and assists "families all over South East Wales, others in the UK, Africa."

Why this matters — timeline of applications and refusals. The first Charity Commission application (org. 5223055, under "Jayne's Mother and Baby Bank, Food Bank & Charity Shop") did not proceed as submitted information was incomplete. The second application (org. 5223411) was refused in August 2023, with formal notification on 20 October 2023. The July 2022 posts therefore predate both applications and both refusals by months and over a year respectively. Charitable framing was deployed to solicit public donations and volunteers before any registration attempt had been made, and the same "all proceeds" language continued in use after both applications failed. This is the earliest confirmed evidential anchor for the sustained use of charitable language on a public platform to solicit support for an operation that the Charity Commission subsequently confirmed twice did not qualify as a charity.

Systematic and deliberate. The boilerplate appears consistently across at least six independently dated post IDs within the first weeks of operation — embedded as a standard footer rather than appearing in isolated posts. This establishes that charitable framing was a deliberate and systematic feature of the operation's public presentation from its earliest days, not an error, an oversight, or a later development introduced once the operation grew. Soliciting donations while representing an organisation as operating for charitable purposes when it does not qualify as a charity may constitute an offence under Section 63 of the Charities Act 1992 and a false representation under Section 2 of the Fraud Act 2006.

The operation was presented publicly as a registered charity or charity-pending entity for over three years. The combined evidence in this finding and in Finding 02 establishes that between July 2022 and at least November 2025 — spanning the Facebook group’s creation, the two failed Charity Commission applications, and the eventual CIC incorporation — the operation was systematically presented to donors, volunteers, service users, councils, and the public as an entity with registered or pending charitable status. The phrase “family run charity” appears in July 2022 posts, standard boilerplate descriptions, TikTok video captions (independently documented in Finding 03), and private Messenger exchanges. The phrase “aspiring charity” is used across a further tranche of the same material. At no point during this three-year period did any Charity Commission registration exist. The sustained gap between the public representation and the documented legal status is the central finding of this investigation, corroborated independently across 34 Tier 1 evidence items in the investigation dataset.

10TrademarkTrademarking "charity" without charitable status, and false legal threats

Trademark portfolio, four UK marks filed across three years under three owner-name variants and two registered addresses. The Intellectual Property Office register shows four UK trademark applications connected to the operator: UK00003910000 (10 May 2023, Registered) "JAYNE’S BABY BANK & CHARITY SHOP" — figurative, Class 36, owner recorded as "Jayne’s Mother & Baby Bank, FREE Food Bank & Charity Shops" at 35 Bowen Industrial Estate, Aberbargoed, Blackwood (the address from which the operator was evicted in November 2023); UK00004010499 (3 February 2024, Refused) "Foodbank Fundraising Shop" — word mark, Class 36, owner Jayne Price at 7 Meadow Road, Pontllanfraith; UK00004013198 (10 February 2024, Withdrawn) "TIN ON A WALL COLLECTION" — word mark, Class 1, owner "Jayne price"; and UK00004316067 (26 December 2025, Registered 1 May 2026) "The New Caerphilly Bird and Small Animal Rescue Sanctuary" — figurative, Class 36, owner "Jayne price" (full chronology in Finding 25).

What the portfolio shows. First, the May 2023 mark was filed for a brand explicitly containing the word "charity" at a time when no Charity Commission registration existed and the second application had not yet been submitted — trademarking charitable language without any legal basis to use it. The IPO owner record for that mark is itself an unregistered trading description, "Jayne’s Mother & Baby Bank, FREE Food Bank & Charity Shops," a name that simultaneously embedded the charitable claim into the trademark register. Second, two further marks were filed in the same week of February 2024 — the "Foodbank Fundraising Shop" word mark refused on 3 February 2024 and the "TIN ON A WALL COLLECTION" word mark withdrawn one week later on 10 February 2024, indicating a rapid-sequence attempt to lock in fundraising-specific branding, both of which failed. Third, the IPO register documents three distinct owner-name variants in use for filings linked to the same individual: the unregistered trading-name owner ("Jayne’s Mother & Baby Bank, FREE Food Bank & Charity Shops") in 2023; "Jayne Price" in February 2024; and "Jayne price" (lowercase) on the two more recent filings. The address change between the 2023 and 2024 filings (Aberbargoed → Pontllanfraith) coincides with the period of the documented eviction and operational relocation. The refused "Foodbank Fundraising Shop" word mark is notable: the IPO declined to register that exact wording while the operator continued to use language describing the operation as a foodbank and fundraising shop in public posts, in council inspection records, and in shop signage.

On 10 May 2023, the first trademark application (UK00003910000) was filed for "JAYNE'S BABY BANK & CHARITY SHOP." At the time of application, no Charity Commission registration existed and the second application had not yet been submitted. The word "charity" was being trademarked while no legal basis existed for its use in the name.

The trademark has been used repeatedly to issue false legal threats. A public Facebook post stated: “Can I remind people that the Baby Bank is TRADEMARKED. Breach of Trademark Law is a CRIMINAL OFFENCE. No unauthorised photos/videos/usage without my permission.” A separate post demanded: “Breach of our trademark — settle out of court will be £2,500 and a public letter of apology on to social media. I think that's fair.” Both claims are legally false. Trademark infringement in the UK is a civil matter, not a criminal offence in most circumstances. A pending trademark application, which had not been registered at the time of these posts — confers no exclusive rights and cannot form the basis of any settlement demand. These public statements appear designed to intimidate critics and the public from documenting or discussing the operation. The casual deployment of cease and desist instruments is confirmed by the operator’s own words in a broadcast dated September 2024: “I can send out cease and desist like sweets.” This public admission that legal instruments are issued routinely and without discrimination is consistent with the broader documented pattern of using the appearance of legal proceedings to intimidate critics rather than to address genuine legal wrongs.

Public solicitation of law students to build a litigation case against critics, archived deleted broadcast. In an archived deleted broadcast — recorded while driving to a shop location. The operator described having received what she characterised as free legal advice from Citizens Advice regarding claims for damages against critics, then made the following public appeal: “if there's anybody out there now studying law in university and college, if you want to talk to your professors and your tutors and your lecturers about our case going forward, the people who have damaged our brand, because consistently the people we are looking to take to court, consistently they have proved that their characters are not the best either, in general. So if you wanted to look at that, and contact me, and ask your tutors and lecturers to appoint us as an advice, because we are looking to take people to court to claim damages and retractions.” Soliciting law students to work on live litigation cases via their university tutors, on a public broadcast — is not a recognised legal process. No university legal clinic operates on the basis of a public Facebook appeal. This conduct is consistent with the documented pattern of using the appearance of legal proceedings and official channels to intimidate and harass critics, while deploying non-expert sources to create the impression of a credible legal threat. The broadcast also states: “We have contacted the Charity Commission and the CIC Commission… about some other charities and groups that's out there, also the AFC because there's a couple of groups out there that are sport related and they've had a go as well”. A further documented instance of complaint filing against named third parties across multiple regulatory bodies simultaneously.

“We are also trademarked which is a criminal offence to copy cat or replicate including intellectual property theft” — 21 October 2023. A public post states: “We are also trademarked which is a criminal offence to copy cat or replicate including intellectual property theft. We are lucky I have a good mentor and an amazing team.” Trademark infringement in the UK is a civil matter under the Trade Marks Act 1994, not a criminal offence in ordinary circumstances. The post makes a false legal claim directed at individuals using similar names or concepts, misrepresenting civil IP law as criminal to deter critics and similar operations. This post was published in October 2023 while the trademark application was under active review.

“My trademark law is criminal” — 20 May 2024. A broadcast states: “Can I just remind people that our name, our concept, our logos are all trademarked and you cannot use them, write about them, produce anything about them, reproduce them without my permission. My trademark law is criminal. And if a criminal case is dealt with, then I have more levity in a court of law to take it up civilly as well.” The statement that trademark infringement is a criminal matter is legally incorrect and was made to a public audience of approximately 71,000 followers. It was deployed to deter the publication of critical commentary, screenshots, and investigative reporting.

“I can send out cease and desist all day long if I want” — 19 September 2024. A broadcast dated 19 September 2024 contains a formulation distinct from the “like sweets” quote already documented: “I can send out cease and desist all day long if I want.” The immediately preceding context line is: “Okay we’ve got business insurance.” The phrase “all day long if I want” confirms the deliberate and unlimited nature of the instrument’s deployment — establishing it as policy, not isolated incident.

25 October 2026 — “Trademarked Registered” on new signs. Signs posted that day carry the words “Trademarked Registered CIC 16838920” beneath a new name, “Foodbank Fundraising Recycling & Donation Centre”. None of the four filings listed above is for that wording, and the Intellectual Property Office refused the word mark “Foodbank Fundraising Shop” on 3 February 2024. See Finding 34 and Exhibit I.

11Lottery / Licensing Act 2003Unlicensed raffles continued after registration lapsed

JBB formerly held a Small Society Lottery registration tied to the Aberbargoed premises from which the operator was evicted in November 2023. A Caerphilly Council FOI response confirmed no active raffle or lottery licence existed during relevant periods of 2025 and 2026. The operator publicly admitted she had never renewed the prior licence. Despite this, "grand raffles" and "football cards" at £5 per stake continued to be promoted online without required statutory disclosures.

Marie Curie collection pot present in JBB premises — 17 August 2025. Observers documented the presence of a Marie Curie collection pot inside JBB premises. Marie Curie is a registered charity. Conducting collections on behalf of a named charity without authorisation from that charity raises concerns under the Charities Act 2011 and, if funds collected were not remitted to Marie Curie, potentially the Theft Act 1968. The presence of a third-party charity collection vessel in premises that simultaneously restricts free access to paying customers and donators — while publicly presenting itself as a charity — adds a further dimension to the documented fundraising concerns. Whether Marie Curie had any knowledge of or gave authorisation for the use of their branded collection equipment at JBB premises has not been confirmed.

Alcohol raffle across three shops simultaneously — August 2023. A public Facebook post dated 27 August 2023 promoted an "Au magic colour change VODKA raffle" at £2 per ticket across the Pontypool, Risca, and Blackwood shops simultaneously, with proceeds stated as going towards the food bank. This post predates the November 2023 eviction from Aberbargoed but the lottery registration was site-specific to that address. Raffling alcohol without a Premises Licence or relevant permission engages the Licensing Act 2003 in addition to the Gambling Act 2005 — a bottle of spirits constitutes a licensable article for prize purposes. The post confirms three concurrent trading locations as of August 2023 operating the same unlicensed prize draw activity.

03IdentityMultiple names across legal and operational contexts

The operator's legal birth name is confirmed by the England and Wales Civil Registration Birth Index as Carrie-anne Ridsdale, registered in Newport in the April–June quarter of 1980, with mother's maiden name recorded as Jenkins. This is directly significant: Director 2 on the CIC filing is Mrs Gail Jenkins. The same surname as the operator's mother. The public-facing persona is Jayne Price. Official documents, including the CIC36 contact field, Trading Standards papers, and Torfaen Council enforcement records — all reference Carrie-Anne Ridsdale. A Caerphilly CBC Subject Access Request of 398 pages documents at least seven name variants. A lease for the Pontypool premises (17 January 2023) lists the tenant as "Miss Jayne-Anne Carrie-Anne Ridsdale" — combining both identities in a single legal document. The £7,141 CCJ (case ref. 521MC287) was registered against "Ceri-Ann Ridsdale T/A Jayne's Baby Bank." The Aberbargoed eviction notice was addressed to "Ms Ceri-Anne Ridsdale." A publicly posted driving licence shows the name "Jayne-Anne Price." Additionally, a TikTok post from the official JBB account (tiktok.com/@jaynesbabybank1_tm) dated 29 December 2020 uses the hashtag #carrieanneridsdale, meaning the operator herself publicly linked the Carrie-Anne Ridsdale identity to the JBB account in the operation's first year, predating by years the repeated public denials that this name had any connection to her.

TikTok account network — multiple accounts, prior username, and cross-platform alias confirmations. Two primary TikTok accounts are documented: tiktok.com/@jaynesbabybank and tiktok.com/@jaynesbabybank1_tm. A video on @jaynesbabybank (tiktok.com/@jaynesbabybank/video/7026188989606497542) shows the TikTok display name as @jayneceriprice — a prior username predating the account rename, combining the public-facing given name Jayne with the Ceri variant of the legal surname Ridsdale. This is an independently documented hybrid identity on a third-party platform, predating the JBB operation’s main expansion. A further video on @jaynesbabybank (tiktok.com/@jaynesbabybank/video/7141874599314181381) features the account @alchemistmagician — directly linking the TheAlchemistMagician alias to the primary JBB TikTok account within the video content itself. On @jaynesbabybank1_tm, videos show the usernames @stiflersmam and @stiflersmam_1 — corroborating the Kik alias of the same name documented above, and establishing it as an active TikTok identity used concurrently with the operational accounts. The @jaynesbabybank1_tm account additionally contains images of the operator in a state of undress. For an operation presenting itself as a welfare and safeguarding service for vulnerable mothers, and whose operator publicly claims professional nursing and health qualifications as the basis for working with families — the presence of inappropriate personal images on a partially operational account represents a professional conduct inconsistency documented here as part of the broader platform conduct record.

Civil registration birth index — Daniel-James Ridsdale. The England and Wales Civil Registration Birth Index additionally records the birth of Daniel-james Henry G Stockwood, Registration Date October 2000, Registration District Cardiff, Inferred County Glamorganshire, with Mother’s Maiden Name: Ridsdale. This is a public civil registration entry and independently corroborates the Ridsdale surname as the operator’s legal maiden name via a second registration document — separate from and additional to the operator’s own birth index entry. The CIC subscriber listed at the registered office address is Daniel-James Ridsdale. Multiple independent witnesses from the Oakdale Comprehensive School peer group confirm that the operator was known as Carrie-Anne Ridsdale throughout her school years (approximately 1991–1996). A search of the Oakdale Comprehensive School Facebook group by a third party additionally surfaces a Daniel James account, consistent with the CIC subscriber. Oakdale Comprehensive School is the independently confirmed school of attendance, directly contradicting the “Friends of Blackwood Comprehensive School” entry added to the operator’s Facebook profile in the March 2026 Wayback snapshot.

Archived Google+ account — Carrie Ridsdale identity confirmed via independent pre-JBB record. The email address caridsdale@gmail.com, documented in the public CIC36 filing and in SAR correspondence as detailed above — is independently linked to a Google+ account archived by the Wayback Machine on 25 March 2019, three years before the JBB Facebook group was created. The archived profile displays the account name Carrie Ridsdale. The archived URL is plus.google.com/104319803074054520708 (single capture, 25 March 2019). This constitutes an independent third-party archive record confirming that the caridsdale email address was in active use under the Carrie Ridsdale identity in 2019 — predating any claimed name change and predating the JBB operation entirely. The Google+ archive is not sourced from investigation correspondence or SAR material; it is an independently preserved public record held by the Internet Archive. The same Google account identifier — 104319803074054520708 — additionally appears as a Google Maps contributor profile under the alias “The Alchemist” (105 contributions), using the same teal Buddha profile image as the archived Google+ account. This confirms the Google+ account and the Google Maps contributor profile are the same underlying Google account, both linked to caridsdale@gmail.com. The single visible Google Maps review — posted approximately eight years ago (circa 2016–17), predating JBB by several years — gives a 1-star rating to a hospitality business on the Isle of Wight with the sole text: “Owners are racist.” The owner responded publicly: “No. They’re not. We welcome everyone here. If you’d ever met us you would know that.” This is an early documented instance of the same false review pattern — a serious unsubstantiated allegation against a named business, publicly denied by the owner. From the same account, predating the JBB operation by approximately five years and predating the documented coordinated review attacks by the same period.

Public records chain — parental identity and lineage independently verified. A complete two-generation identity chain is independently established through publicly available civil registration records. The England and Wales Marriage Index records Gail L Jenkins marrying Alan J Ridsdale in Q2 1974 at Newport (Monmouthshire) — the marriage through which the Ridsdale surname entered the family. The England and Wales Birth Index records Gail L Jenkins born Q1 1953 in Caerleon, Monmouthshire, mother’s maiden name Bushell. The England and Wales Birth Index independently records Carrie-Anne Ridsdale born Q2 1980 in Newport (Monmouthshire), with mother’s maiden name: Jenkins — directly linking Gail L Jenkins (later Ridsdale) to Carrie-Anne Ridsdale as mother and daughter via civil registration. The UK Electoral Register records Alan J Ridsdale and Gail L Ridsdale at Brooklyn Bungalow, Blackwood, Gwent, NP12 2AR across electoral rolls from 2002 to 2013, placing the parental household in the same Blackwood, Gwent postcode district as the operator’s own registered address at 7 Meadow Road, NP12 2AG (confirmed on electoral rolls 2013–2016). The Ridsdale surname was acquired through marriage in 1974 and was not a prior family name on either parental side. This public records chain — marriage → birth → electoral registration across two generations — establishes the legal identity of Carrie-Anne Ridsdale from civil registration through to the address used in the first County Court Judgment, without reliance on any single investigative source. All records cited are publicly available via the England and Wales civil registration indices and the UK Electoral Register.

The parents — occupations (information received). Information received by the investigation from more than one source is that her mother, Gail Ridsdale (née Jenkins), now the company’s second director as “Mrs Gail Jenkins”, worked as the caretaker at Pontllanfraith Primary School, where the operator also worked, in the resource base (Finding 06); and that her father, Alan Ridsdale, worked as a crane operator at Alcan, not as the electrician she has described (Finding 09). Both are recorded because both are part of the operation’s own account: the mother as a director of the company, and the father as the “qualified electrician” said to have done its PAT testing.

On-camera identity denial — 12 June 2025. During a documented confrontation at a JBB shop premises (archived to YouTube by the Sherlock investigation at youtube.com/shorts/690cpSTuMbs), a member of the public directly addressed the operator by the name "Carrie" and stated "your real name is Carrie." The operator denied this on camera, stating: “No it's not, it's Jayne.” This denial was made publicly, in the operator's own shop, on video. It directly contradicts the birth index record, the commercial lease, the two CCJs, the electoral register entry, the enforcement notices, and the operator's own TikTok hashtag — all of which confirm the Carrie-Anne Ridsdale identity. The denial is archived as primary evidence. See Finding 20 for the full context of this incident.

At least three PayPal accounts have been used to solicit donations: @jaynesbabybank, @Jaynesbabybank100, and @jaynesbabybankrisca. The primary account is held under the name “Jayne R-Price” — a hybrid surname that does not appear on any formal legal record, combining the Ridsdale surname used in court and enforcement records with the Price surname used publicly. This name variant matches neither the CCJ debtor names (Ceri-Ann Ridsdale; Miss Carrie-Anne Ridsdale), the commercial lease name (Jayne-Anne Carrie-Anne Ridsdale), nor the CIC filing name (Jayne Price). The account description explicitly states "100% of profit goes towards the charity". A false claim, as no charity registration has ever existed. The full PayPal fundraising analysis is documented in Finding 17.

Earlier trading identity — "Baby Bank and Friends" (pre-JBB Facebook page). Prior to the establishment of Jayne's Baby Bank, the operator ran an earlier operation under the name Baby Bank and Friends. Confirmed by archived Facebook posts in which items are described as "on loan from the Baby Bank and Friends," and by archived screenshots of the page's public About section and Messenger interface. The page listed categories including Baby goods/children's goods, Product/service, and Charitable organisation, with the short description "Baby Bank for the community." The About text — the permanent public-facing biography, not a passing post — stated verbatim:

The biography deploys two narrative elements that recur throughout the later operation: a claimed health care professional identity, and personal medical hardship presented as the reason community support exists. The infertility and childbirth-complication framing predates the ovarian-cancer profile on the successor JaynesBaby Bank Price account documented in Finding 08. The page category Charitable organisation sits alongside documented Messenger conduct from the same period: families requesting donated items were told they would need official ID, proof of address, a signed hire agreement, and a refundable deposit, and when a member of the public questioned why a charity would require payment and documentation, the page responded in writing: “You are borrowing it from us. You will need to sign documentation. I am not a charity.” That explicit denial is documented on the same pre-JBB profile whose public categories included charitable organisation. The hire-and-ID conditions are analysed below; the health claims in the About bio are documented in Finding 08.

Documented alias network — at least 18 confirmed or suspected identities. Investigative records compiled from archived posts, whistleblower evidence, IP address tracking, and platform records confirm the following alias accounts in addition to the primary Jayne Price and Carrie-Anne Ridsdale identities:

Email addresses — further identity confirmations. The operator's own submitted legal complaints and SAR correspondence with CCBC contain two significant email addresses. First, caridsdale@gmail.com, an address directly incorporating the Ridsdale surname — appears in documents authored and submitted by the operator herself, independently confirming the Carrie Ridsdale identity in self-generated correspondence. Second, Ridsdale1952@btinternet.com. Confirmed as belonging to the operator's mother — was used in connection with the JBB PayPal donation accounts. Routing a public-facing donation instrument through a family member's personal email account adds a further layer of identity and financial accountability obscuration to the PayPal infrastructure already documented in Finding 17. The existence of these two email addresses in official submitted documents was confirmed via the SAR broadcast analysis published at jaynesbabybank.co.uk on 15 January 2025. Two further email addresses have been identified in connection with the operation: Jaynesbabybankandfreefoodbank@yahoo.com and Jaynesbabybank20@yahoo.co.uk. The use of four distinct email addresses across the operation, two under the Ridsdale identity (caridsdale@gmail.com and Ridsdale1952@btinternet.com) and two under the JBB operational name, consistent with the broader pattern of identity fragmentation documented across accounts, payment instruments, and trading names throughout this record. The Ridsdale1952@btinternet.com address is additionally linked to a Google Maps account displaying the name gail ridsdale — independently corroborating via a third platform that the email belongs to the operator’s mother, Gail Ridsdale, whose identity is separately confirmed through the civil marriage and birth index records documented above. The numeral 1952 in the email address is consistent with Gail L Jenkins’ birth registration year of 1953 — a single-digit variance common in self-chosen email addresses. This constitutes a third independent source confirming the email’s ownership, alongside the electoral register and civil registration records.

Investigative reports conclude that this multi-name pattern is not a standard use of a preferred name but a deliberate strategy to obscure accountability across multiple platforms simultaneously. The Peter Mal account's coordinated posting with the main JBB page and the practice of requesting critics' home addresses and employer details from community groups represents a documented pattern of using alias accounts for targeted harassment and intelligence gathering.

Phone number cross-check — verifiable from public filing. The contact telephone number listed on the public CIC36 filing (Companies House ref. 16838920) is 07521789261. A Facebook "Identify your account" recovery search using this number returns three abbreviated account entries: one consistent with C… R… (Carrie-Anne Ridsdale), one consistent with J… B… (Jayne's Baby Bank), and one consistent with D… J… This cross-check is reproducible by any member of the public using the number as published in the official filing. The presence of multiple accounts linked to a single CIC contact number is consistent with the broader documented pattern of parallel identity operation.

David Jones. Confirmed by screenshot, 8 February 2026. On 8 February 2026, the operator accidentally shared a screenshot of content while visibly logged into the David Jones profile — publicly confirming the attribution. The screenshot is archived and preserved. The D… J… entry returned in the Facebook account recovery result described above is consistent with either David Jones or Daniel-James Ridsdale. Both individuals whose initials match and both of whom are documented in connection with this operation. No definitive attribution of the D… J… phone entry is made on initials alone.

Daniel Ridsdale — Facebook URL confirms Ridsdale surname independently. The Facebook profile used by Daniel James — the operator's son, listed as a subscriber on the CIC incorporation documents (Companies House ref. 16838920) at the same address as Director 1 — carries the public profile URL facebook.com/daniel.ridsdale.96. The URL slug is assigned by Facebook at account creation and reflects the name under which the account was registered. The use of Ridsdale as the registered surname on this profile independently confirms the Ridsdale family name at the same address and CIC filing — entirely separate from the operator's own identity records. This is significant in the context of repeated public denials that "Ridsdale" is the operator's name or has any connection to the operation: a second named individual at the same household, on the same CIC incorporation document, is publicly registered on Facebook under the Ridsdale surname. The profile URL constitutes an independently verifiable public record requiring no investigative assertion.

Identity document collection from vulnerable families. No lawful basis established. A documented private Messenger exchange on the pre-JBB Baby Bank and Friends page shows the operator responding to a member of the public requesting a pram for a young child. The response states: “Yes no worries i would need to see official i.d. and official proof of name and address/bill etc and then you could hire one from us and the full deposit is paid/refunded when you collect/return. I will give you a letter and receipt.” When the requester questioned why a charity would require ID and payment, the page replied: “You are borrowing it from us. You will need to sign documentation. I am not a charity.” The same hire-and-ID conditions appear in a later leaked Messenger exchange attributed to the JBB account — establishing continuity of access policy from the pre-JBB page through to the formal operation. This message raises four distinct concerns. First, a CIC operating a baby bank has no statutory authority to require official government-issued identity documents or proof of address as a condition of accessing donated goods. This is the verification standard applied by regulated financial services, housing providers, and statutory bodies, not community goods-sharing operations. Second, collecting names, addresses, and copies of official documents from members of the public without ICO registration as a data controller, without a published privacy policy, and without a documented lawful basis under UK GDPR constitutes a potential data protection violation. Third, the operation is documented throughout this record as using fabricated identities, multiple aliases, and fake profiles to target individuals — in that context, the collection of real identity documents from vulnerable families who believed they were accessing a charitable service warrants scrutiny as to the purpose for which those documents were retained and used. Fourth, charging a refundable deposit for a donated pram converts a charitable donation into a commercial hire transaction on an operation simultaneously presenting itself as a free baby bank for families in need. No date is available for this exchange but it is documented as a primary source record of the access conditions applied to families approaching the operation for assistance.

TikTok account @jaynesbabybank1_tm — significant video descriptions. The account published 240+ videos. The descriptions below are curated from the full archive for evidentiary significance — each is a verbatim public caption from the platform, cited by TikTok video ID.

Lemon8 — same _tm handle replicated on a second ByteDance platform. The handle @jaynesbabybank1_tm documented above on TikTok also appears on Lemon8. A separate ByteDance-operated short-form content platform at lemon8-app.com — at content ID 7555247755354997281 (listed in the alias table above). Lemon8 is owned by the same parent company as TikTok but is a distinct platform with its own community, trust, safety, and content rules. The _tm suffix mirroring the May 2023 trademark application has been carried across to this additional platform under the same JBB branding, extending the cross-platform identity footprint beyond Facebook and TikTok to a third public-facing surface operated under the same handle.

Formal Notice in the window — 15 September 2026. On the morning of 15 September 2026 the landlord of 6 Commercial Street, Pontypool took the building back and taped two sheets of A4 inside the window. The notice is headed “FORMAL NOTICE” and, beneath that, “EXPIRED COMMERCIAL TENANCY — NO UNAUTHORISED ACCESS”. It records the “Former Tenant: Carrie-Anne Ridsdale” and the landlord as Nasrat Shoaib. It opens “Dear Ms Ridsdale,” and then sets out, clause by clause, why the tenancy has ended, quoting Clauses 1, 8, 14 and 15 of the lease. Under Clause 1 the contractual term was for one year from and including 27 October 2024, and therefore expired on 26 October 2025. Jayne’s Baby Bank continued to trade from the premises for a further 324 days.

This is different in kind from every identity document recorded in this dossier so far, and it is worth stating why. The judgment material at Finding 19 was met with the position that the name was somebody else’s — “not even my name” — and that no legal documents connected to the operation existed at all. A court register entry can be dismissed as somebody else’s record. A credit file can be dismissed as an error. A lease cannot be either of those things. It is a private contract between two parties, and somebody sat opposite that landlord on 27 October 2024 and signed it. The landlord’s notice does not guess at a name and it does not lift one off a database: it names the person on his own lease, addresses her directly as “Dear Ms Ridsdale,” and was fixed to the window of a shop run publicly under the name Jayne Price.

What follows is a binary, and the source reporting identifies no third answer to it. Either Carrie-Anne Ridsdale signed that lease and has been trading from that building — or Jayne’s Baby Bank spent 324 days occupying premises let to a woman it says it has nothing to do with. That is the denial the notice has to be read against: asked on camera on 12 June 2025 whether her name was Carrie, the operator replied “No it’s not, it’s Jayne.” (recorded above). The occupation question arising from the expired term is recorded separately at Finding 31.

The name printed on the documents — September 2026. The run of qualification images published in September 2026 carries the same name in three variants, none of them the name in the contemporaneous record. The two RSA Examinations Board certificate images dated to the June 1996 series, and the BTEC Advanced General National Vocational Qualification dated July 1999, are each made out to “Jayne-Anne Price”. So are the three Pearson Edexcel Health and Social Care documents dated 14 March 2016. The three 2019 CPD certificates photographed in July 2025 with the name area covered were republished on 13 September 2026 as a four-panel image, every panel made out to “Jayne Price, Cardiff University Student”, with a 2018 “Newborn Care” certificate appearing for the first time — a document dated May 2018, sixteen months before the last “Carrie Anne” post. And on the WJEC 1996 GCSE image the surname is covered over with green highlighter while the forename is left visible, reading “JAYNE – ANNE”.

The record against which those documents sit is dated and public. Her personal profile posted as “Carrie Anne” from February 2013 to January 2019. The bound coursework photographed on 11 May 2016, eight weeks after the date on the Pearson certificates, carries “Carrie-Anne Ridsdale” on its cover. The name “Jayne” does not appear anywhere in the public archive until the September 2020 page. This site holds a copy of the birth registration, which records Carrie-Anne Ridsdale. The conclusion is left open and labelled: it is the source reporting’s opinion, from the sequence of names and the timing of publication, that the name field on these documents has been altered, and it states expressly that this is “an inference, not a finding” — one that would be settled in either direction by Pearson confirming what was issued under the certificate number, the one part of the document that has been obscured, or by production of the originals. The platform labels, generation markers and image-comparison findings carried by those same images are dealt with at Finding 30, and are not re-argued here.

Two further accounts enter the record — September 2026. The first is “Dank Drangon” — a misspelling of Dank Dragon, an established child-protection team — operated as an impersonation of it. The Baby Bank page published a Messenger screenshot presented as a message from the “Dank Drangon” page, its header showing a profile picture copying the real team’s dragon logo, and then disowned it in a comment under the real team’s own live broadcast: “It’s nothing to do with us I recieved a message earlier” and “I have not set up a page ot threatened you at all” (spelling as published). The second is “South Wales Peadofiles Hunters” (spelling as published), which appears in the reply box at the foot of the three screenshots the Baby Bank page published as its own material, in the first person, on 15 September 2026. The strip across the bottom of each reads “Comment as South Wales Peadofiles Hunters” — a line Facebook displays only to the person holding the device, naming the account that person is set to post as.

The caveat attached to that observation is carried here in full, as the source reporting carries it. A screenshot alone does not establish who owns or operates an account. A screenshot can be taken by one person and sent to another — and that is the same possibility the page itself relied on when it said the “Dank Drangon” message had been sent to it. What can be said is narrower: the account exists, it is branded as a paedophile-hunting group, and material published by a registered company’s official page was produced on a device signed in to it. Only Meta can resolve the question from its own records. The publications themselves, and the eight people named in them, are recorded at Finding 29.

“Former Student Nurse” — profile capture, 6 September 2026. The archived capture of 6 September 2026 is the first in which the profile describes a former student rather than a graduate: “Former Student Nurse at Cardiff University”, alongside “Bsc nursing at NHS” and “Studied Adult Nursing at Cardiff University”. Every role on that capture is prefixed “Former” except “Founder and Director”. It belongs in this finding rather than only in the qualifications record because of where the retreat took place. The claim was built up in the public-facing Jayne Price identity over several years, and it is in that identity, on that profile, that it has now been narrowed.

04CPUTR 2008 Reg. 5FareShare misrepresentation and Olio ban

FareShare confirmed in writing on 16 October 2025 that Jayne's Baby Bank has never been a member or received food via FareShare Go, directly contradicting repeated public claims. The operator's Olio account ("Cerii") was terminated in April 2022 following misuse. Food collected via Olio was publicly described on Facebook as FareShare-sourced. The operator was subsequently banned from the Olio Food Waste Hero programme following complaints from stores and volunteers. The full mechanics of the Olio operation, including the use of a fabricated identity and a food diversion scheme — are documented in Finding 04a below. Multiple broadcasts additionally claim that the operation distributed "a quarter of a million Tesco meals"; specifically attributed to "Tesco FareShare food, the end of day food." Tesco's end-of-day surplus redistribution operates through FareShare Go and approved partner organisations. FareShare has confirmed JBB was never a member or approved partner. The specific attribution of 250,000 meals to Tesco FareShare food therefore directly contradicts the confirmed absence of any FareShare membership, and is inconsistent with the OLIO food collection scheme, which operated under fabricated identities and was terminated for misuse. The quarter-million meals claim also appears as a written public declaration in a separate post: "We have given out over a quarter of a million meals since 2020." No independent verification of this figure exists. The figure is additionally notable in the context of Cwtch-Up (registered charity no. 1194295), the organisation the operator has publicly claimed credit for shutting down. Cwtch-Up’s own platform data, published on their Facebook page on 8 February 2022, records 252,784 meals equivalent, 106,167 kg of collected food, and 2,950 total collections at that date. This independently verified figure — 252,784 meals. This is the origin of the “quarter of a million meals” figure. At the time Cwtch-Up published this data, JBB had been operating for under two years from a single Aberbargoed premises with no FareShare membership and no verified food distribution infrastructure. The operator’s subsequent public claim to have distributed “a quarter of a million meals” appears to be a direct appropriation of Cwtch-Up’s own verified achievement. From an organisation she was simultaneously campaigning to destroy. Information received by the investigation from a source with direct knowledge of the operation’s early period corroborates this pattern: during the Covid period, the operator approached at least one local business to propose a Tesco surplus food collection arrangement, explicitly advising that uncollected food could be retained personally by those doing the collecting. This account is consistent with the documented OLIO food diversion scheme and the personal retention of donated goods described by former volunteers, and suggests the food retention dynamic was present from the earliest stages of the operation rather than developing later.

“Never in my 3 years of fareshare and olio” — 10 June 2023. A public Facebook post states: “Never in my 3 years of fareshare and olio and working for foodbanks have I ever seen this practice. As a qualified health and social care professional I would advise anyo…” This directly claims three years of active FareShare membership, a claim FareShare formally denied in October 2025, confirming JBB was never a member or approved partner. The same post simultaneously claims the status of a “qualified health and social care professional,” combining two unverified credential claims in a single publication.

“The donation centre isn’t for customers anyway, it’s never has been for customers” — 26 May 2026 on-record contradiction. In a public livestream dated 26 May 2026, defending the operation against critics, the operator states verbatim: “We’re allowed in the donation centre, the donation centre isn’t for customers anyway, it’s never has been for customers.” This statement is in direct, unambiguous contradiction of the “free items for customers and donators only” positioning that is recorded across 105 unique source documents in the JBB corpus (see §06 pattern table) — the pattern that is the central pillar of the operation’s public framing as a customer-and-donor mutual benefit operation. Either the long-standing “customers and donators only” framing or the 26 May 2026 “never has been for customers” framing must be false; both cannot be true simultaneously. The contradiction is on-record, in the operator’s own words, from a primary public broadcast, and is recorded in the timeline at tl-2026-05-26-2. The statement is also in tension with the documented pattern of selling items to the general public across all five shops (see Finding 09 trading-in-violation paragraph and the 7 April 2026 spot check at 5 Crane Street.

04aFraud Act 2006 s.2 / CPUTR 2008The "Cerri" scheme — fabricated identity, food diversion, and volunteer exploitation on OLIO

Following scrutiny and bans of her primary accounts on the food-sharing platform OLIO, the operator created the alias “Cerri“ / ”Cerii“ / ”Cerri Price” to continue securing food collection slots from supermarkets including Iceland and Tesco. The account was presented to supermarkets and volunteers as belonging to the operator's daughter, who would attend collections in person. Whistleblower evidence and investigative records confirm that no such daughter exists — a pattern that also appears in the pre-JBB period, when printed defamatory cards in August 2014 falsely claimed Ridsdale had a daughter who died by suicide (Finding 27). In a 2022 public post, the operator explicitly listed "Cerri Price" as one of her children's names alongside other names — the fabricated child was given a public family identity to make the deception sustainable across multiple supermarket relationships.

A documented message thread from 12 July 2021 records the "Cerii" account actively coordinating collection slots with messages including "Yes I can collect" and "Ready." The OLIO account "Cerii" was officially terminated with immediate effect in April 2022 following multiple reports of misuse. The misuse consisted of "snagging" collection slots allocated under OLIO's food-sharing terms — under which food is required to be distributed freely, and diverting the collected food to JBB shops or for personal and volunteer use rather than free distribution through the platform.

The food rebranding scheme. Food collected under the Cerri/Cerii OLIO account was subsequently presented on the Jayne's Baby Bank Facebook page as being from "FareShare" or described as "charity donations." When members of the public asked in comments whether the food shown was actually from OLIO, those comments were deleted. This deletion practice was documented by investigators and is consistent with a deliberate effort to maintain the false FareShare narrative. The same narrative that FareShare formally denied in October 2025.

Volunteer exploitation — the “Food Fairies” scheme. The operator recruited volunteers under the title "Food Fairies" to collect food under the Cerri/Cerii account and similar arrangements. Internal instructions permitted these volunteers to "take 20% or a green tray full" of collected food for personal use before the remainder was processed. Investigators note that these volunteers were recruited in good faith and may not have understood that the collection arrangement violated OLIO's terms of service — making them unwitting participants in a scheme that misrepresented the source and destination of donated food to the public.

Following the April 2022 termination of the Cerii account, the operator continued to create new alias accounts on OLIO to re-access food collection slots. A public comment from an independent witness confirms: “She had tried to set up a FareShare Go account. She hasn't stopped stealing food — she just keeps making fake accounts on OLIO and claiming that it's FareShare food.” This witness reported the activity directly to OLIO and FareShare and had the account banned, but observed further fake accounts continuing to operate. The accounts operated under a fabricated family structure: the operator presented "Jayne" as an older mother and Carrie, Daniel, and associated names as her children — creating a network of nominally distinct identities all controlled by the same individual.

The Cerri scheme illustrates the operational relationship between the alias network documented in Finding 03 and the food sourcing misrepresentations documented in Finding 04. The false FareShare claims were not simply opportunistic — they were the public-facing layer of a documented food collection operation that relied on fabricated identities, circumvented platform bans, and diverted donated food away from the free distribution it was sourced under.

Documented FareShare claim timeline — 17 October 2022 to 16 October 2025. Public FareShare claims span exactly three years to the month. A public Facebook post dated 17 October 2022, five months into the operation's public life — carried the following header text: "Bare with us as there is a massive scope for human error but these are our preliminary figures on the spreadsheet for what we have helped people with for free since Jan 2020." The post lists 255,598 FareShare meals as the leading figure. The same statistics were republished in a second post dated 28 December 2022. The claim of records "since Jan 2020" is significant: the JBB Facebook group was created on 21 May 2022 — the operation had no confirmed public presence before that date, and no independent record of food distribution predating it has been produced. The post closes with: "thank you to my mother for recording it all" — a reference that independently corroborates the operational involvement of the operator's mother, who is Director 2 on the CIC incorporation document filed in November 2025. The 17 October 2022 post is the earliest documented instance of the FareShare affiliation claim. FareShare subsequently confirmed in writing on 16 October 2025 that JBB "is not, and has never been, a member of FareShare."

05Brand rotationDeliberate successor brands after scrutiny

New trading identities have emerged after each episode of scrutiny: Jarmani's Charity Boutique (Caerphilly, June 2025), Second-Hand Land, and Community Shop One — linked by shared social media content, shop interiors, and staff. On 1 October 2025, a Jarmani's sign was found illegally attached to a Salvation Army clothing bank in Morrisons Caerphilly car park. In April 2026, following a Facebook page ban, operations were renamed "Jaynes BabyBank (Baby Jayne)" to bypass the platform ban. By 6 May 2026, a Facebook account titled "South Wales Largest Baby Bank & Foodbank Fundraising Shops" was in active use (including the Hb 5 g/dL health claim); after a documented ban on 8 May 2026, the same display name was re-established on a new profile (ID 61589841172921, observed 21 May 2026) — see Findings 03 and 14. As of May 2026, the Caerphilly unit has been reclaimed by the landlord. The investigation has additionally identified that a specific metric claim — describing the operation as moving “thousands of tons of stock” — was taken verbatim from the promotional material of Cwtch-Up, the registered charity (no. 1194295) operated by whistleblower N####A W########, whose charity number and name were also used without authorisation in JBB fundraising material.

The operator has made two separate public admissions, across two distinct broadcasts, that Jayne's Baby Bank was created deliberately as a decoy to divert regulatory and public scrutiny away from the underlying operation:

These admissions establish that the baby bank brand was not a genuine charitable response to the pandemic but a calculated instrument of misdirection — designed to absorb scrutiny from regulators, critics, and the public while a separate operation continued in parallel. The 9 January 2026 broadcast was recorded abroad during what the operator described as a working holiday, during which she states she had already set up a SumUp account, bank account, web domain, and website for the rescue operation before the trademark was registered, confirming the successor venture was pre-planned infrastructure, not a new idea. The "decoy" framing directly undermines over five years of public charity claims, donation solicitation, and public funding applications made in the JBB name: if the baby bank was the decoy, the charitable representations made under that name were made in the context of an operation the operator herself describes as designed to mislead.

False public allegations against T##### W###### and O#### W###### — repeated across multiple broadcasts. Across multiple broadcasts and posts, the operator publicly and repeatedly identified O#### W###### by name, describing him as a “software designer” or “software engineer” and asserting he personally built the Sherlock investigation website, created fake profiles and bots, and is the operational intelligence behind the investigation group. T##### W###### and O#### W###### are a married couple documented as named targets of the operator’s harassment campaign and in her pre-written police complaint template (see Finding 12). Representative examples include: “O#### W###### is a software engineer… All 3 of these individuals have been involved in criminal convictions and made the website and Facebook groups and fake profiles”; and “O#### W###### is making up all of these… he’s a software designer. He is the one with the brains to do it”. No evidence supporting any of these claims has been produced. O#### W###### is a named private individual against whom these allegations were made publicly and repeatedly to audiences of tens of thousands across multiple dates.

Third decoy admission — most explicit, 5 February 2026. In a broadcast dated 5 February 2026, the operator provided the most detailed account of the baby bank's origin as a deliberate decoy, naming her son Dan as a co-decision maker and identifying the specific organisations they anticipated would target the rescue operation:

This is the most operationally specific of the three documented decoy admissions. Unlike the October 2025 and January 2026 broadcasts, which reference the decoy in general terms. This account names the co-decision maker (Dan), identifies the organisations anticipated to interfere (Community Volunteers Wales, HCT, and a bird rescue), and explicitly states the baby bank was created so those organisations would have "no idea about the rescue." The admission was made in the same broadcast in which she states: “I started this baby bank, okay, I didn't start it to be a baby bank. We started it as a rescue and immediately we were targeted.” The three decoy admissions now span October 2025, January 2026, and February 2026 — each progressively more specific, and are made by the operator herself, in her own words, across three separately archived public broadcasts.

“I started this because I was bored and wanted to take them down“, archived deleted broadcast. In an archived deleted broadcast, the operator stated: “I've started this because I was bored and wanted to take them down and there's two of them that's been taken down and two outstanding and they're not looking too good, I'll be honest with you.” This is a direct public statement, in the operator's own words, that the operation was founded out of boredom and with the stated purpose of taking down specific organisations, not as a charitable response to community need. It is the most concise single-sentence encapsulation of the operation's true purpose in the investigation corpus. The same broadcast confirms Facebook monetisation — “Facebook are paying us now. There's not many people around you that's being paid by Facebook to put out content”, and states: “hashtag away haters because we get paid every time you do it.” In a separate archived deleted broadcast, the same admission is repeated in expanded form: “My goal was to take you down before I died because that's how ill I was, right? So that decent charities could actually get a look in. And then it backfired on myself and then you blew up our profile beyond belief… It was never supposed to be this big. We were never supposed to have all these shops and looking for more shops. My sole goal was to take you wasteless down, which I've done.” Both broadcasts confirm the operation's origin as a targeted campaign against competitor organisations, not a charitable impulse.

“I could rebrand tomorrow. I could call myself something else tomorrow“, archived deleted broadcast. In an archived deleted broadcast, the operator stated publicly: “I could rebrand tomorrow. I could call myself something else tomorrow. I could do something else tomorrow. A different name, different logo. People had still come here shopping because people like us.” This statement — made from a public platform to tens of thousands of followers; a direct public admission of the brand rotation strategy documented in this finding. It confirms that the operator regarded the JBB brand as fungible and replaceable, not as a fixed charitable identity; that she anticipated rebranding as a viable response to scrutiny; and that she expected the same audience to follow regardless of name or logo. The statement is consistent with the documented succession of brands. From JBB to Community Volunteers Wales references, to Jarmani's Boutique, to Community Shop One — each representing a new identity deployed as regulatory and public pressure on the previous brand increased.

Rescue-brand sequence — see Finding 25. Across at least a decade the operator has cycled through rescue-branded public donation operations. From the now-deleted "The Forever Home Rescue and Sanctuary" Facebook page (active c. 2016-2021, sharing the same Amazon wishlist URL as Jayne's Baby Bank), to the 2026 "The New Caerphilly Bird and Small Animal Rescue Sanctuary" launch, with no rescue charity, CIC, or company registration at any stage. The full sequence, the 33-year original Caerphilly Bird Rescue history of Carol and Ray Gravenor, the trademark UK00004316067 chronology, the two stolen fox images, the JustGiving fraud appeal, and the original co-founders’ verbatim public refutations are documented as a self-contained case study in Finding 25.

Animal rescue claimed as the origin of the JBB operation — March 2025. A public Facebook post dated 24 March 2025 from the JBB account stated: “As you know we rescue animals from our followers at our own costs in our spare time. We have rescued several animals over the years and it's how we first started helping families.” This claim, that animal rescue predates and underpins the baby bank operation, inconsistent with the established history of JBB launching during lockdown 2020 as a food bank and baby bank. The same post makes an unverified claim that "documented evidence" exists of social services threatening families to "get rid" of pets, without any source being cited or produced. The post also references pet food donation baskets in the shops, an additional undisclosed collection activity not covered by any food business or charitable registration.

"We are the designated collectors of many charity shops and cash for clothes bins" — 11 August 2025. A broadcast dated 11 August 2025 states: "the other thing I wanted to mention was that we are the designated collectors of many charity shops and cash for clothes bins. We have certain times that we pick up every day of the week, once a week, one-offs, usually turn into two or three-offs." A related broadcast (29 August 2025) describes plans for high-visibility vests reading "designated collectors on the back… so that if you drive past you can see that we are a designated collector." The Salvation Army (SATCoL) confirmed in writing on 6 October 2025 that JBB were "not authorised to collect our donations" and that a documented incident in which a Jarmani's sign was found attached to a Salvation Army clothing bank in a Caerphilly supermarket car park had been "escalated." The designated collector broadcasts predate that written denial and provide the public operational framing in which the Salvation Army incident occurred.

“It made me laugh as well with our decoy pages” — 6 October 2025. A broadcast dated 6 October 2025 contains the following statement: “It made me laugh as well with our decoy pages that we had up for a while.” Context: “I just think, well, compared to you lot, I must look like an angel to the public.” The casual, amused reference to multiple plural “decoy pages” as a historical fact confirms that the decoy strategy extended to a network of pages beyond the baby bank name, treated by the operator as an unremarkable operational detail.

“It was a legitimate decoy” — 9 January 2026. A January 2026 broadcast contains the passage: “And the baby bank was helping people anyway. So, you know, it was a legitimate decoy.” The oxymoron “legitimate decoy”, an instrument of deliberate misdirection qualified as legitimate — captures the cognitive dissonance of the decoy admissions in a single phrase. It is the most compressed self-contradicting formulation in the corpus.

2026 — the same sequence at four premises losses, 6 May to 15 September 2026. Each of the four losses between May and September 2026 was publicly attributed to somebody else. Caerphilly, on 6 May, was a landlord who would not let her collect her things. Risca, where the shutter carried a notice reading “This property has been repossessed by the landlord due to non-payment of rent” on 8 June, was said not to be a repossession; when the Torts period expired with nothing collected and a clearance crew emptied the building on 1 July 2026, the line was that “the landlord stopped us from collecting in the designated time period”, an assertion for which this investigation has never been shown a single document. 5 Crane Street, where MMB Property Development Ltd posted a notice on 15 August stating that it had taken possession, was said not to be an eviction: “We gave the shop back Friday…”, and then “No eviction.” 6 Commercial Street, on 15 September, was not a closure but the landlord’s fire safety problem, the “owness [sic]” having, on her account, “been passed back to the landlords” — a characterisation the notice in her own window does not support, since it is a landlord’s notice of expired commercial tenancy and does not mention fire (Sherlock article, 16 August 2026; Sherlock article, 15 September 2026).

In the same 15 September post — published the day the last shop front was lost, and within hours of the closure being disclosed — the page announced the next premises: “Donation centre 2 sneak peak ??? Maybe! Maybe! its got double doors to offload donations off the back of a truck!” (spelling as published). That night the operator broadcast a livestream running to more than 250 lines about a building she had viewed that day, described as an “out of our budget” wild card with double doors, an attic, showers and shipping containers. Neither the post nor the broadcast mentions the eviction.

Substituting a new identity for one that scrutiny has made untenable is the move this finding documents in trading names; in 2026 the same substitution was performed with buildings. It is documented at the last two of the four losses in four months. At Crane Street the successor premises was being promoted before possession was taken: on 1 August the operator said she had the shop she wanted and did not need to be in Crane Street, and on 10 August that the prohibition had effectively accelerated her move elsewhere, five days before the possession notice went up. At Commercial Street the announcement came on the day of the loss itself. The run is recorded here as the 2026 instance of the pattern rather than as a new one, and two features distinguish it. The successor site is announced while the loss it follows is being attributed to a third party, so the audience is offered the next building instead of the reason for losing the last one. And the announcement was made while the only remaining unit, in Newbridge, sat — and at the date of this revision still sits — under a fire service prohibition barring members of the public from entering it: full to the doors, with stock stacked outside against a wall. See Finding 31 on occupation without contractual right, and the premises schedule at §07.

Concurrent unbranded accounts — a separate pattern from successor branding. The brands above replaced one another after episodes of scrutiny. Four further Facebook accounts operated at the same time as each other and as the main page, carrying no Jayne’s Baby Bank name at all: “Recycle Right”, “Recycle Right Shop”, “Mtpf S Hop” and “Jb”. Each posts the same listing, word for word, advertising the same premises.

Three points follow. First, the premises advertised are Jayne’s Baby Bank premises — 5 Crane Street, Pontypool; 14 Pentrebane Street, Caerphilly; and 68 Tredegar Street, Risca (see the premises schedule). Second, the single-clause variation in one copy shows the accounts were being maintained in parallel rather than posted once and abandoned. Third, and not a matter of inference at all: one image file is byte-for-byte identical across two of the accounts — the same 40,112-byte JPEG, MD5 8622d05ff2ada1f4…, published from both “Recycle Right” and “Jb”. Two nominally unconnected accounts uploaded the same file.

None of the four names contains “Jayne”, “baby bank” or “food bank”. A member of the public encountering any one of them would see a second-hand shop listing and nothing connecting it to the operation, to the CIC, or to the charitable framing under which donations were solicited. The line “Card and contactless only we do not accept cash” is recorded because it is a retail instruction, issued by accounts presenting purely as retail, for premises simultaneously presented elsewhere as a baby bank and food bank.

25 October 2026 — the latest name: “Foodbank Fundraising Recycling & Donation Centre”. The graphic first appeared on 7 October over her “Classroom 1” video and, on 25 October, on printed signs (“New signs”, 4.45pm; archived post), with “Trademarked Registered CIC 16838920”. It keeps the “Foodbank Fundraising” wording of the earlier names above, and the address she gives for the building is “Foodbank Fundraising Recycling and Donations Centre, Pye Corner Junction, Rogerstone, Newport NP10 9DT” (15 October). It is set out, with the planning and food-registration position at the building it names, in Finding 34 (Exhibit I).

14Platform conductFacebook ban, immediate profile rename, and TikTok conduct during active investigations

On 21 April 2026, the primary Jayne's Baby Bank Facebook page was removed by Meta. At the same time, the account of Daniel James, also known as Daniel Ridsdale, was observed to go temporarily offline. A statement appeared on the J'armarnis B Outique profile claiming the main account had been voluntarily deactivated due to "stalking" and "harassment" — framing a probable enforcement outcome as a deliberate choice. The 26 April 2026 Sherlock investigation article documents two visibly distinct Facebook profiles operating simultaneously under near-identical display names — “Jaynesbabybank Registered - cic” (with space and dash) and “Jaynesbabybank Registeredcic” (no space, no dash). Both refreshing profile assets within approximately six minutes of each other (one updated its cover photo 10 minutes prior to observation, the other its profile picture 4 minutes prior). Both used the official JBB™ logo with an autism infinity ribbon overlay. One of these profiles (the “Registered - cic” / space-and-dash variant, profile ID 61567483332952) was subsequently confirmed via Facebook PDF export on 26 May 2026 as the active operational profile carrying the “karma has struck another hater” harassment post (24 May 2026 — see Finding 21). The other (the “Registeredcic” / no-space variant, recorded as profile ID 615567483332952 at observation) functioned as a parallel reserve identity. The simultaneous activation of two near-identically-named profiles within minutes of each other — at the same hour the primary JBB page was being taken down by Meta. This is the documented structural feature: redundant reserve accounts pre-positioned and ready to absorb traffic when enforcement action removed the main page. See Finding 03 for the full alias network. On 24 April 2026, a new account titled "Jaynes BabyBank" was created and removed within approximately two hours. On 26 April 2026, the J'armarnis B Outique profile was renamed to "Jaynes BabyBank (Baby Jayne)" — repurposing an established account with an existing audience to restore the brand within five days of the ban. On 3 May 2026, a further account — "South Wales Largest Baby Bank & Foodbank Fundraising Shops" — was created, described by the Sherlock investigation as a return to the platform following a claimed "mental health break." As of 8 May 2026, this account was also banned. On 21 May 2026, a fresh Facebook profile under the same display name — "South Wales Largest Baby Bank & Foodbank Fundraising Shops" (profile ID 61589841172921) — was observed publicly active with Jayne's Baby Bank™ branding, listed as a non-profit organisation, and showing minimal engagement (1 like, 1 follower, 8 posts at observation). The re-establishment occurred in the same period as continued TikTok health-content posting on @communityshopone. See Finding 03 for the profile record. Attempts were also made to present the J'armarnis account as being managed by a separate staff member referred to as "H." However, archived livestreams show the operator directly navigating and interacting with the J'armarnis profile during late-night broadcasts, indicating direct personal control rather than independent management. The TikTok account @communityshopone was separately renamed to "Jayne's Baby Bank CIC TM" during this same period — a parallel consolidation of platform identity. Within the investigation's corpus, this sequence represents the most compressed and documented example of the identity-switching pattern described in Finding 05.

The associated TikTok account (@communityshopone) has continued posting throughout this period. In the week of 12 May 2026 — while the operator is subject to an active Caerphilly CBC criminal investigation, a live fire safety Enforcement Notice, and two unsatisfied CCJs totalling £7,418 — content was published on the TikTok account that mocked the deaths of workers associated with HCT, a registered charity. No retraction or apology has been issued.

This conduct sits within a documented pattern of public attacks on HCT and its operator H##### T###### spanning from at least March 2023 — recorded across 74 unique source documents in the investigation corpus, with named references to H##### T###### appearing in 74 files and HCT referenced in 103 files. Attacks include allegations about charity vehicle use, personal benefit claims, and coordinated attempts to associate HCT with unrelated controversies. The corpus also records 78 harassment-related references across 49 unique source files, with the operator repeatedly threatening critics and members of the public with malicious communications complaints and police referrals — a pattern of using legal threats to deter documentation of the operation. The full analysis of the sustained campaign against HCT, including the Charity Commission's decision not to open a statutory investigation, the Civic Award HCT received in November 2025, and the documented false allegations against its personnel, is set out in Finding 21.

The investigation has further confirmed through archived livestream footage that alias accounts including David Jones and Peter Mal — attributed to the operator — have been used to publish content targeting HCT, H##### T######, and individuals who have left or criticised the operation. The use of alias accounts for this purpose is consistent with the identity-switching pattern documented in Finding 03 and the platform ban evasion documented above.

“Ours wasn’t originally called that, but that was a decoy page as well and a decoy name” — 9 January 2026. A January 2026 broadcast contains the following: “But there’s still a need for it, is what we’ve seen. Ours wasn’t originally called that, but that was a decoy page as well and a decoy name. So, yes, we’ve decided that we’re going to call our rescue the new Caerphilly bird and small animal rescue sanctuary.” This confirms that Caerphilly Bird Rescue was itself operated as a decoy page and name, extending the documented decoy network beyond Jayne’s Baby Bank to the animal rescue brand. This is the primary evidential basis for treating the bird rescue as part of the same deliberate platform rotation strategy, rather than a separate independently motivated venture.

06Credentials / Fraud Act 2006 s.2False credentials displayed publicly for over two years — degree type changed twice, employer fabricated, independently verified via internet archive

Four archived snapshots of the operator’s public Facebook profile, independently preserved by the Wayback Machine (archive.org), document the systematic evolution of credential claims across a 25-month period. The profile URL facebook.com/people/JaynesBaby-Bank/100083342834915/ was in continuous public use throughout. The snapshots, dated 13 February 2024, 1 July 2025, 13 January 2026, and 28 March 2026, establish the following documented sequence:

13 February 2024 (44K followers): The profile lists only “Studied at Cardiff University”. No qualification type, no degree name, no field of study. No nursing credential is explicitly stated at this stage.

1 July 2025 (71K followers): The profile has been substantially expanded. The following new entries appear: Studied BA Hons Nursing at Cardiff University; Nursing at NHS Professionals (listed under current employment); Works at Bio-chemistry diploma (listed under employment, not education); Teaching Assistant level 3 at Aspergers & Autistic Spectrum Disorder & Behavioural Resource Base; Profit Protection advisor at Retail and Profit Protection Management (listed twice, identically). The NHS Professionals listing is significant: NHS Professionals is the NHS’s own temporary staffing agency for clinical personnel. Registration with NHS Professionals as a nurse requires an active, current NMC PIN. No NMC registration exists for either documented name. The listing therefore constitutes a public claim of active clinical employment at an NHS body, a claim that requires NMC registration the operator does not hold.

13 January 2026 (76K followers): NHS Professionals has been removed. The Bio-chemistry diploma entry has been removed. The Teaching Assistant entry has been removed. BA Hons Nursing at Cardiff University is retained. The profile type has changed from “Digital creator” to “Thrift & Consignment Store.” The removal of the Teaching Assistant entry is consistent with the period during which the investigation was querying named schools and the EWC confirmed no registration for this individual.

28 March 2026 (77K followers): The degree entry reads BSC Hons Adult Nursing, not BA Hons Nursing. The change had been made by 30 January 2026, after the investigation reported that Cardiff offers no BA (Hons) Nursing, and was made silently, without correction or acknowledgement. The change is material: Cardiff University does not award nursing degrees as BA (Bachelor of Arts), and its pre-registration adult nursing award is the Bachelor of Nursing, BN (Hons) (Nursing and Midwifery Council monitoring report, 2015; and the portfolio cover she photographed herself). Neither “BA Hons Nursing” nor “BSC Hons Adult Nursing” is the award for that programme, and Cardiff University has confirmed no record of either qualification for this individual. By 6 September 2026 the profile had been re-described a third time, to “Former Student Nurse at Cardiff University” and “Bsc nursing at NHS”. The profile also adds Chief Executive Officer (CEO) & Founder at The New Caerphilly Bird & Small Animal Rescue Sanctuary as a new employment entry, and lists the relationship status as Married. Despite a publicly archived post stating: “I have been single since — forever.” The March 2026 snapshot also adds Went to Friends of Blackwood Comprehensive School. A new secondary school entry not previously disclosed, and one that is directly contradicted by independent evidence. Multiple witnesses posting anonymously to a public Facebook group on 19 April 2026, confirmed as former schoolmates, independently state that the operator attended Oakdale Comprehensive School from approximately 1991 to 1996, not Blackwood Comprehensive. The witnesses confirm the Carrie-Anne Ridsdale identity and Oakdale attendance consistently and without coordination. The addition of Blackwood Comprehensive to the profile — a school she did not attend according to multiple independent accounts, consistent with the broader documented pattern of using the public-facing Jayne Price identity to obscure the Carrie-Anne Ridsdale identity, and with the active denial of that identity documented in Finding 19.

Summary of credential evolution across the four snapshots: The nursing degree designation changed twice (unspecified → BA Hons → BSC Hons), neither version corresponding to a qualification Cardiff University awards or holds on record for this individual. An active NHS clinical employment claim was added and subsequently removed. A specialist teaching assistant role was added and subsequently removed. A Bio-chemistry diploma was listed under employment and subsequently removed. The relationship status changed from Single to Married between January and March 2026. The operator has never been married — independently confirmed. The Married status on the March 2026 profile is a confirmed false statement. The public statement of having been single “forever” is consistent with the confirmed position. All four changes occurred silently, with no correction or acknowledgement published to the 44,000–77,000 followers who saw the profile throughout this period. No registration was found on the NMC, SCWOnline, or Education Workforce Council Wales for either name. A Freedom of Information response from the Education Workforce Council additionally confirms that Carrie-Anne Ridsdale has never been registered as a classroom assistant in Wales, directly contradicting her repeated public assertions of having served in a Special Educational Needs role for twelve years.

A Facebook post in October 2022 claimed “30 year careers” in child protection and safeguarding. A separate broadcast provides a contrasting version of the pre-JBB employment narrative:

“I used to get up in the morning, I’d clean the school. Then I’d go and work in a classroom assistant all day. Then I’d come home and do a night… before I had Daniel. Then I’d go and do the evening shift cleaning in the comprehensive school. And then I’d work in retail on the weekends.”

This account places her working as a classroom assistant alongside school cleaning and weekend retail simultaneously, and specifically states these activities preceded Daniel’s birth. It is inconsistent with a concurrent 25-year senior retail career and undermines the claimed professional seniority of both roles by framing them as simultaneous casual positions.

Independent records establish the actual pre-JBB employment history. Documentary records from 2013 list her role as “Support Worker (Care)” with Pride In Care — a support worker role, not nursing or child protection. This is corroborated by two former colleagues who contacted the investigation independently:

The verified part-time twilight-shift carer role directly contradicts any claim of a nursing, clinical, or senior professional career during these years.

Educational pathway — established record. The investigation has established that the operator attended Crosskeys College (Coleg Gwent) taking a GNVQ in Health and Social Care — a vocational qualification roughly equivalent to two A-levels at Advanced level, and not a direct or guaranteed route into nursing at Cardiff University. The operator has additionally confirmed attendance at Ystrad Mynach College, a further education college. Neither is a degree-awarding institution.

No evidence of any registered professional nursing or clinical career has been produced.

2016 — dissertation and “nursing degree” claim directly contradicted. A pre-JBB Facebook post dated 11 May 2016 from an account in the name "Carrie Anne" shows a bound college submission titled "Is Man Flu An Urban Myth?" with the name Carrie-Anne Ridsdale visible on the cover sheet, captioned with a claim of "6 distinctions." This is consistent with a GNVQ or BTEC Health and Social Care assignment at Crosskeys College, not a university nursing degree. In a separate archived livestream comment from the JBB account dated 14 January 2026, the operator states: "I did my nursing degree in 2016." Cardiff University has confirmed no nursing degree record for this individual. The 2016 document is a college-level submission, not a university degree. The juxtaposition of the archived college work from 2016 and the claim of a 2016 nursing degree, in the context of Cardiff University's formal denial, which directly contradicts the nursing credential claim in its own timeframe.

Additional specific claims documented across hundreds of archived transcripts and publicly fact-checked include: being "accepted to every university applied to with unconditional offers" — nursing unconditional offers are essentially impossible due to mandatory DBS checks, occupational health screening, and interview requirements; being "offered a Learning Difficulties nurse position during a university interview" — universities do not offer employment during admissions interviews; completing "mandatory midwifery hours" and "labour ward and theatre hours" as part of nursing training. No verified record of any such placement exists; and in a publicly archived written post (July 2023), stating in her own words: “now I’m doing a PHD.” In a separate broadcast (September 2025) she corrected this in her own words: “I did a diploma in biochem and passed with distinction.” The contradiction is entirely self-referential — the PhD claim appears in her own published post, and its correction appears in her own later broadcast. No evidence of any PhD enrolment, registration, or institutional affiliation has been produced. Cardiff University, which the operator claimed as her undergraduate institution, has already confirmed no record of a nursing degree for this individual.

“You don’t need to be registered with the NMC to be a nurse” — public reframing of the registration requirement. In a broadcast dated June 2025, the operator advanced a public argument that NMC registration is only required to practise as a nurse in the UK, and that holding a nursing degree without maintaining registration (for example, after retirement or long-term illness) does not mean a person is “not a nurse.” This is technically accurate as a general proposition but is deployed here to reframe the investigation’s documented finding: the NMC confirmed no registration has ever existed for either documented name, and Cardiff University confirmed no nursing degree record. The argument that a person with a degree need not be registered therefore cannot apply to someone for whom no degree record exists at the awarding institution. The reframing attempts to shift the evidential basis from the specific NMC check, which returned no result, to a general principle about retired nurses, which is irrelevant to the documented facts. It represents a sophisticated but ultimately inapplicable public defence of a position that the institutional record does not support.

Autism diagnosis claim — 12 September 2025 broadcast. In a broadcast dated 12 September 2025, the operator publicly disclosed an autism diagnosis for the first time, stating she was assessed by an educational psychologist at Cardiff University in 2016 during what she describes as her nursing enrolment, and subsequently referred to the NHS for a formal diagnosis. Several elements of this account require examination. In the UK, educational psychologists working within university disability services can diagnose specific learning difficulties including dyslexia, dyscalculia, and dyspraxia. This is within their professional scope. However, a formal autism diagnosis in the UK requires a multi-disciplinary NHS assessment team; a university educational psychologist referral is a step in the process, not the diagnosis itself. The operator implies Cardiff University facilitated both the educational psychology assessment and the NHS referral as part of her nursing programme. Cardiff University has already confirmed in writing that no nursing degree record exists for either documented name, meaning the entire institutional context she describes for the diagnosis pathway is unverifiable against the institution's own records. The operator's account cannot be independently verified and is not disputed here as a matter of personal medical history; it is documented because the institutional framing — Cardiff University, nursing programme, 2016, which directly contradicts the documented record.

NHS bursary claim. The same broadcast states: “I was paid to study nursing as well. I had a bursary, a good bursary.” NHS bursaries for nursing students in Wales are means-tested and require confirmed active enrolment on an approved programme at a recognised institution. Cardiff University's confirmation that no nursing degree record exists for either documented name is directly inconsistent with the claim that a bursary was received for nursing study at that institution. An NHS bursary claimed without genuine enrolment would raise questions under the Social Security Administration Act 1992 and the Fraud Act 2006. This cannot be verified from public sources alone and is documented as an unverified claim that is inconsistent with the existing institutional denial.

Haematology placement narrative. The broadcast describes collapsing on a haematology ward during a nursing placement, with the operator's haemoglobin recorded at 62–63 g/L by ward staff, prompting emergency intervention. If accurate, this event would be documented in NHS occupational health records, university placement records, and a Datix incident report. Active placement on an NHS ward requires NMC student registration and university enrolment. Both of which the NMC and Cardiff University have denied for either documented name. The specificity of the clinical detail cannot be independently verified and is noted without further assertion.

Cardiff Prison nursing placement claim. In a broadcast dated January 2026, the operator stated: “bearing in mind I did a week in Cardiff Prison as a student nurse as well.” A nursing placement at Cardiff Prison, or any HM Prison Service establishment: requires verified NMC student registration, formal university placement documentation, and separate vetting clearance from HM Prison Service. No NMC student registration, university placement record, or prison service clearance has been confirmed for either documented name. Cardiff University has confirmed no nursing degree record for this individual. This placement claim is consistent with the broader pattern of adding specific institutional and clinical details — Cardiff Prison, haematology wards, health visitor training in Brynmawr, labour ward and theatre hours — none of which are verifiable against any official record.

NMC complaint filed against a named individual — operator presents as having professional standing. An archived Messenger exchange documents the JBB account contacting the Nursing and Midwifery Council to make a formal complaint against a named Caerphilly individual, alleging she had "slandered my trademarked registered cic on social media." The same exchange includes the JBB account stating: “NMC are aware you are slandering me and my registered cic and refusing your pin”, and separately asking the recipient: “What's your pin please you have to give it.” NMC PIN numbers are the unique registration identifiers held by qualified nurses and midwives. Filing a formal complaint with a professional regulator and demanding a registrant's PIN number implies both that the complainant has standing as a registrant and that the recipient has obligations to comply. Neither claim is established: the NMC has confirmed no registration exists for either documented name for this individual, and private individuals have no obligation to disclose their NMC PIN to third parties on demand. The conduct constitutes a further instance of using official-looking regulatory engagement to intimidate and harass critics.

Publicly filmed interview — multiple false claims in a single sitting. A professionally filmed sit-down interview posted to the Facebook page of Oh My Pasta. A local business whose social media was being managed at the time by the same content creator who conducted the interview, and subsequently archived to YouTube by the Sherlock investigation (youtube.com/watch?v=n_3vMcO2ih0), presents the following claims in a single broadcast: “Prior to the pandemic, I was a student nurse, and I got ill, and I wasn't able to work on the wards because I was considered high risk.” No nursing registration exists on the NMC, no placement record has been produced, and Cardiff University has confirmed no nursing degree record for either documented name. The "student nurse on wards" narrative serves as the founding origin story of JBB, meaning the entire public account of why the operation was created is built on an unverifiable credential claim. The same interview states: “We've registered as the CIC” — deploying the November 2025 CIC registration as legitimacy for the full five-year operation history. The interview was filmed at the premises of a local business ("Oh My Pasta"), that business subsequently confirmed in writing: “We would like to clarify that we do not have any direct affiliation with Jane's Bank.” The business additionally disclosed that their Facebook page was being managed by the same social media content creator who conducted the interview, explaining why comments on the relevant post were disabled — a fact the business stated it had not previously been aware of.

B&Q employment, claimed executive role contradicted by photographic and witness evidence. The operator's Facebook profile listed "Profit Protection advisor at Retail and Profit Protection Management" — a role she has described in broadcasts as being "second to CEO," involving telling "the company how to make profits and where they were losing them" for "one of the largest companies in the world," with 20 to 25 years of claimed experience across sales, marketing, and profit protection. A public Facebook post dated 13 November 2022 repeats this claim verbatim: “I worked as a profit protection officer (which is second to CEO - I told the company how to make profits and where they were losing them), for one of the largest companies in the world for 25 years plus I work in the social and health care systems.” Archived photographs show her wearing a standard orange B&Q retail apron at a B&Q store during what appears to be a community or seasonal event. Former colleagues and local residents who worked with her have publicly recalled her as Carrie-Anne Ridsdale and as a sales assistant, not a senior manager. Separately, the pre-JBB harassment campaign documented in Finding 27 includes a reported incident in which Ridsdale followed victims Alice and Lewis out of a B&Q store in Pontypridd — an incident reported to have resulted in immediate termination of her employment there. The Facebook profile lists this role as beginning in 1996 — when, given her confirmed birth date of 16 May 1980, she would have been 16 years old. A 16-year-old in a position described as "second to CEO" of a major multinational retailer is not credible. The cumulative arithmetic of her claimed work history is additionally irreconcilable: claimed 25 years in retail combined with claimed 12 years as a teaching assistant would represent 37 years of professional experience prior to university — placing the start of that career in her early childhood.

B&Q — the dates, and the move between stores (information received). Information received by the investigation is that she worked weekends at B&Q in Caerphilly from leaving school (she has written “I left school 1996”), carried on through her years in the school resource base and after it, and was transferred to the Pontypridd store in about 2011–12 following problems at Caerphilly, with staff at Pontypridd told she was coming and warned about her before she arrived. The account of the transfer is second-hand. Dated references in the record: her own post of 24 March 2014, “At the races thanks to B&Q and Black&Decker”; the B&Q apron photograph, dated to 2015 in the timeline; and the Pontypridd incident at Finding 27, reported to have ended her employment there, which on these dates can only have happened after the move and is not yet precisely dated. On any of these dates the role is a weekend sales job, not the “second to CEO” position she describes. This rests on information received and held on file, and is recorded as such.

“I worked in a school for 12 years, special needs school, for 12 years as a teaching assistant“, archived deleted broadcast. In an archived deleted broadcast, the operator stated verbatim: “You need to be a qualified teaching assistant or an NEB. If you're training, you can volunteer… I worked in a school for 12 years, special needs school, for 12 years as a teaching assistant.” A Freedom of Information response from the Education Workforce Council Wales confirms that Carrie-Anne Ridsdale has never been registered as a classroom assistant in Wales; because registration only became compulsory in 2016, that bears on her standing since then rather than on earlier employment (scope note below). Information received by the investigation, also below, describes a junior care-assistant role in a school resource base that ended in about 2005, not twelve years as a teaching assistant. The claim of a 12-year special needs school career is additionally irreconcilable with the simultaneously claimed 25-year retail career, the claimed nursing degree, and the claimed biochemistry diploma. The "12 years in a special needs school" claim has been deployed publicly to assert professional expertise in child development, autism, and special educational needs — fields in which the operator holds no confirmed registration, qualification, or employment record. In separate broadcasts the operator has named specific schools and specialist educational units as her former employers. No employment, volunteer, or placement record at any of the named institutions has been produced, and no EWC registration for a teaching assistant or learning support role at any school in Wales exists for either documented name. In a subsequent post, the operator publicly denied the teaching assistant claim: “I have never said I was a teacher.” This denial is directly contradicted by the archived deleted broadcast above, multiple publicly archived posts stating “I worked in a school for 12 years” and “I was a classroom assistant,” and the operator’s own Facebook profile which listed “Teaching Assistant Level 3 at Aspergers & Autistic Spectrum Disorder & Behavioural Resource Base.” The denial is therefore contradicted by the operator’s own prior public record across multiple sources.

Use of “BA” as a post-nominal on public pages — flagged by a witness with direct knowledge. A former colleague who contacted the investigation independently — having since completed a law degree and working in a local authority; specifically noted that the operator was displaying “BA” as a post-nominal credential on her social media page. The witness stated: “It did strike a particular chord with me when she used BA in her page. I’ve recently completed a law degree and we are told what credentials we can use. I suspect she hasn’t done a degree, coupled with the ‘placement’ at Pride not being normal, I don’t think she ever did anything of the sort.” Post-nominal letters in the UK are governed by convention and, in professional fields, by regulatory bodies. Displaying “BA” as a post-nominal where no conferring institution has confirmed the award is a misrepresentation of academic standing. The Wayback Machine snapshots document the progression from no named qualification (February 2024) through “BA Hons Nursing” (July 2025) to “BSC Hons Adult Nursing” (March 2026) — neither version corresponding to a qualification held or confirmed by Cardiff University. The witness’s observation, made independently and before the Wayback evidence was compiled, is consistent with the documented profile evolution.

Movement for Good award nomination — July 2025. The archived July 2025 snapshot includes a post soliciting nominations for a Movement for Good award (Benefact Group, closing date 27 July 2025), which offers a £2,000 donation to the nominated organisation. The Movement for Good scheme is designed for registered charities. Jayne’s Baby Bank C.I.C. is not and has never been a registered charity. Both Charity Commission applications were refused. Nominating a non-charitable CIC for a scheme designed to award registered charities, to a public audience, is consistent with the broader pattern of presenting the operation as charitable in contexts where charitable status confers benefit. The post was published during the same period the “BA Hons Nursing” credential was displayed on the profile.

Scrubs photograph — operator’s own correction self-undermines the defence. A photograph published on 16 November 2015 shows the operator in surgical scrubs captioned “Loved my day in theatre! Decisions, decisions!” and has been used publicly to imply formal clinical nursing training. In a subsequent post, the operator attempted to rebut the investigation’s analysis of this photograph by stating: “Green scrubs are used for theatre my darling not students. Students wear purple which incidently the Queen Elizabeth picked the colour for student nurses.” This correction is self-undermining. By asserting that green scrubs indicate theatre rather than student placement, she inadvertently corroborates the investigation’s position, that the photograph documents a theatre visit or observation day, not a nursing placement. The caption “Decisions, decisions!” is inconsistent with a formal clinical placement; it is consistent with an informal observation. The operator’s own gloss on the scrubs colour confirms, rather than refutes, the evidential significance of the photograph.

“Qualified health care practitioner” self-identification, 98% exam claim, and use of an obsolete safeguarding term. Across multiple broadcasts and posts the operator has identified herself as a “qualified health care professional” and “health care practitioner,” deploying these labels to assert clinical authority over decisions affecting vulnerable individuals. The earliest documented instance is the pre-JBB Baby Bank and Friends Facebook page About bio, which opens: “Hello, I am health care professional with long standing infertility.” — a permanent profile-level claim predating Jayne's Baby Bank, the ovarian-cancer bio on JaynesBaby Bank Price, and every subsequent NMC or nursing credential assertion. In support of the later nursing narrative she has cited a specific exam result — publicly stating she scored 98% on an assessment relating to the digestive system as part of her nursing studies. No verified academic transcript, examination record, or institutional confirmation of any such result exists for either documented name. The claim functions as a precision detail designed to lend credibility to a nursing narrative that Cardiff University, the NMC, and the EWC have each separately been unable to confirm.

“Employed by social services to work with thousands of individuals” — undocumented employment claim. A public post dated 29 October 2024 states: “I was also empolyed by social services to work and care with thousands of individuals with mental health and disabilities with complex care needs. All these qualifications are certified.” (spelling as published). No record of any social services employment has been identified for either documented name across any official database, FOI disclosure, or employment record available to the investigation. The DBS confirmation of her role as “Support Worker (Care)” at Pride In Care in 2013. A private residential care company, not a statutory social services body. This is the only verified employment record for this period. Employment by a local authority social services department would generate verifiable records including payroll, contract documentation, and DBS records under the employer’s own reference. None of these have been produced. The phrase “thousands of individuals” is also implausible on its face for a part-time twilight shift carer working at a single residential care provider, as confirmed by former colleagues.

The operator has additionally stated she acts in a “professional capacity” as a witness in POVA — Protection of Vulnerable Adults, and safeguarding meetings at “Ty Penallta,” including giving evidence against named third parties. This claim contains two independently verifiable errors. First, POVA as a statutory framework was replaced in Wales by the Safeguarding Vulnerable Adults provisions under the Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014, and before that by the All Wales Adult Protection guidance from 2012 onwards; in England the equivalent shift occurred under the Care Act 2014. A professional operating within Welsh adult safeguarding frameworks in any current or recent capacity would be expected to use “Safeguarding Adults” or reference the relevant statutory framework, not POVA, which has been obsolete in practice for over a decade. Second, a former colleague with direct knowledge of Caerphilly adult safeguarding arrangements has confirmed to the investigation that adult safeguarding meetings have not been held at Ty Penallta for some time — they are now conducted either virtually or at Ty Tredomen, sometimes in hybrid format. The specific venue named by the operator is therefore incorrect as a matter of current practice, independently of the outdated terminology. The combination of an obsolete statutory term and a wrong venue is consistent with the claim being constructed without genuine professional familiarity with current safeguarding frameworks. No record of the operator being authorised, accredited, or formally appointed as a safeguarding witness in any official capacity has been produced. It is additionally notable that a Mother and Baby Bank operation — dealing with donated goods and food distribution — would have no established basis for attending adult safeguarding meetings in any professional capacity in the first place, a point independently raised by the same former colleague. A further claim appears in a separate public post : “I have had accredited children and safeguarding training from Cardiff University and Caerphilly Council.” Cardiff University has confirmed no record of the operator’s attendance on any programme. No accredited safeguarding qualification from Cardiff University or Caerphilly Council has been produced or verified for either documented name. The claim of accredited safeguarding training from a university whose own records do not reflect her attendance is consistent with the broader pattern of citing institutional endorsement that the named institutions have not confirmed.

“Childcare qualifications and I have received a great deal of training via the NMC and the local health and education boards” — 9 July 2022. A public post dated 9 July 2022 states: “Childcare qualifications and I have received a great deal of training via the NMC and the local health and education boards in South East Wales. (Both know and support and folow us)” (spelling as published) The NMC — the Nursing and Midwifery Council. This is the statutory regulator for nurses and midwives in the UK. It does not provide training to individuals who are not NMC-registered. Claiming training “via the NMC” without NMC registration implies a professional nursing or midwifery credential the operator does not hold. The parenthetical “Both know and support and folow us” additionally implies that named health regulators endorsed the operation, a claim the NMC has since denied in writing.

False trustee structure — November 2022. A public post dated 13 November 2022 stated: “Me and my son are the owners and trustees and we have one silent trustee.” At this date JBB had no CIC registration, no Charity Commission registration, and no legal trustee structure of any kind — the CIC was not incorporated until November 2025. Describing a family member arrangement as a formal trustee structure on a public volunteer-facing post is a misrepresentation of the operation's legal status. The same post claimed "over 100 registered Volunteers" operating across multiple sites, all without employers liability insurance, health and safety documentation, or safeguarding policies, as confirmed by the October 2023 Caerphilly CBC inspection.

Four credentials claimed in one broadcast — 24 June 2024. In a video broadcast dated 24 June 2024, the operator states in a single passage: “But I am qualified. I am a qualified retailer and I am also a qualified health and social care practitioner. I’ve got qualifications in education and I’ve also studied nursing. So, you know, I am qualified to discuss things like that.” Four distinct credential claims are made consecutively: a “qualified retailer” status (no recognised UK certification for that designation has been produced), a “qualified health and social care practitioner” (no professional body registration exists), “qualifications in education” (Cardiff University has confirmed no record of attendance and the EWC holds no registration), and “studied nursing” (no NMC registration exists for either documented name). The June 2024 broadcast predates by approximately one year the 1 July 2025 Wayback snapshot in which BA Hons Nursing, NHS Professionals, and Profit Protection were first added to the profile, confirming that the credential claims were made publicly on broadcast platforms before being added to the profile in writing. The compressed format, four credentials in three sentences — captures the standard public-presentation pattern of the operator’s claimed qualifications.

Family-member credential claim — “qualified handwriting interpreter” — 28 August 2022 and 13 May 2023. Two dated public Facebook posts publish an identical rate card titled “Tarot and other Readings and Analysis Price List,” including the entry: “Handwriting and horoscope analysis by qualified handwrtting interpretater (my Mum not me). £15 (1 week turnaround and handwriting submission required to be annalysised).” The rate card additionally advertises lucky-dip card readings (£5), three-card tarot readings (£15), and a lovers’ tarot and horoscope compatibility reading (£25), with the footer: “100% of the profits go to Jayne’s Mother & Baby Bank, Food Bank & Charity Shop.” Three issues arise. First, “qualified handwriting interpreter” is not a recognised UK professional designation — there is no statutory or self-regulatory registration body for graphology in the United Kingdom, and no UK protected title attaches to handwriting interpretation. Second, the family member referenced as the “qualified” practitioner is the operator’s mother. The same individual who appears as Director 2 on the November 2025 CIC filing (Gail Jenkins, Brooklyn Bungalow, Woodfieldside) and whose surname Jenkins is recorded on the operator’s own birth index entry as the mother’s maiden name. The CIC director’s commercial involvement in pre-CIC fundraising under a claimed professional designation has not been disclosed in any CIC36 declaration or annual return. Third, the credential claim was deployed to set a price (£15 per reading) and to solicit public payment; independent witness accounts provided to the wider investigation indicate the family member’s actual occupational background is unrelated to graphology. The rate card is published under the early operating name “Jayne’s Mother & Baby Bank, Food Bank & Charity Shop,” the same name later refused by the Charity Commission as the first failed registration application (org. 5223055).

The record has since extended. Further archive material has become available since the four profile snapshots above were compiled, including documents the operator has published herself, and the profile description of the nursing qualification has now changed a third time. The material below is drawn from the investigation’s dated review of the academic record (Sherlock article, 12 September 2026). The profile wording is taken from archived captures of the page (archive.ph, 13 January, 30 January and 6 September 2026); quotations are verbatim from the operator’s own posts, videos and profiles, spelling as published.

6 September 2026 — the description changes a third time. The archived capture of 6 September 2026 carries three entries: “Bsc nursing at NHS”, “Former Student Nurse at Cardiff University” and “Studied Adult Nursing at Cardiff University” (spelling as published). This is the first time the profile has described a former student rather than a graduate, and “Bsc nursing at NHS” is not a qualification any NHS body awards. Set against the two earlier captures, the description moves in three steps: “Studied BA Hons Nursing at Cardiff University” (13 January 2026), “Studied BSC Hons Adult Nursing at Cardiff University” (30 January 2026), then “Former Student Nurse at Cardiff University” (6 September 2026). The January change followed this investigation’s reporting that Cardiff offers no BA (Hons) Nursing. The profile is not the qualification. It is evidence of how the qualification has been described at different points in time, and of the direction in which the description has moved.

Born in May 1980, the operator was 36 in September 2016 and turned 39 in May 2019. “I went to University at 36” matches the 2016 start she has repeatedly given; “I went to Uni at 39” cannot be reconciled with it. The arithmetic also bears on the account of why the course stopped: a three-year Bachelor of Nursing beginning in September 2016 ends in summer 2019, before the pandemic she says prevented her from going onto the wards.

14 March 2016, published 10 September 2026 — the Pearson Edexcel documents. Three Pearson Edexcel documents dated 14 March 2016 were published by the operator on her own page on 10 September 2026: a certificate headed Competence Based Qualification (CBQ) for the Pearson Edexcel Level 1 Award in Health and Social Care (QCF), and two Certificates of Unit Credit, one Level 1 and one Level 2. They are the only formal qualification certificates ever produced. What was published is a photograph rather than a scan, and its authenticity cannot be confirmed from the image.

The qualification number identifies a genuine, now-withdrawn Pearson qualification, which gives Pearson a specific record to check. Three points arise from comparing the certificate with the register.

1. The credit total. The Level 1 Certificate of Unit Credit lists nine units, HSC1 to HSC9, totalling 23 credits, stated on the document to have been “completed as part of” the Level 1 Award. The register lists that Award at 7 credits. Under the Qualifications and Credit Framework an Award was 1 to 12 credits and a Certificate 13 to 36. A learner can take more units than the minimum, so the figure alone does not show that anything is wrong. Whether 23 Level 1 credits were certificated under qualification 500/5487/9 at centre 041260 in March 2016 is a matter Pearson can confirm from its own records.

2. The title and the template. The register title is “Pearson BTEC Level 1 Award”. The certificate prints “Pearson Edexcel Level 1 Award”, on a template headed Competence Based Qualification, which Pearson uses for competence-based (NVQ-type) awards rather than BTEC awards. There may be an ordinary explanation in how Pearson printed legacy QCF certificates in 2016; Pearson has not been asked to confirm this.

3. The Level 2 document. The third document lists seven Level 2 units, HSC10 to HSC16, each of 3 credits, all graded P, “completed as part of the Pearson Edexcel Level 2 Award in Health and Social Care (QCF)”. No qualification number is printed on it, and no separate Level 2 award certificate has been published. The distinction is documentary: a Certificate of Unit Credit records units represented as achieved, and is not the same document as a certificate showing that the overall qualification was conferred. For Level 1 both documents exist. For Level 2 only the unit record has been produced.

The name on the certificates. All three documents are in the name Jayne-Anne Price. Her personal Facebook profile posted as “Carrie Anne” from February 2013 to January 2019; the coursework photographed on 11 May 2016, eight weeks after the certificate date, has “Carrie-Anne Ridsdale” printed on the cover; and the name “Jayne” first appears in the archive with the “Jayne’s Mother & Baby Bank” page in September 2020. Awarding bodies certificate learners in the name registered by the centre at the time of enrolment. A certificate dated March 2016 in a name that does not appear in the public record until 2020 is therefore either evidence of a formal name change before 2016, evidence of the centre registering her under a different name, or evidence that the name on the document is not the name that was printed on it. It is this site’s opinion, from the sequence of names and the timing of publication, that the name field on these documents has been altered. That is stated as an inference and an opinion, not as a finding. Pearson’s record of what was issued under the original certificate number would settle the question in either direction, and that number is the one part of the document that has been obscured. Sixteen units across the two unit-credit documents are graded P for pass; no higher grade appears on either.

10 September 2026 — the “Courses & Training” album. Two days before the September 2026 article was published, the Jaynesbabybank Registered - cic page added a Facebook album titled “Courses & Training”. It contains the photograph of the three Pearson Edexcel certificates described above; eleven photographs captioned “British Journal of Midwifery Training Day CPD (Best buffet)”, showing buffet food, juice and fruit, study-day paperwork dated 2018, attendees seated in a lecture room and around a seminar table, a group beside a birthing pool, and a demonstration on a training mannequin; and a twelfth, captioned “Cardiff Uni — Maternity First Aid”, showing an empty lecture theatre. Apart from the 2016 Level 1 and Level 2 certificates, the album contains no degree certificate, transcript, diploma, enrolment record or award of any kind in nursing, midwifery or biochemistry.

Read in sequence, the description moves from a diploma obtained “at Uni” alongside the degree, to a pre-entry course taken elsewhere, to an Access course. An Access to Higher Education Diploma is a Level 3 college qualification designed for mature applicants and is a recognised route into nursing. It is not a university diploma in biochemistry, and it would not exempt a student from any part of an NMC-approved programme — which is what the June 2025 statement described and the September 2025 statement withdrew. No college and no awarding body has ever been named.

The PhD. The post of 18 July 2023 stated “now I’m doing a PHD” (spelling as published). On 17 June 2025 the operator said: “I never said I had a PhD in biochem… Diploma, I got.” The denial addresses a PhD in biochemistry specifically. The claim has not been repeated since 2023, and no institution, subject, supervisor or registration for any doctoral study has ever been named.

The unconditional offers. “I was accepted to every university I applied for with an unconditional offer” (17 June 2025). “4 addition unconditional offers into Adult Nursing from other universities” (17 July 2026, spelling as published). On 28 September 2025 she said “I actually put the unconditional offers on Facebook”. They do not appear in an archive of more than 2,000 videos and posts. No offer letter has been produced.

The health board employment claim. On 1 April and 10 June 2026 the operator stated: “I am still employed by a health board. I don’t need validation from the health boards. They are my colleagues.” The same posts claimed that health boards provided sanitary equipment and contraception to the operation and free training for volunteers (Sherlock article, 5 September 2026). No board, department or role has ever been named, and every role on the September 2026 profile is prefixed “Former” except “Founder and Director”. The hospital material requires the same distinction: a photograph of JBB material inside a hospital establishes that the material was present there. It does not, by itself, establish endorsement, employment or partnership.

The award title. Cardiff University’s nursing degree is the Bachelor of Nursing (Hons), abbreviated BN (Hons). That is the title on the Student Portfolio cover the operator photographed herself, which reads “Bachelor of Nursing (Hons) / Adult Nursing Field of Practice”, and it is a title she has never used for herself. The Nursing and Midwifery Council’s 2015 monitoring report on Cardiff names the programme “BN (Hons) Nursing (Cardiff Nursing Futures)”, commenced September 2012, with adult nursing a field of practice within it. Neither “BA (Hons) Nursing”, “BSC Hons Adult Nursing” nor “BSc (Hons) Nursing (Adult)” is the award for that programme. A Student Portfolio is issued to enrolled students to record placements and competencies; photographing its cover is consistent with having been a student and says nothing about whether the programme was completed.

What ninety statements describe, and what they do not. Across roughly ninety dated statements about nursing in the archive, running from July 2022 to September 2026, the operator describes being accepted, being paid a bursary, attending lectures, sitting an anatomy and physiology exam, doing placements in haematology, orthopaedics, maternity, the incontinence service, health visiting and Cardiff Prison, falling ill, and being kept off the wards. What none of those statements describes is graduating, receiving an award, registering with the NMC, or working as a nurse. The exceptions are two statements in 2023: “my nursing training and having a degree as well” (2 April 2023) and “got my degree and diploma in nursing and bio chem” (18 July 2023). Nine days after the second, the same period was recast as “studying to be a nurse” (27 July 2023). By September 2026 the profile itself said “Former Student Nurse”.

Scope note — what the Education Workforce Council response does and does not establish. This dossier states the limits of its own evidence. Registration with the Education Workforce Council became compulsory for learning support workers in schools in Wales on 1 April 2016, under the Education Workforce Council (Main Functions) (Wales) (Amendment) Regulations 2016, made under the Education (Wales) Act 2014. A classroom assistant whose employment ended before that date would never have been required to register, and would not appear on the register today. The operator’s own account of the dates is that she was employed “from the age of 18-30” (17 July 2026) which, against the confirmed birth date of 16 May 1980, runs to 2010 — six years before registration began.

The resource base — information received by the investigation. The investigation has been told that the operator worked in the resource base for children with autism at Pontllanfraith Primary School as a level 1 care assistant, whose duties included toileting and changing children and taking some of the more able children into mainstream lessons; that she applied for a level 3 nursery nurse / classroom assistant post in the base and was not appointed; and that she left in about 2005, aged about 25. That sits beside her own accounts: “I worked as a teaching assistant in a resource base for children with Autistic Spectrum Disorder and behaviour disorders and learning difficulties for 12 years” (29 October 2024), “Teaching Assistant level 3” on her profile, “I was a qualified teaching assistant” (17 July 2026) and employment “from the age of 18-30” (17 July 2026). Registration with the Education Workforce Council was not required at that time, as the scope note above explains, so the Council’s “no record” answer does not show that she never worked there. Her mother, Gail, now the company’s second director, was the school’s caretaker; on the same information, the operator had access to the school through her and cleaned there from time to time, which matches her own words: “I’d clean the school. Then I’d go and work in a classroom assistant all day” (24 July 2025). This rests on information received by the investigation and held on file. It is not yet supported by documents, and it is recorded as information received, not as a finding.

The FOI response therefore does not, standing alone, establish that the operator never worked as a classroom assistant, and this dossier does not assert that it does. What it does establish is narrower and still material. It is inconsistent with any representation of being currently a registered or registrable education practitioner in Wales — including the Facebook profile which as at 1 July 2025 listed “Teaching Assistant level 3” under employment, the statement of 17 July 2026 “I was a qualified teaching assistant”, and the recruitment of NNEB and Level 3 staff to a standard the operation set but could not itself evidence (Finding 06a, Finding 33). It is the authoritative public record for Wales, and no certificate, employer reference or payslip for the role has been produced in answer to it.

20 January 2026 — the operator’s own explanation for the absence of a record. Responding on air to this investigation’s classroom-assistant material, she offered a reason: “I think on the Sherlock website they said classroom assistant, blah blah blah. Yeah, well I was pre-Ian Huntley. Yes, so pre-Ian Huntley, nobody had to register. Nobody had to have a check pre-Ian Huntley and Maxine Carr.” Two things follow. The events she refers to occurred in August 2002; a role held to 2010 is not pre-dated by them. And the regime she describes is criminal-record checking, which is not the same thing as professional registration: the Education Workforce Council register is a register of practitioners, not a record of disclosure checks, and it began in 2016 for this category. The explanation offered does not fit either the dates or the register.

06aNursing and Midwifery Order 2001 art. 44SafeguardingCredentials in useInfant-feeding, autism and children’s services set up and staffed on the strength of the disputed credentials — and an asserted link to NHS health visitors used to recruit

The distinction this finding draws is a narrow one and it matters. Finding 06 is about representations — what was said, when it changed, and what the NMC, Cardiff University, Social Care Wales and the Education Workforce Council hold. This finding is about reliance: the services that were opened to mothers, babies and children on the strength of those representations, and the people invited to depend on them. Where a credential claim is deployed only to win status in an argument, the harm is reputational. Where it is deployed to open an infant-feeding group, to assert clinical superiority over other organisations, or to announce a confidential space for the parents of disabled children, the people relying on it are the intended beneficiaries of the operation.

22 September 2024 — a breast feeding support group, opened on a stated qualification. A public post announced an infant-feeding group for mothers using the operation, and gave the qualification as its basis in the same sentence.

Three features of that post are recorded rather than characterised. First, the qualification is asserted, not named: no awarding body, level or certificate is given, and none has since been produced. Second, the group was made private — support given inside it is not publicly auditable. Third, registered professionals were invited to participate in a group convened on an unevidenced qualification, which if they had accepted would have lent it their own registration.

29 October 2024 — a call for baby banks to be regulated, on qualification grounds. A month later the operator publicly proposed that the council regulate baby banks because, in her account, competitors were unqualified to work with children — setting out her own credentials in the same post, including a claim of health visitor training.

Health visiting is not a component of pre-registration nursing. In the United Kingdom a health visitor is a Specialist Community Public Health Nurse recorded on a third part of the NMC register, entered after registration as a nurse or midwife and a further post-registration programme. A person who is not on the NMC register at all cannot have completed it. The claim that nursing study “included… health visitor training” is therefore not a description of any recognised route, and it was made in the course of arguing that other organisations were not qualified to work with children.

20 May 2025 — an asserted NHS link, used twice. A broadcast reported health visitors visiting a shop, and put that to two uses in consecutive sentences: as proof of good standing, and as a recruitment channel for volunteers paid in goods.

Two separate representations are made there. The first is institutional: that an NHS service had linked up with the operation and was recommending it — a claim of standing made to an audience of tens of thousands, and one no health board has confirmed. The record of what health bodies have confirmed in writing is at §02. The second is that NHS staff were asked to relay a payment offer to their own patients: mothers were to be told, by the health visitor attending them, that volunteering carried £20 a day in stock and that it was not taxable. The tax and benefits characterisation of those payments is examined at Finding 12; what is recorded here is that an NHS clinical relationship was the proposed route to the recruits.

6 June 2025 — the self-referral model justified by qualification, and a statement of law about the NMC. Explaining why the operation takes self-referrals where other baby banks require a professional referral, the operator grounded the difference in her own standing: “obviously, I’m qualified in various fields of healthcare… And they all have accredited qualifications. I can’t say that without saying it legally either”, and “there is no middle man… It is a self-referral system. And I am qualified and experienced to allow that to happen.” The same broadcast told followers: “You don’t have to be registered with the NMC to be a nurse, okay? You have to be registered with the NMC to practice as a nurse in the UK. That’s two different things.”

That last proposition was put to the public as a statement of law, and it is the mechanism by which an absent registration is presented as immaterial. Article 44 of the Nursing and Midwifery Order 2001 makes it an offence, punishable on summary conviction, for a person with intent to deceive to falsely represent themselves as registered. Whether any particular statement crosses that line is a matter for a prosecuting authority on the whole of the evidence, and nothing here determines it. What is recorded is that a public explanation was offered for why registration need not exist, and that it was offered to the same audience from whom donations and volunteer labour were being sought.

20 January 2026 — “a trained health professional on site”, and “a qualified baby bank”. Contrasting the operation with a third-party organisation’s handling of a homeless man, the operator framed the difference as clinical: “this is the difference between having a trained health professional on site and having people who adjust first aid trained on site”, and “you see how they’re unqualified, you see how we are a qualified baby bank and they are an unqualified baby bank”. Asked, in effect, why no registration exists, the same broadcast supplies the answer examined in the scope note at Finding 06: “I was pre-Ian Huntley… nobody had to register.”

2 April 2026 — a confidential support group for mothers of autistic and neurodivergent children. The announcement opens with the credentials and closes with confidentiality.

The duration given here is ten years. The same role is given as twelve years in the posts of 2 April 2024, 29 October 2024, 22 January 2025 and 18 April 2025 and in an undated broadcast, and on 17 July 2026 as employment “from the age of 18-30” — a twelve-year span which, against the confirmed birth date of 16 May 1980 recorded in the timeline, runs to 2010. Cardiff University has confirmed in writing that it holds no record of the nursing study referred to in the same sentence (§02).

Throughout — children’s clubs advertised as requiring qualifications the operation itself could not evidence. From April 2024 to September 2026 the operation repeatedly sought NNEB or Level 3 teaching-assistant staff, with enhanced DBS and in-date first aid, to run Lego and craft clubs for children — on the stated principle that “unless you’ve got the actual level three qualification, I personally don’t want you running it” (25 January 2025). The same standard was not evidenced for the person setting it. On information received (Finding 06), her own role in the resource base was that of a level 1 care assistant, ending in about 2005, and she applied for a level 3 nursery nurse / classroom assistant post there and was not appointed. That role is the stated basis for the autism support group, the children’s clubs and the claim to run a “qualified” baby bank. The recruitment, funding and payment terms attached to those posts are at Finding 33.

Update, 7 October 2026 — eight NHS Wales bodies answer; none holds a record. On 13 September 2026 the investigation put six written questions to every health board, NHS trust and national NHS body in Wales. Eight had answered by 7 October, and not one holds a record of any arrangement with the organisation: Hywel Dda (“no dealings”, after checking with its Head of Midwifery; formally, under FOI/21587/26, it “holds no records relating to Jayne’s Baby Bank”), Velindre (no affiliation), Cwm Taf Morgannwg (no declarations on its gifts register), Public Health Wales (not held), NHS Wales Shared Services Partnership (no connection), Digital Health and Care Wales (not held), Powys (“has not had any involvement with Jayne’s Baby Bank”, signed by its Director of Midwifery, Women and Family) and Aneurin Bevan, which runs the Grange and employs the health visitors and midwives of Caerphilly, Torfaen and Newport: “The Health Board does not hold a policy or agreement specifically relating to Jayne’s Baby Bank”, and it holds no recorded permission for photography, filming or promotional activity on its premises (FOI ref. 8883801, 5 October 2026). Public Health Wales and Aneurin Bevan are the two bodies the page named on 9 July 2023 as supporters. On 11 June 2026 Aneurin Bevan’s Chief Executive’s office had told the investigation that books the page said were “donated to the NHS staff” were found on one ward, “stored in the ward manager’s office and had not been issued to patients”. The asserted link to NHS health visitors set out above is not supported by any policy or agreement held by the health board that employs them. The claim to be “still employed by a health board” first appears on 1 April 2026, and no board, site or role has been named. Added 9 October 2026: the health board’s Communications and Engagement Team had already written, on 28 May 2026, that there is “no formal affiliation, partnership, referral arrangement, or working relationship between these Health Board services and the organisation”, and that the page had reshared its public Health Visiting Service posts, which “can be accessed and shared by any individual or organisation without prior approval”. Added 12 October 2026: Cardiff and Vale, which runs the Heath, the one hospital the page ever named for a premature bundle, answered under FoI/26/617 that its children’s hospital and maternity services “have not had any communication or visits from individuals acting for Jayne’s baby bank”; nine bodies have now answered. Sherlock article, 4 October 2026, updated 12 October.

What this finding does not assert. It does not assert that any mother, baby or child was harmed by any of these services. It does not assert that no health visitor ever entered a shop; what is recorded is that an institutional link was asserted publicly and has not been confirmed by any health body. It makes no finding on whether the operator ever worked as a classroom assistant — see the scope note at Finding 06, which sets out the limits of the Education Workforce Council evidence. What is recorded is the sequence: services touching infant feeding, autism and children’s provision were opened, and clinical superiority over other organisations was asserted, on qualifications for which no register entry or certificate has been produced.

07False authorityFalsely claiming FCA authorisation and regulatory accreditation

Between February 2023 and July 2025, the operator made repeated public claims that Jayne's Baby Bank had been authorised by the Financial Conduct Authority to use the word "charity" in its name. A deleted June 2025 video stated: "We're the only charity in Great Britain that's been authorised by the Financial Conduct Authority to use the word charity in our title." This claim is demonstrably false. The FCA does not regulate charities, does not authorise charitable status, and plays no role in approving the use of "charity" in a business name, that function rests with the Charity Commission and Companies House. The FCA confirmed in July 2025 that JBB is not on the Financial Services Register. Misrepresenting authorisation by a statutory regulator in a fundraising context may constitute a breach of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008.

Bank of England / FCA letter — October 2022. An archived letter dated 25 October 2022 from the Bank of England/FCA — addressed "Dear Jayne" at 7 Meadow Road, Blackwood NP12 — documents that the operator had written to the FCA asking for permission to use the word "bank" in the charity name, and was directed to the FCA's Sensitive Business Names process. The letter explains the steps she would need to take to obtain approval and copies the Sensitive Business Names request form. This is the direct opposite of FCA authorisation. It is a letter explaining that approval had not been granted and setting out what would be required to seek it. The first public FCA authorisation claim followed in February 2023, less than four months after receiving this letter. The letter establishes that the operator was fully aware the FCA had not authorised her use of "bank" in the name at the point she began publicly claiming it had.

Separately, across multiple Facebook posts from December 2024 through September 2025, the operator repeatedly claimed JBB had "won a sustainability award by the CRS Accreditation." No body called "CRS Accreditation" exists. The reference is to a commercial self-submitted project award from The Green Organisation (CSR Awards), which does not constitute organisational accreditation, carries no regulatory standing, and is not connected to the Charity Commission or any regulatory body. When the award organiser was contacted for clarification, the justification for the award changed within hours in written correspondence, shifting from "recycling baby clothes" to "food and drink and healthcare" — demonstrating the absence of consistent verification criteria.

08Health claims38 documented conditions — pattern of deployment in fundraising contexts

The ovarian cancer claim was embedded into the permanent public-facing identity of the operation from its founding. The original Facebook profile for "JaynesBaby Bank Price" carried the bio: “I have ovarian cancer, I launched a food bank, womens aid and baby bank to help as people in 2020.” This statement — appearing in the profile description, not a passing post — means that every person who visited the page, every donor, and every organisation that considered partnering with JBB encountered this claim as a foundational fact about the operator. It was not a claim made once; it was the permanent stated identity of the operation from launch.

Pre-JBB health narrative — "Baby Bank and Friends" About bio. The earliest documented health-and-professional framing in the operation's public identity predates both Jayne's Baby Bank and the JaynesBaby Bank Price ovarian-cancer profile. The pre-JBB Facebook page Baby Bank and Friends carried a permanent About-section biography stating the operator was a "health care professional" with "long standing infertility," describing a pregnancy complicated by medical conditions and asserting "I did not have a stich for my baby!" — a surgical-delivery claim presented as foundational context for why the baby bank was created. This narrative layer, claimed professional healthcare identity plus personal medical hardship — is structurally identical to the later permanent-profile health claims documented across JBB, but uses infertility and childbirth complications rather than ovarian cancer. The page simultaneously listed Charitable organisation as a public category while Messenger responses from the same profile explicitly denied charitable status when access conditions were questioned. No independent clinical verification of infertility, the stated medical conditions, or the surgical claim has been produced. The full About text and page metadata are documented in Finding 03.

Across Facebook, livestreams, and FOI-related correspondence, 38 distinct medical conditions have been documented, including aplastic anaemia, blood cancer, bone marrow cancer, leukaemia, bowel cancer, ovarian cancer, womb tumour, brain tumour, bilateral knee replacement, epilepsy, sepsis, neutropenia, endometriosis, sleep apnoea, diabetes, hypothyroidism, panniculitis, pica disorder, kidney cysts, ADHD, autism, dyslexia, dyscalculia, dyspraxia, and suicidal ideation, among others. No independent clinical verification of any of these conditions has been produced in the public domain.

Deployment alongside fundraising. Health claims are consistently deployed in direct proximity to fundraising appeals — framing illness and incapacity while soliciting donations, premises, or operational support in the same publication or broadcast. Representative examples include the October 2022 founding narrative (shielding, tumour, and aplastic anaemia presented as the reason JBB was created) and a September 2025 livestream that moved directly from discussing illnesses to: “Unless somebody wants to fund us for a big massive warehouse, what am I going to do?” Further dated examples appear in the chronological sequence below.

Chronological escalation of health claims, documented by investigation. The health narrative has escalated consistently over time in a documented pattern:

Pre-2015–2015: The operator asserts she was "seriously unwell" with a tumour and aplastic anaemia "well before 2015." She claims a 2015 MRI found a "massive tumour" in her womb, but her GP "shelved" the result for four years. During this same period, official records place her as a Support Worker at Pride In Care (2013–2018) and she was simultaneously claiming to be entering nursing education in 2016.

2019: She claims to have personally discovered the "missing" 2015 scan in her medical records and states she was diagnosed with blood cancer and a 6cm tumour this year. She asserts doctors began using "tumour suppressors" in 2019. In a broadcast, she also stated she returned to university "at age 39" for a nursing and biochemistry degree.

2020 — the founding contradiction: The operator claimed to be "shielding" throughout the first lockdown because she was immunocompromised with a "massive tumour" and blood disorder, having collapsed and developed sepsis due to neutropenia requiring a triple blood transfusion and four iron infusions. At the exact same time, she physically founded, stocked, and operated Jayne's Baby Bank from her driveway and subsequently expanded to multiple retail premises — working, in her own words, "7 days a week."

2021: She claims to have undergone a procedure to stop the blood supply to her tumour due to "angiogenesis." In late 2021, she began using the "palliative" label publicly, asserting she would "never be cured."

2022: A December 2022 post states: “After a recent MRI, I am still in the palliative category — most of you know that I have a massive tumor and aplastic anemia which is a rare blood and bone marrow cancer.” The tumour is described as having grown to 11cm at this stage. Separately, in correspondence with Caerphilly County Borough Council the same year, the operator self-declared dyslexia, dyscalculia, and dyspraxia (listed in the 38-condition inventory above) to explain “difficulties with accounts and correspondence.” Analysis of the Subject Access Request confirms these were submitted by the operator herself, not assessed by any clinical or official body. Investigators noted they functioned as “rhetorical tools” to excuse hostility and unprofessional behaviour toward the council — distinct from any documented clinical diagnosis.

2023: A public post announces a reduction in tumour size — “Tumor has shrunk to 7.8 cm from 9cm from 11cm since 2021!” — presenting a three-year shrinkage sequence as a public health update. A further post shortly after records an updated consultant measurement of 6.8cm alongside disclosure that she was commencing “a course of tumor injections that put you in a state of suspended menopause for 6 weeks.” Both posts were published to the full JBB audience alongside routine operational content.

2024: In April 2024, the operator claimed to be a "grade 3 on the heart attack register" — a non-standard medical classification that does not correspond to any recognised NHS or clinical risk stratification system, after recording a blood pressure of 179/102. Separately, a broadcast from the same month discloses that a nurse had “let slip that the tumour had grown… quite rapidly since the last time” she had been checked — reversing the documented shrinkage sequence of 2023 (7.8cm, then 6.8cm) and reintroducing escalation to the health narrative. The same content appears in a later 2026 file, consistent with a Facebook memory or reshare; the earliest and most reliable archive date is April 2024.

2025: Across 2025, she also claimed to have lost 10 stone in weight, which she attributed in part to her health conditions. Former volunteers have publicly reported that the operator told them privately she had an "incurable brain tumour." When challenged on this claim during a livestream, she denied ever having said it. Both accounts are in the public record. In March 2025, she attributed a "bowel obstruction" to tumour pressure — later, an endoscopy reportedly found no abnormalities, no lesions, and nothing of clinical concern, directly contradicting the claim. She also publicly attributed an obsession with eating "buckets of ice" to blood deficiencies — a reference to pica disorder, which she includes in her self-declared condition list. In a November 2025 broadcast, the operator directly addressed claims circulating online that she had bone marrow cancer, stating: “apparently now I’ve got bone marrow cancer… Read what it says on Google… Shut up, you bloody fools.” In the same broadcast she stated: “You’ve got fibroids and you’ve got bone marrow cancer. Shut up.” These dismissals were made to a live audience. Yet the document of record shows the operator herself used the phrase “rare blood and bone marrow cancer” in a public December 2022 post. The November 2025 denials are therefore inconsistent with her own prior published characterisation.

April 2026 — brain tumour claim denied on camera. In an April 2026 broadcast, the operator emphatically denied ever having claimed to have a brain tumour: “Where do I say I got a brain tumour? When have I ever said I got a brain tumour? I’ve never said I got a brain tumour.” This denial is made across multiple exchanges within the same broadcast. The document records former volunteers reporting that the operator privately told them she had an “incurable brain tumour”, a claim she had already denied in an earlier livestream. The April 2026 broadcast represents a further documented instance of that denial, made with escalating emphasis, while the original claim remains in the public record via volunteer testimony.

6 May 2026 — critical haemoglobin claim deployed in harassment context. A post published on 6 May 2026 from the account "South Wales Largest Baby Bank & Foodbank Fundraising Shops" — the Facebook identity in the documented post-ban rename sequence (subsequently banned 8 May 2026; re-established on profile ID 61589841172921 from 21 May 2026 — see Finding 14) — states: “my hemoglobin (Hb) level has dropped from 15 g/dL to 5 g/dL which can be critical for a blood transfusion and iron infusion.” A haemoglobin level of 5 g/dL represents a critically low value that would typically require emergency hospital admission and immediate clinical intervention, not a Facebook post. Normal adult Hb range is approximately 12–17.5 g/dL. The post frames this claimed medical emergency in the context of "all the harassment and stalking and abuse going on", consistent with the documented pattern of deploying health claims as contextual framing to deflect scrutiny. A further endoscopy ("stomach camera") is also referenced, consistent with the March 2025 bowel obstruction claim that reportedly returned normal findings. This post was made through a renamed account operating under a new name following the May 2026 Facebook bans, establishing that the operation continued posting under a further alias name as of the date of publication.

18–20 May 2026 — @communityshopone TikTok: Amazon oxygen cans framed as transfusion / infusion (not NHS). Before the 21 May hospital attendance, the JBB TikTok alias posted repeatedly (comments disabled) showing retail portable-oxygen cans — goX, OXY, and “CLEAR OXYGEN ENERGY” types available on Amazon, not NHS prescription cylinders — with overlays including “Roll on this blood transfusion if i make it to Thursday” and “Roll on this blood transfusion and iron fusion” (sic). Supplemental oxygen tins have no role in blood transfusion or IV iron infusion. Archived example: tiktok.com/@communityshopone/photo/7640878050720124182.

21 May 2026 — transfusion and iron infusion claimed together; attendance at YYF inconsistent with dual-treatment claim and prior “critical” Hb framing. On 21 May 2026 the operator attended YYF (Ystrad Fawr Hospital) for approximately one hour and subsequently published a further tranche of “proof” content across @communityshopone TikTok and the re-established Facebook profile "South Wales Largest Baby Bank & Foodbank Fundraising Shops" (profile ID 61589841172921). TikTok overlay text stated: “Funny how haters havn't mentioned I was telling the truth about being ill on their pathetic group” and “Feeling better this eveing” (sic). The shared Facebook caption read, verbatim: “Obviously I was lying again about a transfusion and infusion.” — sarcastic framing directed at critics, while simultaneously asserting both treatments occurred on the same attendance. The post paired (a) a wide clinical-room photograph showing a trolley labelled “Blood & Cannulation” and (b) a forearm close-up with an IV cannula and dark fluid in the line (morning archive: tiktok.com/@communityshopone/photo/7642244007023627542). That duration is materially inconsistent with a same-day blood transfusion (NHS practice and published clinical guidance: typically approximately 1–4 hours per unit, plus pre-transfusion checks and monitoring) while still allowing a single intravenous iron infusion (commonly approximately 15–60 minutes infusion time, plus observation). Where both treatments are medically indicated, standard practice is ordinarily to schedule them sequentially — transfusion first for immediate severe anaemia, iron replacement at a later date, not to administer both in a single one-hour outpatient window, partly because each carries distinct adverse-reaction risks that are harder to attribute when combined. The investigation does not assert which product was in the line from imagery alone: iron preparations are often dark brown or black and can resemble blood in a still photograph; a departmental “Blood & Cannulation” label denotes capability, not that a transfusion was performed on that attendance. The discrepancy is therefore between the dual treatment claim she chose to publish and the documented ~one-hour attendance at YYF, which aligns more closely with an iron infusion appointment than with a completed blood transfusion, let alone transfusion plus infusion on the same day. This sits fifteen days after the 6 May 2026 public claim that Hb had fallen to 5 g/dL — a value that, if accurate, would ordinarily trigger emergency assessment and inpatient transfusion pathways, not a short outpatient-style visit later presented on social media as vindication. The document records the inconsistency; it does not conclude clinical malpractice by any named clinician. The more supportable inference from the public record is that the operator has again deployed transfusion language in a context that does not match standard treatment timelines — whether through exaggeration, conflation of separate appointments, or incomplete disclosure of what was actually administered.

The aplastic anaemia cancer claim and retraction. In a Facebook post in 2022, the operator stated she had "aplastic anaemia which is a rare blood and bone marrow cancer." Aplastic anaemia is a bone marrow failure disorder. It is not classified as a cancer. When later challenged by critics on this misclassification, the operator stated on video: "Aplastic Anaemia isn't bone marrow cancer… a quick Google search will tell you that Aplastic Anaemia is not cancer." Both statements are on the public record. The condition was first presented as cancer to the public in a fundraising context, then disowned as "not cancer" when challenged, with no public correction issued to those who had originally been told it was cancer.

The operator has also repeatedly invoked the Cancer Act 1939 as conferring personal legal protection and "registered vulnerable adult" status. The Cancer Act 1939 restricts advertising of cancer treatments and confers no personal protection of any kind. These claims are legally false.

Blood transfusion claims, documented rolling pattern, December 2021 to May 2026 (regular claims escalating from August 2024). The claim of awaiting or undergoing a blood transfusion is one of the most frequently deployed health statements across the archived record. A broadcast dated 23 August 2024 documents the operator attempting to schedule a transfusion around operational hours: “Can’t I come in on a night shift? Because you haven’t got to have a bed, see, for a transfusion. You can sit in one of the chairs. The comfy chairs. I'm happy to sit in a comfy chair.” — the transfusion appointment is presented as a scheduling problem to work around, not a clinical emergency. The documented sequence across an approximately six-month span (November 2025 – May 2026) is as follows: November 2025 (bone marrow transplant and transfusion stated as needed, Hb at 94); 7 January 2026 (re-signing a three-year lease and a separate two-year lease for new premises in the same broadcast as “I am still waiting on a blood transfusion”); 10 January 2026 (blood transfusion needed due to aplastic anaemia — same post used to recruit unpaid leaflet deliverers offering store credit or cash); 20 February 2026 (claims transfusion complete: “I’ve had the blood transfusion. So I don’t know what they’re on about.” Same broadcast: “Then somebody’s changed it to bone marrow transfusion. And now somebody’s changed it on the group that I’ve got bone cancer.”. The operator describes in real time how the claim mutated across public platforms); 13 March 2026 (blood transfusion appointment pending for approximately 13 April); 18 April 2026 (“Then I nearly died. Then I had the triple blood transfusion. I remember lying on my deathbed authorising the food pick-up. It’s going, hang on, hang on, let me do this. There’s people relying on this food. Right now you can inject me or whatever.”); 6 May 2026 (Hb claimed at 5 g/dL — already documented above); [note: on 13 May 2026, seven days later, the operator was photographed physically active at the donation-centre unit with Daniel Ridsdale, not a transfusion claim, but a contradicting activity record]; 18–20 May 2026 (@communityshopone TikTok: Amazon retail oxygen cans — goX, OXY, “CLEAR OXYGEN ENERGY” — captioned as transfusion/infusion; not NHS equipment; comments disabled); 21 May 2026 (YYF/Ystrad Fawr Hospital: ~one-hour attendance; morning @communityshopone cannula post; evening “proof” post sarcastically claiming both “a transfusion and infusion” — dual-treatment claim inconsistent with reported duration; 28th entry in the rolling pattern; see analysis paragraph above); 26 May 2026 (livestream from donation centre during physical stock-sorting and retail pricing of donated stock: “I’ve had my blood transfusion. I’ve had my iron transfusion. I might need another one” — forward-projection priming the next iteration of the claim, broadcast concurrent with the “Haters: I’m phoning dwp!” financial-extraction post (see Finding 26); 29th entry). The pattern is consistent across approximately six months: transfusion claimed as imminent, then completed, then imminent again within weeks, with simultaneous business lease signings, leaflet recruitment campaigns, and physical operational activity documented throughout.

The operator presents herself as "fully work-limited" and eligible for Personal Independence Payment (PIP), while declaring no salary from JBB. A Motability Finance Ltd lease agreement (ref. 96182837, commenced 6 September 2023, 36-month term) has been documented against the operator's details. Confirmed via an Experian outstanding finance check showing "Record Found." Motability vehicles are exclusively available to recipients of the higher rate mobility component of PIP or equivalent qualifying disability benefit. The vehicle was therefore financed directly through a disability benefit entitlement, while the operator was simultaneously managing multiple retail premises and describing working "20 plus hours a day." She has stated that taking a formal wage would require JBB to pay sick pay during her frequent illnesses, which would result in "less mothers being helped." In a separate broadcast she described herself as: "Retired. Director of one of the largest children's charities in Wales and an influencer." The use of health status to simultaneously justify benefit reliance, explain non-payment of a director salary, and solicit public donations represents a documented pattern across the full period of the investigation. Commercial use of the Motability vehicle is documented separately in Finding 09.

Visible personal spending during benefit period — noted by alias account. In an archived post, the Peter Mal alias account highlighted an apparent contradiction between the operator's claimed disability benefit status and visible personal expenditure, commenting on a JBB post about a council funding meeting that included: "Hope you all like my new top and nails." The Peter Mal post stated: “she is bragging about a new set of nails and a new top while you donate her cash… She's on disability benefit how is she affording it all.” This commentary was posted by the Peter Mal account, which this dossier ties to the operator (Finding 23): an alias posing as a critic inside the critics’ own group. It is therefore a self-referential artefact of the alias network, but it still demonstrates that the financial contradiction was visible from her own public posts. The underlying JBB post confirming personal expenditure following a council funding meeting is independently archived.

Documented consumption of alcohol alongside prescribed morphine — December 2023 and January 2026. On 25 December 2023, a post was published on the official JBB Facebook page reading: “Drop a photos of your Christmas tipple! Mines a lidl Bayleys and morphine pill!” The post was published to the public JBB page, an account followed by 70,000+ people including donors, volunteers, and vulnerable mothers. On 12 January 2026, following public commentary about the safety of this combination, the operator addressed the post in a livestream: “So I'm still alive. Can I not have a night off and get shitfaced in a hot tub with a Baileys and a morphine pill that I'm prescribed?” and “I do apologize that I was drunk in a hot tub on Morphine guys.” Morphine is a Class A controlled drug. Combining opioids with alcohol is medically contraindicated and carries documented risks of respiratory depression. The same January 2026 broadcast included a comment mocking addiction services: “And then we'll start an Alcoholics Anonymous group, because, you know, in the last five years of me doing this, I've had one Baileys and a hot tub and a morphine tablet” — made by the operator of a platform that publicly positions itself as a support service for vulnerable mothers and families. The same operator simultaneously claims PIP disability benefits on the basis of serious health conditions that would be significantly contraindicated by alcohol consumption alongside opioid medication. This conduct is documented separately in Finding 12 in respect of the advice given to vulnerable individuals.

Bone marrow transplant, stem cell treatment, claimed then walked back, corroborated by Daniel Ridsdale. A written Facebook post states: “Update from consultant, I need a bone marrow transplant, blood transfusion and series of iron infusions. Aplastic anemia has caused a dip from 115 heams to 94.” Two days later, a broadcast walks this back: “If not I might need to have bone marrow transplant… we’ll be looking at in the new year looking for a donor.” The progression from confirmed consultant recommendation to conditional possibility within 48 hours is consistent with the broader escalation-and-retreat pattern documented in the tumour shrinkage sequence above. A September 2025 broadcast references stem cells in the operator’s own words: “With those stem cells I know and the red blood cells not the stem cells get released from the bone marrow area down where the tumor is situated.” In November 2025, the operator read aloud a medical educational explainer about aplastic anaemia to her audience, describing in third-person clinical terms the stem cell and bone marrow transplant treatment pathway, before posting a DKMS stem cell donor appeal the same day. These primary sources establish that stem cell treatment and bone marrow transplant were referenced in the operator’s own public content before Daniel Ridsdale’s independent public corroboration. A publicly visible comment exchange on Daniel’s personal Facebook profile (facebook.com/daniel.ridsdale.96) includes a reply from Daniel to a family friend, referred to here as S##### Lewis###### — stating: “Yes my Mum has been seriously ill for a long time. Back and forth haematology, blood and iron transfusions and stem cell treatment.” This constitutes independent family corroboration of the haematological treatment narrative from a source separate from the operator’s own broadcasts. The operational activity documented throughout this record — running multiple retail premises, conducting daily public broadcasts, and travelling between shops — spans the same period. This document does not assert the operator’s health claims are entirely fabricated; the documented position is that health claims have been systematically deployed to deflect scrutiny and frame critics as targeting a seriously ill person.

Documented health claims inventory — at least 31 distinct conditions claimed across Facebook posts and broadcasts. The following conditions have been publicly claimed across archived Facebook posts and broadcast transcripts. Primary source references are available via Sources on each row (searchable in the transcript archive):

Additional claimed conditions documented in broadcasts: The following are documented in posts and broadcasts but are not yet listed in the inventory above. Further sources are available in the transcript archive. The following have not yet been matched to a specific source file: ADHD (referenced in operational teaching context but no confirmed self-claim transcript located), fatigue (referenced across hundreds of files but no isolated self-claim file), and hypothyroidism (listed in SAR and operator self-declarations but no broadcast source located). Blood cancer, brain tumour, gabapentin, ovarian cancer, immunocompromised status, and sleep apnoea have now been added to the inventory above with primary source references. No single official medical record, NHS discharge summary, or clinical letter has been produced in evidence of any of the above conditions. The document does not assert the operator has no medical conditions; it documents the pattern of their public deployment.

“Britain’s most stalked woman” — repeated self-description across at least 15 documented broadcasts. From May 2025 onward, the operator repeatedly used the phrase “Britain’s most stalked woman” as a public self-identifier, deploying it as an opening greeting in broadcasts and as a framing device before naming critics or dismissing scrutiny. Representative examples include: “So, as you are fully aware, I am Britain’s most stalked woman”; “Good evening from Britain’s most stalked woman”; “Afternoon, guys. It’s Britain’s most stalked woman”; and “I’m the most stalked woman in Britain” (January 2026). The phrase continued in use through at least March 2026. The claim is additionally attributed to a named police officer: “The most stalked woman in Britain. The police said that to me. The main police officer from [Ystrad] said that to me. He said you’re the most stalked woman in Britain.” No official police statement, crime statistics report, victim assessment, or press release confirms this claim. “Britain’s most stalked woman” is not a designation issued by Gwent Police, the National Police Chiefs’ Council, or any official body. The phrase functions as a recurring rhetorical device deployed to frame all criticism, scrutiny, and public interest documentation as criminal stalking — pre-emptively characterising the investigation and its sources as a criminal enterprise rather than a public interest record.

Addendum — further claims identified in the September 2026 corpus sweep. The following are recorded separately from the thirty-eight-condition tabulation above, which is not re-counted here. Each was located by exhaustive search of the indexed transcript corpus and each is the operator’s own account.

Pan colitis — 19 August 2025. Reporting a hospital telephone call: “They just rang from the Royal Gwent now. Right, so I’ve got something called pan colitis.” The same passage then disputes the diagnosis and does so from a position of clinical familiarity: “I don’t feel like I’ve got colitis, I’ve got to be honest. You know, I’ve seen… I know patients that have had colitis and I know people who have had it and I don’t feel like I’ve got that. But anyway, you know, I’m not a specialist.” The reference to “patients” is a clinical framing; the disclaimer follows it in the same breath. The same call is reported as also disclosing “a bulky mass in the womb” and a re-referral to oncology and gynaecology.

Crohn’s disease and coeliac testing — 23 April to 22 May 2025. A month-long sequence in which investigation is announced, expanded and then closed without result. 23 April: “the doctor’s going to check me for Crohn’s disease. Now I didn’t think I had Crohn’s disease. So I don’t know why he’s looking at me thinking I’ve got Crohn’s disease.” 15 May: “I’ve had to do a poop test. I’ve had to do a blood test… and I’m checking for Crohn’s and celiac.” 22 May: “they’ve said nothing about Crohn’s and nothing about celiac.” The sequence is recorded here as investigation reported publicly, not as a condition claimed; it is included because it follows the documented pattern in which a named illness is introduced, circulated, and then leaves the account without a stated outcome.

Tramadol — 20 February 2026. During a broadcast conducted while the operation was running: “I’m not very good, guys, because I’ve had to take Tramadol.” Tramadol is a controlled opioid analgesic. This is recorded alongside the morphine and alcohol material at Finding 12, which addresses prescribed opioids and the public broadcast of the operation to an audience including donors and vulnerable mothers.

Why the addendum matters to the count, and why the count is not changed. The thirty-eight figure was compiled from a defined set of archived posts and transcripts. These four items were found by a later, exhaustive pass over a larger indexed corpus. Folding them into the earlier figure would produce a number that cannot be reproduced from either method. They are therefore set out separately, dated, and quoted, so that an investigator can verify each independently and recount on whatever basis they choose.

09EnforcementCCJs, council fines, fire prohibition orders, trading in violation

A County Court Judgment for £7,141 (case ref. 521MC287, County Court Online) was registered on 23 May 2024 against "Ceri-Ann Ridsdale T/A Jayne's Baby Bank" at 7 Meadow Road. As of 26 January 2026, court records confirm the judgment remains unsatisfied. The use of the "Ceri-Ann" name variant in this formal financial liability directly contrasts with the "Jayne Price" persona used for public fundraising, and was publicly dismissed with claims the name was not hers and there were "no legal documents" connected to the operation.

A second County Court Judgment was subsequently registered on 27 January 2026 (case ref. M3DP9X7A, Civil National Business Centre). This time directly under the name Miss Carrie-Anne Ridsdale, at the same address: 7 Meadow Road, Pontllanfraith, Blackwood, NP12 2AG. The amount is £277 and the judgment remains unsatisfied. Unlike the first judgment, this record does not use a variant spelling — it uses the exact Carrie-Anne Ridsdale identity that had been publicly challenged, denied, and minimised. Both judgments appear on the same TrustOnline Register of Judgments, Orders and Fines report. See Finding 19 for a full analysis of the identity significance.

Cumulative outstanding liabilities across multiple creditors. Beyond the two unsatisfied CCJs (£7,418 combined), the following additional liabilities have been documented: a Torfaen business rates summons for £1,105 (accidentally displayed on camera, August 2025, addressed to Miss Carrie Anne Ridsdale); and community witness testimony — publicly corroborated by A### O######, the Blackwood Market Place manager, that the operation left that premises in July 2025 owing over £8,000 to the landlord and with an outstanding £6,000 electric bill, the latter attributed to the operation rerouting electrics and fitting floodlights in breach of lease obligations rather than using a qualified electrician as required. Across documented sources, claimed and outstanding financial liabilities total in excess of £22,000 across multiple creditors.

SSE warrant — utility disconnection, Pontypool, 19 June 2026. On 19 June 2026, SSE personnel attended 6 Commercial Street, Pontypool NP4 6JJ — one of two originally separate Pontypool shops later knocked through to 5 Crane Street NP4 6LY as one combined unit, with no Listed Building Consent found on Torfaen planning records — with a warrant for meter check and disconnection, accompanied by a locksmith. A JBB representative initially resisted entry, stating that the shop was under a prohibition notice; access was granted after a brief dispute. Independent sources confirmed power was cut on the Commercial Street side; operator footage showing working lights the same day was recorded from the Crane Street elevation only. JBB acknowledged SSE’s attendance. The account grounds for the warrant are no longer unconfirmed. On 15 September 2026 Jayne’s Baby Bank published video of itself opening and reading SSE’s own paperwork for the meter — the invoice, the balance and the warrant notice. That material, and what it establishes about who was consuming the electricity, is set out at Finding 09a. The incident also sits within the documented pattern of utility arrears and unauthorised electrical works at JBB premises (see Blackwood departure above). The knock-through between the two units was undertaken without Listed Building Consent in a Grade II listed building — analysed in the Sherlock article of 19 June 2026, which notes the resulting meter and addressing confusion as relevant context. See timeline.

Torfaen County Borough Council has issued fines to Carrie-Anne Ridsdale. A court summons for £1,105 in unpaid business rates was accidentally displayed live on camera in August 2025. A witness statement documents rent unpaid for over one year at the Pontypool premises, with landlords attempting to locate the operator.

Motability vehicle used for commercial purposes. The vehicle consistently used for JBB operations, documented at car boot sales, stock collection runs, and commercial activities — has been confirmed as a Motability Finance Ltd vehicle. Under the Motability Scheme's terms, vehicles must be used for the disabled person's benefit; use for business, deliveries, or commercial transport is explicitly prohibited and constitutes misuse. Motability Operations confirmed it investigated nearly 36,000 possible misuse cases in a single year, terminating vehicles in approximately 5,300 cases including unauthorised commercial use. On 26 May 2026, the operator implicitly confirmed Motability use in a public livestream: “They’re saying I’m using my mobility car to deliver, I’m not. I’m too busy to deliver.” The denial of using the “mobility car” to deliver is itself confirmation that the operator holds a Motability vehicle, a scheme issued exclusively to claimants of qualifying disability benefits, primarily PIP at the enhanced mobility rate. On the same date the operator published a public Facebook post articulating intent to “claim pip, and get a company car with fuel expenses” (see Finding 26). The combination establishes a documented Motability vehicle, public articulation of PIP claims, and contemporaneous documented operational activity across multiple commercial premises. Whether a formal misuse report has been made to Motability Operations in respect of this vehicle is not publicly known.

Documented reporting chain — Gwent Police signposting and Operation SNAP submission, June 2025. On 6 June 2025, a member of the public reported to Gwent Police a livestream broadcast from the operator’s Facebook account, in which she was observed live streaming while driving, in what appears to be holding the phone on multiple occasions, while actively promoting a newly-opened premises at 14 Pentrebane Street, Caerphilly. The report was logged by Gwent Police Force Contact & Control under reference Gwent Police log ###/06.06.2025 (full reference held on file). Gwent Police responded the same day, signposting the reporter to two channels: Trading Standards for the wider commercial concerns, and Operation SNAP (the Welsh Road Casualty Reduction Partnership’s public-evidence submission system at gosafesnap.wales) for the driving offence. Operation SNAP is the standard Welsh-policing pathway for citizen-submitted video evidence of driving offences. The reporter submitted the broadcast footage to Operation SNAP the same day, generating GoSafe SNAP reference 2e3…d85a (full reference held on file), with confirmation acknowledged at 18:19 the same evening.

SNAP outcome — evidential threshold not met on this specific submission. On 11 June 2025, GoSafe issued an update on the submission, with the decision recorded as “No Further Action Taken.” The reasoning given by GoSafe was strictly evidential, quoted verbatim: “To prove an offence to the evidential threshold required we need to prove the following beyond all reasonable doubt: 1. Date 2. Time 3. Vehicle registration. If we cannot confirm the above from the evidence provided, we’re unable to take action.” The SNAP outcome is not a finding that no offence took place; it is a finding that the livestream footage as submitted did not establish the vehicle’s registration plate to the criminal evidential threshold required for prosecution. In Operation SNAP cases generally, footage that lacks a clearly visible registration plate cannot proceed to enforcement regardless of the conduct depicted. This is documented here as a matter of investigative completeness: the reporting pathway recommended by Gwent Police was followed in full, the institutional record exists at both Gwent Police and GoSafe, and the SNAP outcome reflects a limitation of the specific footage rather than an exoneration of the conduct broadcast.

An independent Fire Risk Assessment at 5 Crane Street, Pontypool (September 2025) graded the overall risk to life as “Substantial Risk” with potential consequences described as “Extreme harm.” Documented failures included extreme fire loading blocking escape routes, no valid electrical installation report, PAT testing carried out by an unqualified volunteer, a fire door found damaged and propped open, a faulty fire alarm panel described as "not operational," and zero evacuation procedures or staff training records. South Wales Fire and Rescue Service spent 15 months attempting to bring the premises into compliance. A return visit in September 2025 found more stock than on both previous visits with zero actions taken from an April 2025 Schedule of Works. SWFRS issued Prohibition Notice PNO1/0151 on 3 March 2026. On 7 April 2026, a spot check confirmed the shop was trading in violation, two members of the public were observed entering the premises, with stock and advertising boards on the pavement. Separately, an AD01 filing at Companies House dated 14 November 2025 records that the CIC's registered office was formally changed from 7 Meadow Road, Blackwood to 5 Crane Street, Pontypool NP4 6LY. The same premises that was subsequently subject to Prohibition Notice PNO1/0151 from 3 March 2026. As of the date of prohibition, the CIC's own registered office was an address where members of the public were legally prohibited from entering. The enforcement register was subsequently updated to “Enforced” and the premises remains subject to an Article 30 Enforcement Notice for ongoing breaches of Articles 8, 13, and 17 of the Fire Safety Order.

PAT testing — who was said to be qualified. Her explanation of in-house PAT testing was: “My father was a qualified electrician and him and Daniel have both done the pat testing course” (quoted in the investigation’s report of 1 October 2026). Information received by the investigation from more than one source is that her father, Alan Ridsdale, worked as a crane operator at Alcan, not as an electrician. The fire risk assessment of September 2025 recorded PAT testing carried out by an unqualified volunteer, at premises open to the public. Sherlock article, 1 October 2026.

The Newbridge Road warehouse (The Donation Centre) was separately prohibited after SWFRS officers attending in March 2026 found the premises completely inaccessible — officers reported being “unable to enter without climbing onto a wooden unit and over stacked materials.” Access was restricted solely to removal of materials. Management had previously refused officers entry in November 2025, claiming the site was not in use.

Pontypool Community Council declined a 2026 funding request after due diligence (Minute 468(vii), 4 February 2026), with the committee recording that JBB is "not the type of organisation that should receive funding." Caerphilly Social Services have formally stated JBB is "NOT endorsed and NOT allowed to make referrals" on their behalf. Following publication of the council minutes by the investigation, the operator sent a direct message to Pontypool Community Council advising them: "Ok don't correspond with them because the police have people on bail in regards to this website and the fb group." This is a documented attempt to discourage a statutory public body from corresponding with a public interest investigation by making an unverifiable claim about criminal proceedings. The council had already confirmed the minutes were published from their own publicly available governance records (Minute 468, February Finance Governance and Policy).

Ongoing criminal investigation — Caerphilly. A Freedom of Information request for Environmental Health records relating to 14 Pentrebane Street, Caerphilly (FOI 25/1498) was refused by Caerphilly CBC on 9 January 2026 under Section 30(1)(a)(i) — investigations a public authority has a duty to conduct with a view to ascertaining whether a person should be charged with an offence. The council's decision states: “Part of the information requested is in relation to an ongoing investigation which the authority may be required to rely upon should it be necessary to instigate legal proceedings.” The exemption was applied to protect the integrity of that investigation. This confirms that as of 9 January 2026, Caerphilly CBC had an active ongoing investigation at 14 Pentrebane Street with potential criminal proceedings in view.

A separate FOI request (ref. FOI 25/1318, Caerphilly CBC) sought confirmation of whether charitable rate relief (80%) or discretionary relief had been applied to three JBB premises — the Newbridge Road HQ, 68 Tredegar Street Risca, and 14 Pentrebane Street Caerphilly. Caerphilly CBC refused to confirm or deny under Section 41. The question of whether charitable rate relief — applicable only to registered charities or qualifying organisations — was applied to any of these premises therefore remains publicly unresolved.

A further FOI request to Torfaen CBC (ref. 25/418) sought confirmation of whether charitable rate relief or discretionary relief had been applied to the Pontypool premises. In the internal review, the Head of Legal Services confirmed the refusal under Section 40(2) personal data — noting: “The requested information is personal data as it relates to an individual as the entity known as Jaynes Baby Bank is not a registered company.” This is a formal legal confirmation from Torfaen's own legal services that JBB, as an unregistered entity, is treated in rates law as an individual rather than a corporate entity.

68 Tredegar Street, Risca absent from the public business rates register. A search of the VOA business rates database at gov.uk/find-business-rates for Tredegar Street, Risca returns every numbered property on the street with the exception of number 68 — the address registered on the food business registration, and the address listed in the Risca FOI documentation as a JBB premises. Absence from the business rates register at a commercial address can indicate that the premises was either rated as domestic, exempt, or that charitable rate relief had been applied and the property was removed from the active liability register. The Caerphilly CBC FOI refusal under Section 41 (referenced above) declined to confirm or deny whether charitable rate relief had been applied to 68 Tredegar Street specifically. The combination of these three records — absence from the public rates register, a food business registration filed at that address declaring the operator as "A charity (registered by a representative)" with charity number "Awaiting", and a Risca FOI document listing it as a charity premises, consistent with charitable rate relief having been applied to an organisation that held no charity registration at any point during the period of occupation.

24 July 2026 — environmental health prohibition documentation, 5b Crane Street. Environmental health prohibition documentation was served in relation to 5b Crane Street. The covering letter records a serious risk of personal injury caused by water penetration, dampness and mould growth and states that the premises were required to be vacated and not reoccupied until remedial work had addressed the risk. A second prohibition notice was also served on MMB Property Development Ltd in relation to matters contained in the same documentation. This is a separate notice under separate powers from the fire Prohibition Notice PNO1/0151 recorded above — the fire safety proceedings and the later environmental health prohibition concerned different regulatory powers and different risks — and the public possession notice posted at 5 Crane Street on 15 August 2026 refers to Prohibition Notice 004244. The two July notices imposed different obligations on different parties: the property company was the party required to deal with the matters falling within its notice, and the occupier was the party required not to continue using the premises in circumstances where the prohibition applied. The landlord also receiving a notice did not extinguish the occupier’s. Recorded in the Sherlock article of 16 August 2026.

25 November 2023 to 23 July 2026 — the condition was not a new discovery. On 25 November 2023 the operator wrote that the roof had been leaking for 456 days, a calculation reaching back to August 2022, before the January 2023 lease commenced. On 16 June 2026 she wrote that ceilings were falling because of the leak. On 19 June 2026 she filmed mould inside the premises and said: “look at that mould that we’re just getting worse with.” On 1 July 2026, three weeks before the prohibition, she said: “we are available at least 12 hours a day, seven days a week, for them to do work.” On 23 July 2026, the day before the environmental health documentation, she was still discussing contractors and the historic damp and leaks. The water penetration identified in the prohibition was therefore not a condition that first appeared on 24 July 2026.

16 June 2026 onwards — access before and after the prohibition. On 16 June 2026 the operator said the landlord had 24-hour access seven days a week. On 19 June 2026, referring to officials entering the premises, she said: “They didn’t have to break in. They didn’t need a warrant. We let them in.” After the prohibition she said: “We have to lock the door because the fire don’t want anybody just walking in here.” A witness account recorded in the underlying investigation states that environmental health officers were allowed a period to remove what was needed and that entry was subsequently refused when officers returned. That account was put to Torfaen County Borough Council. It is recorded here as an account and is not treated as an established finding; the precise circumstances of any alleged refusal of access remain unestablished.

29 July 2026 — police attendance at the Crane Street frontage. Police attended the Crane Street frontage. A director of MMB Property Development Ltd was also present and goods were visible on the pavement. The operator’s public explanation was that police had attended because somebody had falsely reported children locked inside and that she was at home: “Police tuned up because one of them lied and said there were children locked inside. I have a security team and volunteers inthe correct accessible areas. I’m at home having a day off.” (spelling as published). The nature of the report which prompted that attendance has not been established.

15 August 2026 — public notice of possession, 5 Crane Street. MMB Property Development Ltd placed a public notice in the window of 5 Crane Street, Pontypool NP4 6LY stating that it had taken possession of the premises, that access was restricted and that the building had been secured because of identified health and safety risks, with unauthorised persons not permitted to enter until remedial works had been completed and the prohibition notice lifted by Torfaen County Borough Council. The notice refers to Prohibition Notice 004244 and to the previous tenancy involving Jayne’s Mother and Baby Bank and Foodbank Fundraising Shop. The notice does not itself establish the legal mechanism by which possession was obtained; it is recorded here as evidence that the property company publicly stated on 15 August that it had taken possession, and not as proof of any particular court or enforcement procedure.

15 September 2026 — Formal Notice of expired commercial tenancy, 6 Commercial Street. The landlord of 6 Commercial Street, Pontypool, Nasrat Shoaib, placed a Formal Notice headed “EXPIRED COMMERCIAL TENANCY — NO UNAUTHORISED ACCESS” in the window of the premises, naming Carrie-Anne Ridsdale as former tenant and recording that the contractual term expired on 26 October 2025. See Finding 31.

14 September 2026, 15:33 — council email recording a live prosecution file. An email from a torfaen.gov.uk address, timed 14 September 2026 at 15:33, reads: “Okay, thanks, let me know when you have the caddies and I will close the prosecution file.” The operator published it in the 15–16 September 2026 posting period as a debunk of fly-tipping allegations, under the caption “Just debunking the fly tipping allegations from the haters. We were allowed to put rubbish out but we didn’t have the right containers.” The document does not debunk the allegations. It establishes the existence of a live prosecution file held by Torfaen County Borough Council, to be closed conditionally on the operator obtaining the correct containers. See Finding 15.

15–16 September 2026 — Environmental Health Officer email published under a caption it does not support. The operator published a screenshot of an email from an Environmental Health Officer under a caption stating that the go-ahead had been given to remove stock and that the email confirmed both premises were unfit for purpose. The email states neither.

Current position — 15 September 2026. With both Pontypool units returned to their owners, one unit remains: the Donation Centre at Newbridge Road Industrial Estate, Blackwood. It remains subject to a fire service prohibition and members of the public are not permitted to enter it. It is full to the doors, and has been for several weeks, with stock stacked outside the unit in the open air. Nothing can lawfully be sold from it and the public cannot enter it while the prohibition stands. Recorded in the Sherlock article of 15 September 2026.

09aElectricity Act 1989 Sch. 6 para. 3Rights of Entry (Gas and Electricity Boards) Act 1954The SSE warrant, answered by the operator’s own footage — a meter consuming electricity during her occupation, billed to a company dissolved before she moved in

The dossier previously recorded that the account grounds for the 19 June 2026 warrant had not been independently confirmed (Finding 09). They no longer need to be. The paperwork was published by the operation itself, on camera, and read aloud in part.

What was published, and when. The video appeared on the Jayne’s Baby Bank Facebook page on 15 September 2026 — the day the landlord retook 6 Commercial Street — in a batch of older footage from the Pontypool premises. It shows a bundle of at least five SSE envelopes, described in her own words as “stuck in a letter box they were. They hadn’t actually come through.” She reaches her conclusion before opening the first: “So, it wasn’t us, guys, the warrant was for. It was for discount deals.”

The source article estimates that the footage was recorded on 19 June 2026, the day of the warrant, on two grounds: she discusses the SSE visit as that day’s news, and the address “Unit 1, Lion House” that she reads off the envelopes first appears in her public posts that same day. That recording date is an estimate and is identified as one; nothing in this finding turns on it. What is not in question is that the documents are SSE’s, that she is reading them, and that they were published on 15 September 2026.

The arithmetic, which is the whole of it. Payment due £5,735.17, less the balance brought forward of £5,525.80, is £209.37. February’s energy charge of £199.40 plus VAT at five per cent is £209.37. The figures reconcile exactly. The debt SSE went to court over was not inherited from a previous occupier and left to sit: it was still growing in February 2026, by one month of metered consumption, in a building Jayne’s Baby Bank had by then occupied for fifteen months.

326.90 kWh across twenty-eight days is roughly 11.7 units a day. A disconnected supply records nothing. An empty unit records close to nothing. Something was drawing on that meter every day of that month.

The company on the envelope had ceased to exist. The Companies House register records DISCOUNT DEALS PVT LTD, company number 14805585, incorporated 15 April 2023, registered office in Scarborough, SIC 47910. Its filing history shows a DS01 application to strike the company off filed on 3 July 2024, first Gazette notice on 16 July 2024, and final Gazette and dissolution on 1 October 2024. The lease on 6 Commercial Street was signed on 27 October 2024 — twenty-six days later. A dissolved company has no legal existence, cannot occupy premises and cannot consume electricity. From the commencement of that lease the occupier of the building was Jayne’s Baby Bank.

That leaves a narrow set of explanations, and “not my bill” is not among them. Either the Discount Deals account was never closed when the company folded and the supply simply continued into premises the operation occupied with a dead company’s name still on the envelope; or the supply was kept running under that name. This dossier does not determine which, and no evidence before it establishes the second. What the law does say is that the name printed on a bill does not settle who is liable for electricity used in a building. Paragraph 3 of Schedule 6 to the Electricity Act 1989 provides that where electricity is supplied to premises otherwise than under a contract, the supplier is deemed to have contracted with the occupier of those premises for that supply. Occupation is the connecting factor, not the addressee.

“The Occupier” — the notice was addressed to whoever was in the building. SSE did not write to a dissolved company alone. The warrant notice is addressed to “Discount Deals PVT Ltd/The Occupier”, and its opening words record that it followed earlier contact: “Our records indicate that you still haven’t paid your outstanding invoices, despite our recent visit to your property and previous correspondence. As we haven’t been able to gain access to your property, it’s now our intention to apply for a warrant of entry…” By 13 March 2026 SSE had already attended the premises and already written. The bundle of at least five envelopes in the video is that correspondence.

The sequence that follows is the answer to a question this dossier had previously left open — why access had not been obtained earlier. The notice was delivered to a trading shop in March. Its return date passed on 3 April. It was still unopened on the morning of 19 June 2026, when a representative of the operation stood in the doorway telling SSE that nobody could enter because of a prohibition notice. “They hadn’t actually come through” does not describe five envelopes from one supplier accumulating across months, following a visit and prior letters.

“1 Lion House” — a correction, and a postcode. The 19 June 2026 reporting stated that property records showed no property addressed as “1 Lion House”. That has since been corrected at source and is corrected here. Lion House is the historic name of the corner block at Commercial Street and Crane Street — the White Lion tavern until around 1840, then Fowler’s store, which took the building’s name from the pub. The block was later divided into the separately addressed units that include 6 Commercial Street and 5 Crane Street. There is no freestanding “1 Lion House” on a map; there is a supplier’s site label for one meter inside that block.

The postcode settles where the meter is. Every SSE envelope reads NP4 6JJ. So does the Property definition in the lease, and so does the landlord’s Formal Notice taped inside the window on 15 September 2026. NP4 6JJ is a live postcode in Pontypool Fawr, Torfaen. Earlier versions of this dossier gave 6 Commercial Street as NP4 6XU in several places; that postcode does not exist on the Royal Mail address file and has been corrected throughout. The meter on the Discount Deals account is inside the block Jayne’s Baby Bank occupied from both sides and knocked through in the middle.

Where the meter was found, on her own account. “They checked the meter up here. It wasn’t the meter up here. And then they went downstairs, they said, there’s another meter in one of these buildings… So, they went round all the rooms looking for meters, ones they could get in properly, all upstairs in P3. And they eventually found it, I think, on a side part that we couldn’t access.” P3, which she has described as a basement (June 2025) and as upstairs (September 2026), is the space she never held a lease for and filled with donated stock (Finding 31a). One consequence of her own description is worth recording: a meter serving only an inaccessible side room does not black out a shop floor, and independent sources confirmed the Commercial Street unit went dark on 19 June.

£15,000 became £5,735.17. The figure offered in the same video was second-hand: “the lad that works in the vape shop said that they had a bill in for 15,000.” The invoice in her hand reads £5,735.17.

The letters were addressed to somebody else. Twice in the video the question is raised and not answered on camera: “I don’t know if I’m allowed to open them”, and then “Let me see if this letter will fall open now.” The camera is set down; an envelope is heard being torn open. This dossier records that sequence and makes no finding on it: post already delivered to premises raises different questions from post in the course of transmission, and the point is noted rather than pressed.

What this finding does not assert. It does not assert that anyone impersonated Discount Deals Pvt Ltd, or deliberately kept a dissolved company’s account open. It does not assert the amount ultimately owed by anybody, which is a matter for SSE and, if it comes to it, a court. It does not determine the recording date of the video. It does not assert that the whole £5,735.17 accrued during the occupation — only that the £209.37 attributable to February 2026 demonstrably did, and that the balance was carried forward from earlier invoices on the same meter. What is recorded is that a meter in the occupied premises consumed electricity during the occupation, that the statutory notice was addressed to the occupier and delivered to the shop, and that the operation published the documents establishing this while telling its followers they proved the opposite.

Her own test for whose bill it is — 27 or 28 May 2026. Three weeks before the warrant was executed, answering a question about an energy bill, the operator set out the distinction she relied on.

That is the wrong test, and it is the test the whole “it wasn’t us” position rests on. The name on an account does not determine who is liable for electricity consumed in premises: under paragraph 3 of Schedule 6 to the Electricity Act 1989 the supplier is deemed to have contracted with the occupier. On her stated test the Discount Deals account was not hers because the envelope said otherwise. On the statutory test it was, because the meter was inside the building she occupied and it was recording consumption. The post is recorded because it is her own articulation of the reasoning, made before the paperwork was opened on camera.

Note on this date. The post survives in a backup of the operation’s current Facebook account under a bare content-delivery filename carrying no date. Facebook photo identifiers in this series increase monotonically with time; 904 dated anchors drawn from the transcript archive fix it between two posts of 27 and 28 May 2026. The same method independently returns 8 June 2026 for “We have permission to use all areas of p1, p2 and p3”, which is the date already established for that post from a separate source — so the method is checkable and has been checked. The date is nonetheless an interpolation and is identified as one.

A second SSE account, in the operation’s own name — Blackwood, June 2026. Eleven months after the operation left 13–15 The Market Place, Blackwood (Premises), the electricity account for that shop, held with SSE Energy Solutions in the name “Jayne s Mother & Baby Bank”, stood at £5,013.63 overdue.

On her own test of 27–28 May 2026 (below) — “obviously the shop bills would be in the business name” — this is a shop bill, in the business name. There is no dissolved company on the paperwork and no previous tenant to point to.

Her public statements on electricity since then: “As for an energy company trying to get in, we’re not with SSE” (video, 27 May 2026, about the Pontypool shop); “the bill is the druggies who had the bottom shop before us and I pay my bill” (15 June 2026, Pontypool); and “Just for proof for the haters we have closed our electric account” (18 August 2026). Her complaints while she held the Blackwood shop were about the landlord rather than the supplier: “Then they tried to push a bill onto us and we’re like we’re not paying it” (video, 13 June 2025). The archive to 1 October 2026 contains no public reference by her to the Blackwood balance.

What this addition does not assert. It does not assert that the balance is unpaid today: the figure dates from June 2026 and nothing later is before the investigation. It does not determine which legal person held the account: the account name is a trading name, and the Blackwood shop closed four months before Jayne’s Baby Bank C.I.C. was incorporated. The amount ultimately owed is a matter for SSE.

34Town and Country Planning Act 1990 ss.55 and 57Food business registrationChildren’s clubsRogerstone “Foodbank Fundraising Recycling & Donation Centre”: classes, Lego clubs and a shop in a former factory with no planning permission for them

Which building. She has not named it. Her posts call it “Donation centre 2” and, on 13 October at 12.02pm, ask “Donation centre 2 is 6200 square feet - will it be big enough for us?” (archived post). The agents’ particulars for Principality House, Western Valley Road, Rogerstone give 6,200 sq ft (Section 07; Finding 31). On 15 October she gave the address of her “Foodbank Fundraising Recycling and Donations Centre” as “Pye Corner Junction, Rogerstone, Newport NP10 9DT” (archived post; the listing postcode is NP10 9DS), and on 19 October she called it the “Rogerstone Warehouse”. In a video of 13 October she shows the way to “Donation Center 2” and says “this is the wild card”, the building she described on 15 September (machine transcript; Section 07). The investigation identifies the building as Principality House from the size, the junction she names and the council’s reply, which answers the investigation’s enquiry about Principality House and speaks of an enforcement case at “this site”. She has not used the name. On 21 October she wrote “Just remember we are only here for 5 years and then building then will be demolished.” (archived post), beside her 30 September “1825 countdown!” (timeline).

15 September to 21 October 2026 — what she was told about how long she can stay, and what she tells the public. After viewing the building on 15 September she said on video that she had been told there was “no renewable lease” because the owners were “looking for planning permission to do something else” and that “the longest you can have is five years” (machine transcript); her list of the building’s points that day read “5 years lease but no renewal as they have plans!” (timeline). From 13 October she has advertised classrooms for hire at £25 an hour and clubs to book, and on 21 October she wrote “we are only here for 5 years and then building then will be demolished” (archived post). No lease or tenancy has been evidenced (Section 07). The investigation’s article of 25 October reports the building’s published background: Sherlock article, 25 October 2026.

14 October 2026 — what Newport City Council’s planning officer says. The investigation asked the council about the activities she was advertising for the building: craft classes, kite-making, wreath-making, Lego clubs, speech and language activities, music therapy and music lessons. The Principal Planning Officer, Regeneration and Economic Development, replied by email at 3.31pm on 14 October 2026, answering under each question:

On the council’s own account, then, no planning history formally confirms the building’s lawful use, and neither business use it expects (B2 or B1) includes classes, children’s activities or community sessions. The council’s planning register, as reported in the investigation’s article of 25 October, lists a 2006 permission to keep a storage shed and an outside staff rest area (05/1581) and no permission for classes, children’s activities, a shop or a café; the article reports that none has been applied for. The reply is about the activities the investigation listed; it does not separately address a shop, a café or a donation point. The council has not said that a breach has occurred. That is for the council.

8 October 2026 — not registered as a food business. On 7 October the investigation asked Newport City Council’s Environmental Health team to check whether a food business at Principality House, which her page had branded the “Foodbank Fundraising Recycling & Donation Centre” that day, had been registered. The Food, Safety & Public Health team replied at 12.29pm on 8 October:

Since then she has described a foodbank (19 October: “we take uncarved pumpkins after Halloween for our foodbank!”, archived post) and a café (24 October: “New floor for our cafe. Think we will go with a Disney themed cafe!”, archived post). The investigation has seen no notice that a registration has been made since 8 October, and the Food Standards Agency’s food hygiene register showed no entry at NP10 9DT when the investigation checked it for its article of 25 October.

7 to 20 October 2026 — classrooms, classes, groups and Lego clubs, in her own words. 7 October, 6.26pm: “SNEAK PEEK! CLASSROOM 1! ready for free lego and craft club for the children and the Mums.” (archived post). 8 October, 5.19pm: “you will need to sign up as a memeber before you can enter the new building as we will be holding groups and classes and baby and children’s classes not just a shop” (spelling as published; archived post). 13 October, 9.52am: “Classrooms can be hired £25 an hour” and “we will be using them to run our FREE classes:- Craft class for Mums / Kite making for adults and children / Wreath making / Lego clubs / Speech and language and music therapy / Music lessons ect” (line breaks shown as /; archived post). 14 October, 11.36am: “Mums let us know if you would like a play area that you can access for free.” (archived post), and in her video that day, of rooms she planned as playrooms, “the imaginary playroom which you could book” (machine transcript).

A second version at 4.06pm adds “Am/afternoon/pm sessions available for Mums” (archived post; the 3.54pm post is archived here); her TikTok caption at 11.08pm reads “Rogerstone booking required 2 classrooms available multiple slots available” (TikTok video of 20 October). Childcare in Wales for children up to 12 must be registered with Care Inspectorate Wales if it runs for more than two hours a day (timeline, 4 October); the hours of these sessions have not been stated, and no registration has been shown. Care Inspectorate Wales acknowledged a concern about Jayne’s Baby Bank from the investigation on 8 October and said it would consider whether the service requires registration; no outcome has been reported to the investigation. The earlier announcements of a children’s club, and the staff and checks said to go with it, are in Finding 33.

13 to 25 October 2026 — trading from the unit. 13 October, 7.12am: “We will be open today from 9am- 6pm approx at Rogertstone.” (spelling as published; archived post). 15 October: “we are open most days 10- 6 pm - Pye Corner Junction, Rogerstone, Newport NP10 9DT”. 23 October: “Trike needs a respray £20 please / Little tikes slide £35 please rrp £79. / Rogerstone. We can’t deliver sorry atm” (archived post). 24 October, 12.59pm: “ROGERSTONE open until 5pm” (archived post); 1.46pm: “New shop floor day!”; 10.32pm: “Rogerstone open tomorrow guys but not the main room… Open areas for Sunday :- Baby items, toys, Christmas bits and haberdashery and adult shoes.” 25 October: cribs “£10 each please / Collection only atm Rogerstone”. She also calls the building the “Rogerstone Warehouse” (19 October) while advertising it as a shop, a café, classrooms and a play area.

7 and 25 October 2026 — the name, and the new signs. The “Foodbank Fundraising Recycling & Donation Centre” name first appeared on 7 October as a graphic laid over her “Classroom 1” video, with “Trademarked Registered CIC 16838920” and “By Jayne’s Baby Bank”. On 25 October at 4.45pm her page posted “New signs” (archived post) with one photograph: a printed black poster headed “Foodbank Fundraising Recycling & Donation Centre” beside a green recycling symbol, with the Facebook, TikTok, Instagram and X symbols (Exhibit I). It continues the “Foodbank Fundraising” wording of the successive names in Finding 05; the Intellectual Property Office refused the word mark “Foodbank Fundraising Shop” on 3 February 2024 (Finding 10); and on 4 August 2026 she said funding had been approved for a second donation centre, without naming a funder (timeline).

13Offensive Weapons Act 2019Unsanctioned knife amnesty. No police authorisation, CCTV disabled

In April and May 2024, the operator announced and ran a knife and weapon surrender scheme for young people from the Pontypool premises. In her own words on a public livestream: "We're gonna turn the CCTV off. I'm not interested in your name." A follow-up video showed her handling a surrendered knife in a bag, stating: "I grabbed a bag because I thought, well, I don't want my fingerprints all over it." She also publicly stated: "If you feel like you wanna stab somebody… can you go in contact with us? We can give you a number and set up counselling."

Under UK law, knife amnesty schemes may only be run by police or organisations formally coordinated and authorised by police forces. Private collection, handling, or storage of surrendered weapons without such authorisation may constitute an offence under the Offensive Weapons Act 2019. Deliberately disabling CCTV during collection of potentially illegal weapons could obstruct future investigations. Handling weapons without proper protocols compromises forensic integrity. Offering unqualified counselling referrals to young people experiencing violent ideation — without clinical training, safeguarding clearance, or a formal partnership with a qualified mental health organisation — places vulnerable young people at significant risk. The operator claimed this was "the first time anybody's ever done this in the UK for children", a claim implying official endorsement that did not exist.

13aTheft Act 1968 s.1 / Fraud Act 2006 s.2Unauthorised vehicle disposal — false representation to scrappers and public admission of legal consequences

On 22 January 2023, the JBB Facebook page published a post stating there was a "KA car outside 35 Bowen Industrial Estate" — the Aberbargoed operational address, and invited scrappers to collect it. The post claimed the operation had "inherited it from the previous owner" and that there was no paperwork because "the fella has died." The post explicitly stated: "on the ground that we rent so I have inherited it from the previous owner. We don't have paper work because the fella has died you have my permission to tow it." No legal basis for this claimed authority has been established. Inheritance of a tenancy does not transfer ownership of a third party's vehicle, and the stated justification, that the previous occupant had died — is unverifiable and was used to circumvent the requirement for title documentation. Screenshots of the exchange were subsequently shared publicly within the investigation group, where members of the public described them as evidence of prior historical concerns about the operation's conduct at this address.

Documented exchange with a scrapper — vehicle confirmed removed. Archived Facebook Messenger exchanges show a scrapper responding to the post and being instructed: "Yep you will need to get it on the truck no key or logbook fella has died." The scrapper confirmed collection the same day: "Yeah it's gone seen loads of people turn up for it." JBB responded: "Thank you." A further exchange shows JBB directing the same scrapper to the Bowen Industrial Estate landlord for additional vehicles, at which point the scrapper declined, stating: "We do not take illegally parked cars only scrap we collect your have to contact someone else about them being illegally parked that's not my job."

Operator's own admission of legal consequences. Following the scrapper's refusal to collect further vehicles, JBB responded: “I'm getting done for taking the last one your mad you've coursed me trouble.” This statement, made in the same Messenger thread; a direct admission by the operator that the removal of the first vehicle had generated legal consequences, and that the scrapper's refusal on the second collection frustrated a further attempt. The admission is archived as part of the investigation corpus.

Directing a third party to remove a vehicle that does not belong to the operator — by means of a false public post asserting inherited authority and fabricating a deceased-owner narrative — may constitute dishonest appropriation of property belonging to another under Section 1 of the Theft Act 1968, and a false representation made to obtain the removal under Section 2 of the Fraud Act 2006. The vehicle's registered keeper would have had no notice of, or consent to, its disposal. This incident occurred at the Aberbargoed premises and predates the November 2023 eviction from that site.

15Environmental Protection Act 1990Fly-tipping at St David's Hospice Care, and a false partnership claim denied in writing

Residents and members of the public raised concerns about repeated fly-tipping outside the St David's Hospice Care charity shop in Newbridge. Video footage and CCTV images, sourced from the investigation group and the Newbridge premises, document waste being deposited outside the shop during late evening hours when the premises was closed. Items observed include multiple black refuse sacks, donation bags, and bulky household goods including duvets. The individual responsible has been identified by those familiar with him as Daniel-James Ridsdale — listed as a subscriber on the Jayne's Baby Bank C.I.C. incorporation documents (Companies House ref. 16838920) at the same address as Director 1. A silver Honda vehicle, registration WF11 TZH, is consistently seen at the location during the relevant incidents.

Fly-tipping is a criminal offence under Section 33 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. Local authorities are empowered to investigate, issue fixed penalty notices of up to £1,000, and pursue prosecution — with a maximum penalty on conviction of an unlimited fine and/or 12 months imprisonment on summary conviction, or up to 5 years on indictment for the most serious commercial cases. The identification of both the individual and the associated vehicle provides a clear evidential basis for referral to the local authority environmental enforcement team and, where applicable, Gwent Police.

False partnership claim, denied in writing, circa April 2025. In a public social media post dated circa 16 April 2025, the operator claimed JBB were “the designated collectors at 430pm daily of whatever St David's doesn't want or can not use themselves… We only have 3 designated collectors. Myself and 2 senior staff who use cars and are there from 4–5pm approximately. We do this in partnerships to cut down on waste… We work with multiple charities and shops with their permission. We take everything the charity shop gets ready for us.” St David's Hospice Care (registered charity no. 1010576, Blackett Avenue, Newport NP20 6NH) responded in writing via their enquiries address: “We can confirm that St David's Hospice Care does not work collaboratively with Jaynes Baby Bank.” No partnership, designated collector arrangement, or permission to attend the premises exists. This is the 14th documented instance of a claimed affiliation or partnership being formally denied in writing by a named organisation, and one of the most specific: the claim identifies a named time, named collector roles, and named permission, all of which are directly contradicted by the written denial. In the same post the operator states it is “actually an illegal offence to take items from outside a charity shop or clothes bin” — a statement she made publicly while her own son was being identified in CCTV and video footage depositing waste outside St David's Hospice Care's Newbridge premises.

Separately, Carrie-Anne Ridsdale herself has been observed engaging in fly-tipping during a livestream on her private Instagram account "TheAlchemistMagician," recorded and archived as part of the investigation. This represents fly-tipping conduct documented across two members of the same household, both named in the CIC incorporation documents. The TheAlchemistMagician username has additionally been confirmed on Kik at kik.me/thealchemistmagician, registered under the display name "Carrie Anne" — further establishing the cross-platform use of this alias identity across private messaging and social platforms. A second Kik account has been identified at kik.me/stiflersmam — the username “stiflersmam” being a cultural reference. Confirmed via profile image as belonging to the same individual. This constitutes a sixth identified messaging or social alias in addition to the primary JBB Facebook account, the TheAlchemistMagician Instagram, the Jarmani’s Boutique channel, the Community Shop One TikTok, and the Cerri / Cerii food collection identity.

15–16 September 2026 — the fly-tipping “debunk” which records a live prosecution file. The operator published a post captioned: “Just debunking the fly tipping allegations from the haters. We were allowed to put rubbish out but we didn’t have the right containers. 1 of our bags had Monmouth on too. Not sure how that turned up. Shall we run a raffle on who they are going to report me this week?? CADW and the Bishop are still hiding from them.” (spelling as published). The document attached to that post as the debunk is an email from a torfaen.gov.uk address, dated 14 September 2026 at 15:33, which reads: “Okay, thanks, let me know when you have the caddies and I will close the prosecution file.” A prosecution file does not exist unless a council has opened one. The material published as proof that the allegations were false therefore records the opposite: a live prosecution file, held by the local authority, to be closed conditionally on the operator obtaining the correct bins. This investigation is not aware of any arrest or charge, and the email records the file as one the authority proposes to close. The same caption records that one of the bags bore Monmouth, the operator stating of it that she was “Not sure how that turned up.” Recorded in the Sherlock article of 15 September 2026, as updated on 17 September 2026. See Finding 09 for the wider enforcement record, and Finding 15a for the earlier admitted fly-tipping.

That post also carries a label the page did not write. Beneath the page name, where the timestamp sits, Facebook applied its own tag, “AI content”. Meta applies that tag where its systems detect that media in a post has been generated or altered by AI, and it is not infallible. The label was applied by the platform and not by this investigation; the fact of it is recorded here and no conclusion is drawn from it. The platform labelling, and what it does and does not show, is set out at Finding 30.

15aEnvironmental Protection Act 1990 / Protection from Harassment Act 1997Retaliatory fly-tipping — on-camera admission, targeted at a registered charity's premises

In approximately April–May 2023, waste was deposited at Station Place, Risca — immediately adjacent to the Big Risca shop, and subsequently moved to the doorstep of The Pantri, the premises of Community Volunteers Wales (CVW), a registered charity (Charity Commission no. 1191383). Photographs dated 27 April and 4 May 2023 document both the waste at Station Place, where a Jayne's Baby Bank & Charity Shop A-board is visible in the foreground, and the waste deposited outside The Pantri the following morning, which included mixed refuse, cardboard, and rusting paint tins constituting controlled waste under the Environmental Protection Act 1990. A delivery receipt found in the dumped waste was traced to items previously donated to Jayne's Baby Bank.

On-camera admission, made in advance. The operator filmed herself on her private Instagram account (TheAlchemistMagician) outside the Big Risca shop while the waste was lined up, making an explicit verbal announcement of what she was about to do and why. The videos were subsequently leaked to the investigation and published on the Sherlock YouTube channel on 23 February 2026. The verbatim transcripts of the two clips are as follows:

Context and motivation. The transcripts make the motivation explicit: the fly-tipping was a direct response to a council fly-tipping report made against the operator by the recipient. The statement “even the council told me you were reporting me” — if accurate, raising a separate concern about the disclosure of complainant identity by a local authority, noted here without assertion. The waste outside the Big Risca shop is described in the video as items the operator no longer needed, presented as material for the retaliatory dump.

Police response. Gwent Police were contacted following the incident. Despite the videos, photographs, and provenance receipt, police advised that prosecution was not possible on the available evidence — stating that the operator cannot be clearly seen in the footage (only her shadow, voice, and vehicle) and that the advance announcement combined with the next-morning fulfilment was not considered sufficient proof of responsibility. Police recommended installation of additional security cameras and noted that direct intervention in similar situations had in some cases led to escalation including arson. No charges were brought.

This incident predates the Newbridge fly-tipping documented in Finding 15 by approximately three years and involves the operator herself rather than an associate. The targeting of a registered charity's premises — announced on camera, executed overnight, and confirmed by photographic evidence the following morning, representing a documented pattern of using physical environmental offences as a tool of intimidation against organisations that have made formal complaints about JBB.

12GovernanceProtection from Harassment Act 1997 / UK GDPRGovernance failures, safeguarding concerns, and documented harassment of private individuals

The sole PSC holds over 75% of voting rights and the right to appoint or remove the majority of the board. The surplus use and asset-locked body fields on the CIC36 were submitted blank. The Articles permit directors to set their own remuneration including pension, sickness, and disability benefits. A member expulsion clause grants unilateral power to remove critics or whistleblowers where directors deem continued membership "harmful to the interests of the Company."

A Torfaen CBC FOI internal review (ref. PE/23245, 8 September 2025) confirmed that the council notified Jayne's Baby Bank of the content of an FOI request, including the specific documents to be disclosed, before the statutory recipient received the response. The council sent the full request details and a list of intended disclosures to the subject of the investigation on 22 August 2025, giving the operation advance notice of what official inspection records were about to be released. The internal review upheld this as standard third-party consultation practice. No consultation log was found to exist.

A separate internal review by Torfaen CBC (ref. 25/418, 6 October 2025) confirmed that JBB is not a registered company, and that business rates information therefore attaches personally to the individual operator rather than to a corporate entity. The Head of Legal Services stated: “The requested information is personal data as it relates to an individual as the entity known as Jaynes Baby Bank is not a registered company.” This formal legal determination has implications for the accountability of any financial liabilities, rate reliefs, or public obligations connected to the operation.

Facebook creator monetisation income has been documented as being used to fund commercial premises costs. In a publicly archived transcript, the operator stated: “Dan set it up now so that the money that we earn from the Facebook goes straight into the money that we'll pay for the rent for the shop. So that's brilliant, isn't it? Because this month we've paid for at least one shop rent out of the Facebook money.” The same transcript includes: “I am the influencer for it. So, you know, technically it should be my wage, but I don't…”, an admission that social media income is being treated as personal income while simultaneously claiming no wages are taken. In a separate broadcast, the operator publicly stated that critical engagement from those opposed to the operation directly increases her income: “Facebook pays me to put up with these people. By unblocking them, we should triple how much we're going to get paid for all their comments on Facebook.”

Documented ad revenue figures vs public claims — May to September 2025. Dashboard screenshots shared publicly during this period allow a partial reconstruction of actual Meta creator earnings. Documented figures (all USD, approximate GBP conversion at prevailing rates): 13 May 2025 — $71.32 (~£56); 21 May 2025 — $66 (~£52) on 527,850 views; 7 June 2025 — $63.95 (~£51); 13 June 2025 — $77 (~£61) on 586,007 views. Despite a concurrent public claim of approximately £500 earned that period; 20 June 2025 — $82 (~£65) on 836,975 views; 11 July 2025 — $102 (~£82) on 3.9 million views; 23 July 2025 — $165 (~£132) on 1.5 million views; 31 July 2025 — $399.81 (~£320) payout; 25 August 2025 — $399.81 (~£320), an identical figure to the July payout; 9 September 2025 — $184.13 (~£147) alongside a third appearance of the $399.81 (~£320) figure; mid-September 2025 — $120 (~£96) on 1.6 million views. The figure of $399.81 (~£320) appears three times across July, August, and September, suggesting the same screenshot was reused across separate claimed payment periods rather than representing three independent payouts. The estimated average CPM across the documented period is approximately $0.07 (~£0.06) per 1,000 views, significantly below the typical industry range of $2 to $10 per 1,000 views. Public claims during the same period included statements about earning "half a grand," paying shop rent from Facebook income, and covering household bills from platform earnings. These claims are not supported by the documented earnings figures. The operator has separately stated: “When you are running a 6 figure business with no business plans, out here winging it 7 days a week, giving all the profits to Mothers and babies in need.” A claimed six-figure turnover is inconsistent with the documented creator income above and the financial picture presented to regulators and the public.

No-wages claim made in a publicly filmed interview. The filmed interview, posted to the Oh My Pasta Facebook page and archived to YouTube by the Sherlock investigation (youtube.com/watch?v=n_3vMcO2ih0), includes the explicit statement: “I don't take a wage. Dan don't take a wage. S##### doesn't take a wage. It's all voluntary. All our other volunteers, it's all voluntary. Nobody takes a wage. It's all about recycling.” This claim — made on camera to a public audience, directly contradicted by the documented volunteer rate card (£40 for an eight-hour day shift, £50 for a 5pm–10pm evening shift), the Facebook monetisation admission above, and the operator's own statement that social media income "technically should be my wage." The same interview states that "any profits that we make go back into helping mothers" — the use of the word "profits" in a charitable framing context is inconsistent with not-for-profit operation.

Volunteers were offered structured store credit payments across a documented rate card: £40 for an 8-hour day shift, £50 for a 5pm–10pm evening shift, and £20–£25 for shorter weekday shifts. The operator publicly described these as a "gesture of goodwill" declared to HMRC and DWP. Under HMRC guidance, calling a structured payment "goodwill" does not alter its legal classification — if it functions as payment, it will be treated as such. This may reclassify volunteers as workers entitled to the National Minimum Wage, holiday pay, and employer tax obligations, and may expose benefit-claiming volunteers to undeclared income sanctions.

St John's Ambulance Hall, Risca — pre-JBB financial conduct. Prior to the formal establishment of Jayne's Baby Bank, the operator ran activities from St John's Ambulance Hall in Risca during the pandemic period. Multiple archived livestream transcripts place her directly inside the operations, including the statements: “Me and my cousin used to do that when we were down the ambulance hall working” and “When we were in the ambulance hall we used to rent out tables to small business a day.” Community witness testimony, published in the investigation group, states that she took over an existing jumble sale on a 50% profit-share agreement with the hall's owners, and never paid the agreed share. The same witness states she was additionally renting out tables to third parties and retaining the income, which was strictly not permitted under the hall's insurance arrangements. According to community witness testimony corroborated by a separate account from RCV.uk (now operating as Community Volunteers Wales / CVW), St John's discovered the unauthorised subletting and told the operator to leave. The operator's own archived posts claim "she got the old people thrown out" — a characterisation the community witness directly contradicts, stating the group in question found larger premises and left on good terms. The significance of this pre-JBB period is twofold: it establishes the pattern of financial conduct predates JBB, and it is the period during which the operator simultaneously promoted the hall under a named alias while publicly denying any connection to it (see Finding 03).

Unlicensed collection jar activity — vulnerable volunteer. The investigation documented a case in which a volunteer described by observers as having cognitive impairments was sent out to solicit public donations using unlicensed collection jars. A Freedom of Information response confirmed that no active raffle or lottery licence existed during the relevant period. Street and public collections require a licence under the Charities Act 1992; directing a vulnerable individual to conduct unlicensed collections without legal oversight raises concerns under both charitable fundraising law and the duty of care owed to volunteers.

House fire donation collection — pattern of conduct. On at least one documented occasion, Jayne's Baby Bank publicly announced itself as "the only official collection point" for donations intended to support a local family who had lost everything in a house fire. Following the collection, the affected family confronted JBB regarding items they had not received. The family was subsequently blocked and publicly ridiculed on social media. This pattern — public charitable appeal, disputed distribution, blocking and dismissal of those who challenged the outcome, consistent with the conduct documented in the Ukraine appeal material in Finding 18 and the Cerri food diversion scheme in Finding 04a.

Council enforcement — reported arrest of official. The operator publicly broadcast an incident in which she claimed to have had a council representative arrested at her doorstep while the individual was attempting to carry out official duties. Following the incident, she stated publicly that she was protected from such actions by virtue of her status as a cancer patient and as the director of a charity. Both of those claimed statuses are contested throughout this document. Separately, Gwent Police confirmed they had no knowledge of a subsequent police-related claim she made on her public platform in connection with the same period, indicating a pattern of misrepresenting official engagement.

Morphine — public promotion and driving concern. In a January 2026 livestream, responding to an investigation commentary about a post referencing alcohol combined with prescription morphine, the operator stated: “Can I not have a night off and get shitfaced in a hot tub with a Baileys and a morphine pill that I'm prescribed?” and later in the same broadcast: “Any donations that go in the box go to my Baileys hot tub and morphine fund.” The operator has referenced morphine use across multiple broadcasts and transcripts. The archived deleted video contains the following verbatim statement, made while driving: “I'm not very good because I've had morphine, guys. I'm a bit like, oh my god. But, oh, driving is killing me. I think I'm gonna have to give up driving until I get my knees, you know, have the injections again on my knees. Because, I just, driving is killing me.” The admission of driving while having taken morphine, made in her own words on a public broadcast, raising concerns under Section 5A of the Road Traffic Act 1988, which makes it an offence to drive with a specified controlled drug above the legal threshold in the blood, regardless of prescription. The vehicle used for operational activities has been confirmed as a Motability Finance Ltd vehicle (see Finding 09).

Documented instances exist of the operator publicly advising vulnerable mothers not to engage with social services, in a context where Caerphilly Social Services have formally confirmed JBB is not endorsed and is not authorised to make referrals on their behalf. A Facebook post dated 3 October 2022 made the opposite claim — stating that social services had "acknowledged we are registered with CCBC" and had "asked us to make referrals." This is directly contradicted by the formal denial from Caerphilly Social Services. Directing vulnerable individuals away from statutory services without professional qualification or oversight, while simultaneously claiming false endorsement from those same services, represents a serious safeguarding concern.

Social services likened to “the Gestapo” — 3 June 2025. In a public broadcast dated 3 June 2025, the operator deployed the following language to discourage vulnerable mothers from accessing statutory safeguarding support through other baby banks or health practitioners:

This statement was made in the context of a wider post. Published 1 June 2025 — in which the operator claimed to be a qualified health practitioner capable of making clinical decisions about whether mothers needed help, explicitly framing the self-referral model as an alternative to engaging with health professionals who might trigger social services involvement. The comparison of Children's Social Services to the Gestapo — the Nazi secret police — was made to a public audience of tens of thousands of followers, many of whom are the vulnerable mothers the operation purports to serve. The effect of this framing is to associate statutory child protection with persecution and fear, discouraging at-risk families from accessing professional, regulated support. This constitutes the most extreme documented instance of the anti-social services narrative in the corpus. Caerphilly Social Services have formally confirmed the operator holds no referral authority. Cardiff University has confirmed no nursing registration. The NMC and SCWOnline databases yield no results for this individual. The basis on which she claimed clinical authority to substitute for regulated health practitioners is entirely unsubstantiated.

Advice to vulnerable mothers to consume alcohol — January 2026. During the 12 January 2026 livestream addressed to approximately 71,000 followers, including donors, volunteers, and mothers seeking support. The operator explicitly recommended alcohol consumption to mothers in distress: “But what I would suggest any mothers out there that are struggling, get yourself a Baileys. Get in a hot tub, get yourself a Baileys and chill out.” This advice was given in a broadcast that also documented the operator's own consumption of alcohol alongside prescribed morphine. Advising vulnerable mothers experiencing distress to drink alcohol. From a platform that publicly presents itself as a welfare and support resource, directly contraindicated by basic safeguarding principles. The Mental Health Foundation and NHS guidance specifically caution against alcohol use as a coping mechanism for stress and mental health difficulties. The advice engages no professional standard, is inconsistent with any recognised support framework, and is the opposite of what a regulated support service would provide. The conduct is documented in full in Finding 08.

Offering to accompany sexual abuse survivors to police and court — without qualification or authorisation. A public post from the JBB account stated: “We can support you with reporting historic sexual abuse or other behaviour. We can attend with you when you make the statements or attend court with you as support.” The post was accompanied by a South Wales Police image about reporting rape and sexual assault. Independent Sexual Violence Advisers (ISVAs) and court support workers who perform this role must hold recognised training, operate under formal referral pathways, and be accountable to regulated organisations. The JBB operation has no NMC registration, no accredited safeguarding qualification, no formal partnership with South Wales Police or any victim support service, and operates from premises found in serial breach of basic safety regulations. Publicly offering this service to survivors of sexual violence — without the qualifications, oversight, or legal framework that governs it, representing a significant safeguarding risk to highly vulnerable individuals.

Naloxone distributed to untrained volunteers — medically incorrect instructions broadcast publicly — 22 January 2024. In a broadcast dated 22 January 2024, the operator described receiving naloxone (a prescription opioid reversal medication) from GDAS (Gwent Drug and Alcohol Service) and distributing it across her shops for use by volunteers. The broadcast contains at least two medically inaccurate statements that were published to a large audience and repeated as instruction to volunteers: (1) “This blocks drugs, alcohol, opioids for up to 20 minutes” — naloxone has no effect on alcohol intoxication whatsoever. It is an opioid antagonist only. Instructing volunteers that naloxone reverses alcohol overdose is a potentially dangerous medical falsehood that could result in a delayed emergency response; (2) the broadcast includes the instruction “if they say no, then I would still do it” in reference to administering the medication to a conscious, refusing patient — administering any medication to a person who has refused consent constitutes assault regardless of good intent. While lay administration of naloxone is lawful in Wales under the Naloxone (Wales) Regulations 2023, and stocking it from community premises is permitted, those provisions do not authorise overriding a patient's refusal of treatment. The operator has no verified NMC registration, no confirmed nursing qualification, and no accredited clinical training — yet presented herself as competent to train others in administering prescription medication and interpreting patient capacity. The naloxone items were subsequently removed from the operation's possession. The broadcast was published to thousands of followers and volunteers who may have acted on the instructions given.

Confirmed real-world naloxone administration — safeguarding response concerns. In a broadcast dated 19 February 2026, the operator described administering naloxone to a member of the public who attended one of the JBB shops visibly impaired. The individual was described as accompanied by what may have been a child, and was purchasing toys described as being "for a child." The operator states she administered naloxone and then allowed the individual to leave the premises, subsequently making a CCTV referral to police due to concern about the child's welfare. Under Welsh safeguarding guidance, where a child may be in the immediate care of a visibly impaired adult, the appropriate response is to contact emergency services directly and, where possible, prevent the individual from leaving with the child until welfare can be assessed. The operator's account describes the reverse sequence — administering medication, releasing the individual, and later making a referral. The operator is not a qualified social worker, ISVA, healthcare professional, or safeguarding officer, and the shop has no formal agreement with any statutory safeguarding body. Making retrospective CCTV referrals after releasing an individual of concern is not equivalent to a real-time safeguarding response. The incident is documented from the operator's own public broadcast.

Distribution of contraception to under-18s. No registration, no oversight. A public Facebook post, shared from the operator's personal TikTok account (@alchemistmagician), stated that JBB distributes free contraception to under-18s from vases at the front of each shop, explicitly adding: “You don't need to ask staff for them” and “no registration or details needed.” For young people under 16, contraception provision requires compliance with the Fraser Guidelines — a qualified professional must assess that the individual understands the advice given, cannot be persuaded to involve a parent or guardian, and that their physical or mental health would be likely to suffer without provision. Anonymous self-service dispensing from a shop display by an unqualified, unregistered operation satisfies none of these requirements. The post also stated that "Wales has the highest teenage pregnancy rate in the world" — a factually incorrect claim. The distribution of contraception to minors without any safeguarding framework, parental consent mechanism, or qualified professional oversight, from premises that were subsequently subject to fire prohibition notices and had no employer liability insurance, represents a documented safeguarding concern that should have been referred to the relevant local authority designated officer (LADO) and public health authority.

FSA food hygiene rating — exempt, no inspection. The FSA food hygiene database lists "Jayne's Mother and Baby Bank, FREE Food Bank and Charity Shops" at 5 Crane Street, Pontypool NP4 6LY with a status of EXEMPT and last inspection recorded as N/A. The registered business name on the official food authority database contains both "FREE Food Bank" and "Charity Shops". Both false claims embedded in the formal food business registration name. The exempt status confirms that no food hygiene inspection has ever been conducted at the Pontypool premises despite a food bank operation running from a site that a September 2025 independent fire risk assessment rated as "Substantial Risk" with "Extreme harm" potential consequences. Independent information received by the investigation from a source with direct knowledge of the Pontypool premises confirms that the fire safety system has a known fault, and that the original lease places fire system maintenance as the tenant’s contractual responsibility. The cost of the required rewiring has been acknowledged as unaffordable. An eviction notice was served on the Pontypool premises in or around December 2025; the tenancy terms provide a protection period, though the landlord is actively working with the relevant fire officer to accelerate removal. The fire system defect therefore exists in a context where the tenant has acknowledged the liability, cannot meet the cost, and is simultaneously resisting removal.

A documented pattern exists of serious public allegations against individuals who questioned the organisation or left its operation. In one documented case in 2022, a member of the public who challenged whether JBB was a registered charity was publicly labelled a paedophile and compared to Jimmy Savile on the JBB Facebook page, his DBS certificate, published in response, showed "NONE RECORDED." In a separate incident, a former volunteer, referred to here as P##### — was publicly named on Facebook and accused of stealing approximately £5,000 in cash and stock, lying about a prison record on his DBS form, making female staff uncomfortable, and refusing to use the card machine. The post was publicly visible, unredacted, and included his photograph. Making serious criminal allegations against named individuals on a public social media platform raises significant concerns under defamation law and UK GDPR. In a separate post, the operator additionally claimed that she personally injected £4,500 from her own savings to cover the shortfall and keep the baby bank operational. This claim is notable in the context of her repeated public statements that she takes no wage from JBB: the existence of £4,500 in accessible personal savings available to replenish a commercial till float — drawn from a person simultaneously claiming PIP disability benefits and zero operational income — is not reconciled in any public filing or financial disclosure.

Prescription medication with patient details displayed publicly on livestream — approximately 2025. Prescription medication boxes were photographed and posted publicly — apparently from within the operation's stock — with patient names, medication names, dosages, pharmacy details, and dispensing dates clearly visible. Archived images published to the investigation group on 19 April 2026 as part of a review of historical material confirm two items: a box of Citalopram 20mg tablets (dispensing date 01/10/2024) and a box of Sandrena 1mg gel (dispensing date 24/11/2023). Each item bore a named patient's prescription details. The original post in which the images were published has not been located; the items and their details are confirmed from the archived images. A member of the investigation group with pharmaceutical professional knowledge identified and publicly confirmed the dispensing signature on one of the labels as their own — independently verifying the label as genuine. Prescription dispensing labels constitute special category personal data under Article 9 of UK GDPR — they disclose an identifiable individual's health information, medication, and dispensing history without their consent. Broadcasting such details to thousands of followers, in the context of criticising the named patient, constitutes a serious UK GDPR violation. Patient names, pharmacy names, and the identity of the professional who confirmed the label are all redacted in this document. How these prescription items came to be present within the operation's donated stock is not established by the archived evidence.

Pre-JBB conduct, archived personal post. Digital archives recovered from the operator's personal account contain a post, dated approximately mid-2010s and predating the JBB operation, in which she described a prank involving a pregnant woman: “Mwhahahaha STILL the funniest thing ever — he fed you dog food that I cooked, when you were pregnant!” This post predates JBB and is not connected to the operation's activities. It is documented here as part of the broader evidential record on conduct and attitude toward vulnerable individuals; specifically expectant mothers — given that JBB's stated primary beneficiary group is pregnant women and new mothers. The post is archived from personal digital records and its date cannot be confirmed with precision.

Defamatory allegation against the Blackwood Market Place landlord — May 2026. In a post from the KnowledgeableEagle3954 alias account. Confirmed as the operator — the Blackwood Market Place landlord was publicly referred to as a "money launderer" with the assertion that the business currently occupying the vacated unit is a "money laundering clothes shop." No evidence has been produced for either allegation. A### O######, the Blackwood Market Place manager, is referenced in the same post as the individual whose public rebuttal of the departure narrative the operator was responding to, but the money laundering allegation is directed at the landlord and current tenant, not at O###### personally. Publishing false allegations of money laundering against a named private individual and their business constitutes a serious defamatory publication under the Defamation Act 2013. The same post includes the admission: “we removed the barrel lock”, confirming that the operation changed the locks on the Blackwood premises, directly corroborating A### O######'s statement about the keys and consistent with the documented tenancy dispute.

Public profile-trawling livestreams. Multiple archived livestreams document the operator scrolling through the public Facebook profiles of named critics in real time, broadcasting commentary on their appearance, relationships, business activities, and personal circumstances to thousands of followers. Documented conduct in a single archived broadcast (12 September 2025) includes: reading out names of individuals from comment threads, commenting on their physical appearance and cosmetic procedures, publishing and zooming in on profile photographs, and describing critics collectively as known to the operation. In the same broadcast, when challenged by a viewer about her conduct toward others, the operator responded: “Fucking ruthless. That's what you label somebody as.” — a self-description made publicly in direct response to being called "heartless." The broadcast also includes the statement: “it's only slander if it's not true. They can't charge me for saying something malicious if it isn't malicious and it is true. Otherwise I'd have been charged by now. You can't go around calling people a paedo if they're not, unless they are”. A public assertion that her paedophile allegations against named individuals are legally protected as true. This claim is documented in Finding 16.

Targeted business harassment campaign — N#####E / S#### 4 H####. Following a documented shop confrontation on 12 June 2025 (see Finding 20), the operator used her platform of approximately 72,000 followers to conduct a sustained campaign targeting a local business owner referred to here as N#####E. Documented conduct includes: publicly and falsely identifying N#####E as the creator of the jaynesbabybank.co.uk investigation website; publicly alleging her business was "not a registered business or registered with HMRC"; threatening to report her to Trading Standards for running a business from a council property; encouraging mass reporting of her business page; and boasting of maintaining a named complaint file on N#####E. In the same broadcast the operator made multiple public comments about N#####E's child custody history — deploying personal vulnerability information as a rhetorical weapon in a business dispute. The coordinated use of a disproportionate public platform to damage an individual's livelihood and reputation engages the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and the Defamation Act 2013. N#####E's business name is partially redacted here to prevent further amplification of the reputational damage.

Full home address and postcode published as cease and desist threat — B##### S##### (May 2025). In a separate documented instance, a public post published the full name and home address including postcode of a private individual, referred to here as B##### S##### — alongside a public declaration that a cease and desist would be sent that week in response to comments she had made. Publishing a private individual’s complete home address and postcode to a public audience of tens of thousands of followers as part of a legal threat compounds the intimidatory effect of the cease and desist mechanism: the address publication itself functions as a signal to followers of the individual’s location, independently of any legal instrument. This instance is separate from and additional to the B###### S#### address publication documented below. Both engage the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and UK GDPR.

Full home address published publicly — B###### S#### (May 2025). In one of the most severe documented instances of address publication, the JBB account posted an image in large white text on a black background stating the full name and home address of a disabled mother who had commented critically on JBB posts — accompanied by an explicit threat to send her a cease and desist that week. Publishing a disabled private individual's complete home address to thousands of followers as a form of intimidation directly engages the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and UK GDPR. The individual named is referred to here as B###### S#### to prevent further amplification of the doxxing.

Public targeting of a local business owner — A## B#### / A# B##### (March 2026). In March 2026, the JBB account published a photograph of a named local business owner, referred to here as A## B#### — taken outside her shop in Caerphilly, accusing her of "stalking" and uploading photographs to a "bullying website." The post warned the operator's followers: “be careful what photos she takes of you ladies when you are in there.” Publishing a private individual's photograph alongside a stalking accusation and a warning to thousands of followers to be wary of them in their place of business constitutes targeted public harassment of a local business owner, engaging the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and the Defamation Act 2013. The business name is partially redacted here.

Full address, phone number and email published — N#####E J####. In a separate incident, the JBB account published the full Facebook profile, home address, phone number, and business email of a named individual, referred to here as N#####E J#### — alongside allegations of harassment, stalking, and scamming. The same post offered £1,000 to anyone who screenshotted a private group chat and claimed the individual's business was "not a registered business or registered with HMRC." The post also stated the operation was "authorised to trade for 5 years under 3 different councils". A new specific false authority claim directly contradicted by multiple documented written denials from local councils. Publishing complete contact and location details of a private individual to a large public audience, alongside criminal allegations and a financial inducement to surveil their private communications, engages the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, UK GDPR, and potentially the Computer Misuse Act 1990.

Public solicitation of private individuals' home addresses. Two archived posts from the verified JBB account document the operator publicly soliciting the home addresses of named critics. In one post, the full name, profile link, and personal details of a named individual were published to the JBB audience with the explicit request: “does anyone know where she lives please.” A second post states: “Dm me her address please” — accompanied by a photograph of the individual captioned "This is the woman" and a false allegation that she had shouted at staff members with learning difficulties. Publicly publishing an individual's identity alongside a photograph and soliciting their home address from thousands of followers — particularly where the operator has a documented history of retaliatory physical conduct at addresses (see Finding 15a), raising serious concerns under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and UK GDPR. This conduct on the primary JBB account is separate from and additional to the same behaviour documented via the Peter Mal alias account.

Public admission of obtaining a private individual's home address. In the 15 June 2025 voice-over broadcast, the operator stated directly: “it wasn't that person that gave me your address. Somebody else had to do.” This is a direct public admission that she obtained the home address of the individual she was addressing, made in a broadcast to thousands of followers, while conducting a campaign against that individual's business and reputation. The admission establishes not only that the address was obtained, but that the operator was aware of who had provided it and chose to publicly attribute it to a different source.

£1,000 cash bounty — conditional on withholding information from police. An archived deleted video (backup: youtube.com/shorts/jcyVidec0ao) documents the operator offering £1,000 in cash to anyone providing screenshots of members of the Sherlock investigation group, with explicit conditions: “I want everybody who's in the group because the online stalker and the paedophile have both less slip than it's a group… £1,000 cash, no questions asked and you won't be reported to the police.” The offer was framed as a financial inducement with police non-reporting as a stated reward, an implicit acknowledgement that the individuals approached might themselves have concerns about contact with police. Offering a financial inducement conditional on withholding information from police raises concerns under the Criminal Law Act 1967 s.5 (concealing an offence for consideration) and the Contempt of Court Act 1981 in any context where police investigations were active. The same broadcast confirms the operator attended council offices that morning to collect SAR data specifically to identify complainants for malicious communications filings — documenting the bounty offer and the SAR misuse in a single archived source.

Employer targeting, archived comments from the primary JBB account. In a separate documented incident, the JBB account publicly stated: “I've got S######'s address” followed immediately by: “Or where they work because I can send the documentations to where they work or their employers.” The same comment thread included a published screenshot of the named individual's Facebook profile showing her employer (Welsh Ambulance Services NHS Trust), home town, and date of birth — confirming her age as approximately 20 years old at the time. Publishing an NHS worker's employer details, home location, and date of birth on a public platform while simultaneously threatening to contact their employer constitutes a serious data protection violation under UK GDPR and engages the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. This conduct is documented as part of the broader systematic targeting of the W########## family — see below.

Systematic targeting of a family — September 2025 to February 2026. The W########## family, referred to here as Alice# W., R####### W., and S###### W. — were the subject of a sustained, multi-month public harassment campaign conducted across the JBB platform and associated alias accounts. S###### W. was first named publicly on 18 September 2025, when the operator published posts and livestreams labelling her a "stalker" and a "weirdo," sharing screenshots of her private profile, and stating on record: “There’s S###### W. She’s friends with a pedo look”, an attempt to link her by association to individuals the operator had labelled as paedophiles. On the same date, a screenshot of S###### W.'s employer profile — showing her employment at Welsh Ambulance Services NHS Trust — was shared publicly, with a threat to send "documentations" to her employer and to her home address. The campaign escalated in mid-January 2026, when a three-day window (16–18 January) saw repeated public naming of Alice# W. as the alleged source of over 70 abusive messages. On 17 January 2026, harassment cases involving the family were reported to be under active review by Gwent and Torfaen police officers. On 18 January 2026, the operator publicly requested Alice# W.'s home address from her 71,000 followers, stating verbatim: “Can someone provide me with Alice# W########## address please so I can pass on to police and solicitor.” A Sherlock forensic analysis published on 23 January 2026 confirmed that, after removing commercial sales posts. The primary remaining content on the JBB Facebook feed at that time was a fixation on the W########## family, with R####### W. and S###### W. being "publicly named via screenshots and tagged." Contemporaneous posts also included unverified allegations against Alice# W.'s son-in-law of damaging shop windows and CCTV cameras. The campaign against the W########## family represents the most extensively documented sustained targeting of private individuals in the investigation corpus, spanning over five months across the platform.

Electoral Register used to research critics' addresses. A public post from the verified JBB account included a screenshot of a response from the Electoral Register confirming that two named individuals at the operator's address had opted out of third-party data sharing, establishing that the operator had submitted a formal Electoral Register enquiry about individuals she suspected of investigating her. The same post named RCV.uk (now operating as Community Volunteers Wales / CVW) and Hope No Bus CIC, accusing them of "trying to stalk my home address," and stated: "Thank you to all the other charities, CICs and businesses and Councils that support and work with Jayne's Baby Bank" — a blanket false claim directly contradicted by 14 documented written denials from named agencies. Using the Electoral Register to research the residential details of critics, and then publishing the enquiry outcome publicly, representing a further documented instance of address-intelligence gathering targeting individuals who questioned the operation. A separate post dated 6 April 2026 states: “We are a Trademarked Registered CIC authorised by the Financial Conduct Authority for Great Britian and audited by audited accounts.” This repeats the false FCA authorisation claim documented in Finding 07, with the addition of “audit” language. The same post includes a screenshot of a private individual’s Facebook profile, referred to here as S##### W###### — showing his location (New Tredegar), mutual connections, and a list of his Facebook friends published to the JBB audience. The pretext for publishing his profile is his mutual friendship with critics of the operation. Publishing a private individual’s personal profile, location, and social connections to tens of thousands of followers constitutes targeted exposure conduct consistent with the wider harassment pattern documented throughout this finding.

Caerphilly Bird Rescue brand hijack — see Finding 25. The 20 January 2026 public launch post for "The New Caerphilly Bird and Small Animal Rescue Sanctuary TM" mischaracterised a 2024 animal-welfare keeping ban against original co-founder Carol Gravenor as a finding of "animal cruelty"; the post was publicly refuted twice by Carol Gravenor herself (25 January 2026, and again on 6 February 2026 in an explicit donor warning post). Engages the Defamation Act 2013 (for the cruelty mischaracterisation directed at named individuals) and the Fraud Act 2006 s.2 (for soliciting donations under a takeover narrative known to be false). The full evidential sequence, including trademark UK00004316067, two stolen fox images, the JustGiving £1,000 appeal, and the false review left by the operator on the original rescue page — is documented as Finding 25.

A further documented instance involves the Blackwood shop landlord. A public post from the verified JBB account linked the landlord — by name and business connection, to a news story about car wash operators convicted of people smuggling, implying criminal association without any evidential basis. The same post made additional unverified claims about a planning refusal for a morgue and referenced a "massive Government investigation" into funeral parlours, presented as if connected to the landlord. No evidence supporting these claims has been produced. Publishing material that implies a named individual has criminal connections or is the subject of government investigation — without factual basis — may constitute defamatory publication under the Defamation Act 2013. This post is consistent with a documented pattern of using the public JBB platform to make serious reputational allegations against landlords, council officers, and others in positions of authority over the operation.

Private written admission of creating a fabricated social media profile in a named individual’s identity. A leaked private Messenger exchange from the JBB account contains the following statement: “I made up a fake david evans one and posted his shit everywhere.” This is a direct private written admission of creating a fabricated social media profile using a real individual’s name, referred to here as D##### E####, and posting content attributed to that person. Creating and operating a false identity profile in another person’s name without their consent engages the Malicious Communications Act 1988, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, and potentially the Computer Misuse Act 1990 depending on the platforms used. The same exchange also contains the statement: “I told the police he is making up profiles on people.” Read together, these two statements establish that the operator simultaneously reported to police the conduct of creating fake profiles — while privately admitting to having done the same thing herself. This pattern of accusing critics of conduct she was herself engaged in is consistent with the documented use of false reporting as a harassment mechanism throughout this finding. No date is available for the exchange but it is documented as a primary source record.

Public accusation of waxing a minor directed at a named beauty business — February 2026. A broadcast dated February 2026 contains a direct public accusation against the operator of a local beauty salon, referred to throughout this document as E###### M####### — stating: “She’s just yesterday accused me of my beauty business. I’ve waxed and prided flowers of a child and explained it on my page.” The accusation, that E###### M####### had performed intimate waxing on a child — was made to a broadcast audience of tens of thousands. The operator simultaneously questioned why a beauty business would display images of intimate waxing on its public page, describing the images as attracting “weirdos” and comparing the business practice to displaying a “foof” publicly. The broadcast additionally states that the operator “will put my review on” E###### M#######’s business page and refers to existing negative reviews as “honest review of how you behaved yesterday.” Making a public accusation of performing intimate treatments on a minor against a named business — to an audience of tens of thousands, constituting a serious false allegation that could foreseeably damage the business’s reputation and regulatory standing. The operator also claimed in the same broadcast that E###### M####### is related to O##### W######, though this familial connection has not been independently verified. Separately, a later broadcast states: “[operator’s nickname for T##### W######] and O#### W######, [name], (as you are their auntie).” The relationship claim is documented as stated by the operator without independent corroboration.

Repeated public broadcasts naming critics’ partners — “dick pics” claims used as deflection and retaliation mechanism. Across multiple broadcasts from September 2025 to January 2026, the operator repeatedly and publicly claimed that the partner of S###### W. — already documented in this finding as the individual whose home address was publicly stated on camera — had sent her unsolicited “dick pics” via Facebook. The claim is made on camera, using those words verbatim, addressing S###### W. directly by first name in multiple broadcast sessions. A separate broadcast dated January 2026 adds a second individual, referred to here as C####### Lewis# — whose partner is named in the same context. The primary function of the claim in each instance is deflection: when challenged publicly about laughing at an autistic child, the response across every broadcast is that the laughter was directed at the alleged images, not the child. The claim therefore operates simultaneously as a reputational attack on the partners of two female critics, a deflection from a safeguarding-adjacent criticism, and a public humiliation mechanism directed at named individuals to a broadcast audience of tens of thousands. A January 2026 broadcast additionally states: “We’ve still got that by the way. And the police came out and spoke to him. And he got in trouble over it for sending indecent images.” The public declaration of retaining the alleged images — combined with the repeated on-camera broadcasts referencing them by name to a large audience — functions as an implied ongoing threat. The underlying allegation is unverifiable from the archived material; what is documented is the pattern of its deployment.

TripAdvisor review identified as false by named restaurant owner — reviewer identified as “Ceriann of Jaynes Baby Bank.” A TripAdvisor review of a restaurant referred to here as Flamin’ Joe’s BBQ Co received a public owner response dated 12 December 2023, in which the owner, referred to here as J##### M##### — addressed the reviewer directly: “Hi Ceriann of Jaynes Baby Bank… thanks for the false review.” The owner publicly identified the reviewer as “Ceriann of Jaynes Baby Bank” and characterised the review as false. This is an independent third-party identification of the operator under the name “Ceriann” in a context the operator did not control — confirming both the name variant and the JBB association via a named business owner’s public response. The review conduct is consistent with the documented pattern of using review platforms as a tool against individuals and businesses. In this instance the target was a commercial restaurant rather than a competitor or critic, indicating the review conduct extended beyond targeted harassment of known adversaries to general commercial interactions.

Named individuals at public car boot — 29 March 2026. A post dated 29 March 2026 (deleted, captured via transcript backup) names two individuals by full name who attended a JBB car boot sale at Newport, referred to here as K##### R####### and his mother — describing them as “our regular stalker” and stating they “showed off in front of a child.” The post alleges K##### R####### had been “reported to the organisers for smoking weed on the premises by other stall holders” and that the pair “showed themselves up.” Publishing the full names of private individuals alongside public accusations of drug use and harassment, to a large audience, on a deleted post, is consistent with the documented pattern of using the JBB platform to publicly target named individuals who challenge or attend JBB operations.

“We pay our managers £30 in stock a week so it won’t affect tax or benefits” — 5 October 2024. A public Facebook post states: “We are in need of volunteer managers. We pay our managers £30 in stock a week so it won’t affect tax or benefits. You will need to declare it as a gesture of goodwill. T&Cs apply.” The explicit framing “won’t affect tax or benefits” confirms the operator was aware the payments engaged tax and benefits law while deploying language designed to neutralise that exposure. The “gesture of goodwill” designation obscures a structured weekly payment to volunteers.

“We reward our volunteer managers with £30 store credit per week. This will not affect benefits or tax”, 28 December 2024. A post two months later confirms the same policy: “We reward our volunteer managers with £30 store credit per week. This will not affect benefits or tax as its is a gesture of goodwill. We need weekday and weekend volunteer managers.” Identical language across two separate posts confirms the £30/week scheme was standard operating procedure. Combined with the TikTok corroboration documented in Finding 03, this represents three independent published sources for the same payment scheme.

“Me and Dan don’t take a wage but I have to run a business so that we can all carry on doing this” — 25 April 2025. A public Facebook post states: “Me and Dan don’t take a wage but I have to run a business so that we can all carry on doing this.” The no-wage claim and the explicit business admission appear in the same sentence. This written post is a separate instance of the pairing documented in the Oh My Pasta filmed interview. Confirmed here in the operator’s own written words on a public post.

Infant death information censored from platform — 24 June 2024. In the same 24 June 2024 broadcast, the operator describes removing a follower post containing factual statistics about infant death: “Somebody posted something with facts and figures about infant death earlier. So I took it off because the person isn’t qualified to discuss that, you know, on our platform.” She positions her own claimed credentials as the basis for who is permitted to discuss safety information on the platform: “I am qualified to discuss things like that. Don’t post stuff because it can trigger.” On a platform self-described as supporting vulnerable mothers and openly soliciting referrals of “mothers in need,” the suppression of factual safety information — on the basis of unverified personal credentials, representing a documented safeguarding concern. The operator simultaneously states the platform reaches “over 70,000 followers” and that the audience includes “mothers that are still grieving over children that they’ve lost,” directly acknowledging the safeguarding-sensitive nature of the audience whose access to factual content she was unilaterally curating.

Public-shaming threat against donors — 24 June 2024. The same broadcast contains an explicit threat directed at donors: “We don’t want dirty donations like we had again. If you do that again, we’re going to post your picture on Facebook if you drop them off because they were stinking.” Publicly threatening to publish the photographs of identifiable donors on a 70,000-follower platform — over a contested judgement about the cleanliness of donated goods — establishes a documented pattern of using audience reach as a coercive instrument against the operation’s own supporters, not only against external critics. The threat carries reputational consequences for individuals delivering free goods to an operation publicly presented as a charity.

26 May 2026, documented public threat of civil action against volunteers who speak out. In a public livestream dated 26 May 2026 the operator broadcasts the following statement to her audience, directly addressing volunteers: “Volunteers signed a contract. You all signed a contract when you started. So, you know, if they say anything, then you will be sueable.” The statement is significant on three independent dimensions. First, it confirms the existence of signed contracts between the operator and individuals understood by the operator to be volunteers, raising questions as to whether those signing such contracts were unpaid volunteers (in which case the contract may engage employment-status considerations under HMRC and HMC&TS guidance) or whether they were paid workers in fact, in which case the labelling as “volunteers” in public materials is itself a misrepresentation. Second, the broadcast deploys the threat of civil action (“sueable”) as an instrument of suppression directed at people who may have direct knowledge of operational conduct documented across this dossier. The use of contractual non-disclosure mechanisms to suppress disclosure of matters of public interest engages section 43A and following of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (Public Interest Disclosure protections), regardless of the contractual wording. Whistleblowing protections cannot be contracted out. Third, the threat operates as internal suppression alongside the documented external harassment patterns recorded in this finding and in Findings 16, 21, and 23, completing a picture in which audience reach is deployed both to discipline critics and to silence the operation’s own workforce.

26 May 2026 — public naming of “Deb Furey” with allegation of fake-name use. In the same broadcast the operator publicly names “Deb Furey” and alleges she has been “identified this morning under a fake name, a fake partridge name or whatever it is.” The naming and accompanying allegation are broadcast publicly to the operator’s follower base. This adds to the documented pattern of publicly naming private individuals on the JBB platform (compare the documented naming of S###### W., Alice# W., R####### W., N#####E, B###### S####, and others recorded across this finding and Findings 16, 21, and 23). The naming follows a broadcast pattern consistent with the documented use of public identification as a precursor to follower-base reporting campaigns, employer-contact threats, and the harassment escalation patterns recorded throughout this dossier.

The safeguarding position as at September 2026. An organisation presenting itself as a safeguarding-aware service for families with young children gave a person with a 2013 conviction for child sexual offences a key, a job title and somewhere to sleep, and then announced a new front-line role to be delivered under his guidance. The conviction detail is a matter of contemporaneous published court reporting (WalesOnline, March 2013, Cardiff Crown Court), which records that Raymond Derek Watkins was sentenced at Cardiff Crown Court in March 2013 and made subject to a Sexual Offences Prevention Order barring him from working with children and from being alone with any child under 16. He was given full access to reside at 5 Crane Street during the earlier environmental health closure in order to prevent the landlords from regaining possession; he is referred to across the operator’s own posts simply as “security”; he has been witnessed entering the Pontypool premises with a key late at night on multiple occasions and assisting in moving items through the shop front; and the investigation has independently established his occupancy of 6 Commercial Street. In a public post the operator announced that “Rolling out in Sept/Oct 2026 we have a new Homeless and Vulnerable Co ordinator” (spelling as published) who “has been homeless themselves and is able to verify a genuine need situation”, and the 13 September account records that new venture as launched under Watkins’ own guidance. The conviction, the terms of the order, the occupancy and the whistleblower material are recorded in full at Finding 28 and are not re-argued here. Full account: Sherlock article, 13 September 2026.

Safeguarding as exposure — the hostel post. The JBB page publicly asked its followers for the telephone number of a hostel in Pontypool. The post described a person said to be staying there who had allegedly taken a walker and other items without paying, stated that JBB had the person’s name, and referred to CCTV. The issue is not simply whether the underlying allegation was true. It is the combination of information published — the type of accommodation, the alleged resident, the accusation, and a public request for the audience to help obtain the hostel’s contact details — at a point where established routes existed: the matter could have been reported to the police, the hostel could have been contacted directly, and any CCTV could have been provided to the relevant authorities. Instead the matter became another public Facebook post, which is uncomfortable where the accommodation in question may be supporting people who are vulnerable. The qualification carried by the 5 September article is carried here: it is not suggested that the hostel was a secret location, nor that accommodation providers cannot be identified. The same post supplies a second observation. The person was initially described as a lady; later material changed the description to a man. The archive preserves the original wording as it appeared at the time, which matters when an organisation has publicly asked its audience to help identify or locate somebody. Source: Sherlock article, 5 September 2026.

The M### sequence. JBB has stated that M### and another person were banned from its premises in November 2024 over alleged theft. Those claims were subsequently repeated publicly, including references to jewellery allegedly being stolen and claims that CCTV had proved JBB’s version of events. The dispute later escalated. In July 2026 the page began posting about M### again, including claims that she had physically attacked the operator, with repeated references to CCTV. The 5 September article records the underlying incident directly: the operator punched M###, who subsequently attended hospital with an injury around the eye socket and concerns about potential nerve damage. What followed the incident is what matters to this finding — it became another instalment of the continuing Facebook narrative, with CCTV again presented as supporting evidence. On 4 September 2026 the page posted: “Lovely cctv video of M### walking past Commercial Street shouting abuse at us this morning.” (spelling as published; name redacted).

The CCTV pattern as a governance point. There is a recurring pattern throughout the archive. CCTV is said to exist, to have been seen, to have been sent to police or provided to other parties, and sometimes to prove what happened; yet the public audience is frequently left with the assertion rather than the footage. The investigation records that it has not seen JBB publicly publish the CCTV footage it repeatedly refers to. The caveat is carried in full: that does not mean that CCTV does not exist, nor that there may not be legitimate reasons for footage not to be published, because CCTV can contain private information and may properly be retained by police or other parties. The point is much simpler. An audience cannot independently examine footage that has not been shown to it, and there is therefore a significant difference between saying “we have CCTV” and allowing people to establish for themselves what that CCTV actually shows. In governance terms, the assertion is doing the work of evidence in dispute after dispute, in circumstances where nobody outside the organisation is in a position to test it.

26 June 2026 — the incident outside the Pontypool premises. Emergency services attended an incident outside the Pontypool premises following reports of a fire in the alleyway behind the building and a subsequent physical altercation. On the material reviewed, the following points are not materially disputed: a fire occurred in the alleyway; members of the public attempted to extinguish it before emergency services arrived; a physical altercation took place between the operator and a member of the public; police and the fire service attended the scene; and the operator sustained visible facial injuries. Both principal parties later published differing accounts and each maintains that the other was the aggressor. No official findings have been published resolving the competing accounts, including as to the origin of the fire, and neither the mobile phone footage nor the private CCTV referred to publicly has been released in full. This dossier does not adjudicate between those accounts and records no view on them. One observation is recorded because it is a chronology observation the article itself makes: allegations that the other party had previously threatened to petrol bomb the premises first appear in Facebook posts published after the incident, and no equivalent allegation has been identified in material reviewed from before the confrontation. Full account: Sherlock article, 27 June 2026.

13 to 15 September 2026 — the gravest governance item on this record. Over three consecutive days a director used the company’s official accounts to publish unevidenced allegations of child sexual offending against members of the public. A fabricated Facebook Messenger screenshot, presented as a message from the long-established child-protection page Dank Dragon but in fact carrying the misspelled page name “Dank Drangon”, named five local people as “known paedofiles and sex offenders” and said “It appears to be a child trafficking ring” (spelling as published). The following afternoon the same page published an AI-generated “SAFEGUARDING ALERT” poster carrying those five people’s photographs, names and towns, captioned “Scum” and instructing readers to report them to the police and to shop and group staff; half an hour later the page explained itself as “getting offended when they name and shame you back”. When the Facebook page was disabled at about 16:00, the poster was reposted on the organisation’s TikTok account twenty minutes later alongside a second poster naming two further people; an eighth was added by an anonymous post, which an administrator must have approved, in a public group administered by the page and by the operator’s son, D.R., created on 13 February 2026 to give critics “a bit back”. On the morning of 15 September the page published N.W.’s own messages about expecting vigilantes at her door and that she “could literally be killed”, above the word “Hahhahhhahhahahah”. Eight people, three outlets, and no evidence of any kind produced at any stage. The full sequence, the platform AI labels, the edit history and the provisions engaged are recorded at Finding 29. Full account: Sherlock article, 14 September 2026.

16Police contactTheft Act 1968 s.21 / Malicious Communications Act 1988Counter-group, coercive public posts targeting named individuals, and 18 documented public denials

Multiple sources from early 2026 reference reported police contact in connection with the operation's online conduct. In February 2026, whistleblowers noted that police were actively monitoring the operator following a series of criminal accusations she had published online. On 25 March 2026, the operator publicly posted that content had been "passed onto the police as continued malicious communications from the SAME CHARITIES AGAIN" — one of multiple documented instances in which the operator referenced active police files. In a separate undated broadcast, the operator stated: “because as soon as we got the number, we sent in a document to say, these police files are open on these people for malicious communications, and harassment, and all the rest of it.”

“I don't answer to nobody“ — explicit rejection of all regulatory authority, 18 January 2025. In a public broadcast dated 18 January 2025 — over a year before the fire Prohibition Notice, both CCJs, and the Facebook ban. The operator stated directly to her audience:

This statement is significant across three dimensions. First, it is an explicit, unprompted public rejection of the Charity Commission, council, and police as bodies with any authority over the operation — made while simultaneously claiming charity registration, council recognition, and FCA authorisation on public-facing platforms. Second, it constitutes a direct public threat against charities and community groups: “you are the ones that we're going to take down.” Third, the date places this statement in context: within 14 months of this broadcast, the operation had received a fire Prohibition Notice (3 March 2026), a second unsatisfied CCJ (27 January 2026), a Caerphilly CBC enforcement investigation confirmation (9 January 2026), and a permanent Facebook ban (21 April 2026). The statement that regulatory bodies have no authority over the operation was made before each of those outcomes, and each outcome represents a regulatory body exercising precisely the authority she publicly denied.

Counter-group — "Jayne's Baby Bank STALKERS & HATERS Exposed.” A public Facebook group under this name (583 members) was created as a direct counter to the JBB investigation group, used to target critics and publish content about those who questioned the operation. In May 2026, the @communityshopone TikTok account published a screenshot taken from within this group showing the Facebook interface with the user logged in as KnowledgeableEagle3954. A further confirmed alias account. Since the TikTok post was made from the operator's own confirmed account, the screenshot establishes that the same person was simultaneously logged into the counter-group under an alias identity, directly contradicting the presentation of the group as independently operated by a separate community of supporters. This is the third documented accidental self-exposure in the investigation corpus. See Finding 03.

Coercive public post — child abuse allegations used as leverage, 16 February 2026. A post published from the verified JBB account on 16 February 2026 addressed named private individuals directly, including T######a W####n (referred to by a derogatory nickname), her husband O##n, and the operator of a local business trading as "E#####y" — stating: “delete the groups, fake profiles and websites about me or I will upload more videos of the abuse you have caused to children.” This post makes a public allegation of child abuse against named private individuals as an explicit condition of non-disclosure — i.e. the allegation will be withheld if the recipients comply, and published if they do not. Making an unwarranted demand with menaces, where the demand is to suppress lawful investigative activity and the menace is public accusation of child abuse, may constitute blackmail under Section 21 of the Theft Act 1968. The post is dated the same day as two other written denials documented in this finding. Gwent Police are confirmed to be involved with at least two of the individuals named in this post. The "E#####y" business had previously been subjected to false public accusations by the operation — accusations that are not true and are a matter of public record.

From March 2026, investigative monitors noted a 24-hour period during which the operator was absent from her home, with the property in total darkness while her vehicle remained parked outside — described by community observers as inconsistent with her established patterns. This period coincided with community reports of a possible police detention. The name "H#####" — previously associated with a named JBB worker who left the operation in 2023 — reappears in two signed posts dated 9 and 17 March 2026, after an absence of over two years from the corpus. An archived broadcast dated late October 2023 refers to H##### as a shop manager at that time: “H##### hasn't been very well and obviously we need someone to take her place for the time being.” This anchors her last documented active role to late 2023 — establishing the two-year gap before the name reappears in March 2026 posts as a signed author. Whether this represents a coincidental reuse of a staff name or has any connection to the reported absence is a matter for official record. The investigation notes the timing without asserting any conclusion.

Alias accounts used to amplify health claims. The Daniel James alias account has been documented deploying the same illness narrative used by the operator herself — posting in response to critics on third-party pages that the operator has "a massive tumor and aplastic anemia and has to have regular treatments of tumor suppressors and blood transfusions." This represents the health claim apparatus operating across multiple nominally separate accounts simultaneously. The operator making the claims in her own name, and alias accounts repeating and defending them in external forums where the operator's own account may not be present or credible.

A specific archived post from the Daniel James account — attributed to Daniel-James Ridsdale, the third subscriber on the CIC incorporation documents at the same address as Director 1 — elaborates the health narrative in detail, stating the operator was diagnosed with blood cancer and a tumour in 2019, that a 6cm tumour was missed on an MRI scan in 2015, that by 2019 it had grown to 11cm, that she had a procedure in 2021, and that she remains on tumour-shrinking medication and has blood disorders. The post also states: “Neither of us take a wage or claim petrol. We are going through the charity registration process and the cic process at the moment.” This single post simultaneously advances the illness narrative, the no-wages claim, and the charity registration claim — all three of which are either unverifiable, contradicted by other evidence, or directly refuted by official records. The post is archived as part of the investigation corpus.

Public assertion that paedophile allegations are legally protected as true. In a broadcast dated 12 September 2025, while commenting on critics of the operation, the operator stated: “It's only slander if it's not true. They can't charge me for saying something malicious if it isn't malicious and it is true. Otherwise I'd have been charged by now. You can't go around calling people a paedo if they're not, unless they are.” This is a direct public statement that the operator believes her paedophile allegations against named individuals are accurate and legally defensible — made to thousands of followers on a public livestream. No conviction, caution, or official finding has been produced in support of any paedophile allegation made against any of the individuals she has publicly labelled in this way. The statement that she would "have been charged by now" if the allegations were false misrepresents the law: the test for a criminal charge is not whether the allegations are true, but whether the communications are malicious. Under the Malicious Communications Act 1988 and the Communications Act 2003 s.127, the absence of a charge does not constitute legal endorsement of the content. The public assertion that her allegations are true — made without any official finding, constituting a further defamatory publication under the Defamation Act 2013.

18 documented public denials. Across 16 video transcripts and 2 written posts, the operator has made at least 18 distinct public statements denying arrest, charge, or interview by police. These span multiple specific categories of allegation — assault, bank card theft, criminal damage, scamming, baby bank operations, and statements made about named individuals online. Two written denials are dated 16 February 2026. The remainder are undated video transcript entries from archived broadcasts. The volume, specificity, and repetition of these denials — each responding to a different specific allegation — is itself a matter of public record.

False statement to police — “I don't have a Facebook account,” June 2025. According to verified reports documented by the Sherlock investigation (article dated 3 June 2025), during police questioning in connection with allegations of online abuse directed toward a disabled mother and her child. The same incident in which B###### S####'s full home address was published publicly on the JBB page (May 2025, see Finding 12). The operator reportedly told police she did not have a Facebook account. Authorities subsequently reviewed a publicly accessible Facebook livestream in which the operator herself referenced the police visit, directly contradicting her statement to officers. Knowingly providing false information to police in the course of an investigation may constitute an offence under the Criminal Law Act 1967 s.5(2) or, where it obstructs an investigation, the Police Act 1996 s.89. The matter was confirmed as remaining under active police investigation at the time of the report.

1 July 2025 — elected councillor reported arrested at operator's property; operator's own public admission. A public post from the verified JBB account stated verbatim: “Now this myth isn't a myth, Councillor Adams did get his self arrested on my driveway peering through my kitchen window and following me about with a clipboard. I believe two other councillors were spoken to by the head of fhe Council and the police too on the grounds or harrassing a baby bank owner.” The councillor named in the post is Councillor Michael Adams — Labour Ward Member for Pontllanfraith on Caerphilly County Borough Council, the local authority area in which several of the JBB premises operate. The post is the operator's own published account of the incident; no contemporaneous statement from Cllr Adams, Caerphilly CBC, or Gwent Police has been published confirming her characterisation of events, and no court list entry or charging record has been produced in connection with the alleged arrest. What the post documents as a matter of public record is the operator's own statement that an elected councillor was arrested at her property, and that — by her account, two further councillors were officially spoken to by the Head of Council and police about contact with the operation. The same post includes a self-listed enumeration of bodies the operator states had previously contacted her: “the council, counsellors, NMC, DWP, action fraud, police, Charity commission”, an unprompted aggregate admission, on the operator's own platform, of the regulatory and law-enforcement bodies engaged with the operation during that period. The publication is documented for the pattern it evidences: a public-platform allegation that an elected councillor performing apparent oversight activity (described in the operator's own words as “following me about with a clipboard”) was the subject of police arrest at the operator's address, made without supporting documentation and in the same paragraph as a broader enumeration of the agencies in regulatory contact with the operation.

Selected documented denials from the corpus: “I've never been arrested or interviewed by anything, by the police whatsoever” — “That's why I've never been arrested because there is nothing to be arrested for” — “The police have never arrested us on anything to do with anything going on here in our baby banks, anything, or our rescues” — “I've never been arrested for scamming any money” — “I was never arrested or charged for assault or theft and use of her bank card. I have never even been interviewed over it” (written post, 16 February 2026). Whether any of these statements remains accurate is a matter for official record. What is documented is that they were made — repeatedly, publicly, and on specific dates.

31 August 2025 — cluster of false claims in a single post. A public post dated 31 August 2025 contains multiple demonstrably false statements within a single publication: (1) "There is no report or investigation into the Baby Bank" — directly contradicted by the Caerphilly CBC FOI refusal dated 9 January 2026, which refused disclosure under S30(1)(a)(i) on the grounds that information was held for the purposes of an investigation with a view to ascertaining whether a person should be charged with an offence; (2) "The police are fully aware, and are investigating and looking to arrest them". A false claim about investigators; (3) "The Sherlock account is run by 4 charities, two of which I have personally got shut down for life". No charitable shutdown attributable to this operation has been officially recorded; (4) "We are a registered baby bank and foodbank… with THREE councils". No such registration exists with any council. The same post also claims recognition "across the UK and other Ireland and other countries", a claim unsupported by any official record, and directly contradicted by 14 agency written denials.

29 September 2025 — operator-published arrest claim against two individuals; no corroborating record produced. A public post from the verified JBB account named two individuals, referred to here as K### and a relative, and asserted that they had been “arrested over robbing donations off my driveway and 3 of my charity pots and food.” No accompanying crime reference number, court list entry, charging document, or contemporaneous corroborating source has been produced in connection with this allegation. The post is documented for the pattern it evidences: public assignment of criminal status to identifiable private individuals on the operator's platform without any official finding having been produced, consistent with the documented pattern across this finding of attributing arrests, charges, and enforcement outcomes to named critics without supporting documentation, and with the false “Criminal Record Orders” claims made in early 2026. The named individuals are redacted in this report to prevent further amplification of an allegation that has not been substantiated by any official body; the post is treated as the operator's stated claim rather than as evidence of any underlying offence.

Jeffrey Dahmer imagery used to label critics — TikTok. Content published on the @communityshopone TikTok account (subsequently renamed "Jayne's Baby Bank CIC TM") used the likeness of Jeffrey Dahmer — a convicted American serial killer and sex offender whose crimes are widely known, made further prominent by the 2022 Netflix dramatisation — to represent members of the public who had criticised JBB. The image was captioned "My Stalkers: I can't stand her!" and "Also, My Stalkers: 'GLUED TO THEIR SCREENS'." Jeffrey Dahmer murdered 17 people, targeting vulnerable individuals. Using his image to represent critics on a public platform, in the context of an ongoing pattern of publicly identifying, targeting, and publishing the details of private individuals — carries a threatening and intimidatory connotation that goes beyond ordinary harassment content. The content was published on a platform accessible to the operation's full follower base and engages the Malicious Communications Act 1988 and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.

Mass report solicitation and false fire service affiliation — November 2025. Following a member of the public flagging a JBB shop as a "health hazard" with "no fire standards in place," the operator published a public post mocking the complaint and ending: “Report her profile guys for us.” The same post claimed the fire service “said we can use their clothes bank as an overflow if needed plus access their grants and provide us with free fire equipment”, a claim directly contradicted by the documented fire Prohibition Notices issued against two JBB premises and the written denial from the Salvation Army (SATCoL) regarding the unauthorised use of their clothing banks. The post also claimed councils had "given us grants and discounts," referencing public funding in the context of dismissing a legitimate safety complaint. Publicly soliciting thousands of followers to mass-report a private individual's profile because they reported a fire safety concern to a regulator engages the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and is consistent with the documented pattern of using the follower base as an enforcement instrument against critics.

“That's 15 she's had, I know of“ — fire extinguisher admission of unknown provenance, 11 November 2025. In a public broadcast dated 11 November 2025. The same month as the mass report solicitation above. The operator publicly mocked a member of the public who had threatened to report fire safety concerns to Health and Safety and the Fire Brigade: “Oh no. He's gonna ring Health and Safety. He's gonna ring the Fire Brigade. Oh no. Can you imagine the Fire Brigade? What the fuck? Don't ring us unless she's on fire!” In the same broadcast she stated: “Now we've got to go down there this week and give her another fire extinguisher for free. Brilliant. That's 15 she's had, I know of.” This admission is significant on two grounds. First, it places 15 fire extinguishers on the premises as of November 2025, four months before the Prohibition Notice of 3 March 2026, which cited fire safety breaches including inadequate fire suppression provisions and blocked escape routes. If 15 extinguishers were present and the premises still failed enforcement inspection, this speaks to the broader state of the premises beyond equipment alone. Second, no verifiable source for 15 fire extinguishers has been identified: the fire service has not confirmed supplying them, the Salvation Army has denied any affiliation, and no donation or supplier record appears in any public filing. The public claim, made in the same period, that the fire service provided free fire equipment is directly contradicted by SWFRS enforcement records. The extinguishers' provenance is undocumented. The broadcast also demonstrates that fire safety complaints were being publicly mocked to the full follower base in November 2025, at a time when SWFRS had already been engaged in a 15-month compliance process with the premises.

Gwent Police crime reference — 2600068214, incident date 4 March 2026. In a private Messenger exchange with F### M### (archived 17 March 2026 — shared publicly by F### M### to the JBB Exposed group), the operator sent a photograph of a Gwent Police letter addressed “Dear Jayne-Anne” bearing crime number 2600068214, crime type CR37 (a Gwent Police harassment/malicious communications category), and incident date 4 March 2026. She presented this as her criminal case against investigators: “You have damaged my business and my criminal case against them.” When F### M### responded “That ain't your name is it — who is Carry Anne,” the operator replied “Good knows” — a deflection rather than any explanation of the Carrie-Anne Ridsdale identity. This exchange is significant on two levels: first, the letter is addressed to Jayne-Anne, independently corroborating the Jayne-Anne name variant at the same period as the Gwent Police were engaged with the operation; second, the "Good knows" response to a direct identity challenge, made in a private conversation where there was no public audience to perform for — represents the most candid documented instance of the operator declining to explain the Carrie-Anne Ridsdale name. The crime reference number is an independently verifiable Gwent Police record.

“My business" — private admission, 17 March 2026. In the same Messenger exchange with F### M###, the operator refers to JBB in the following terms on two separate occasions: “You can't volunteer after this as you have damaged our business” and “You have damaged my business and my criminal case against them.” The repeated use of “my business” in a private message, where there was no public audience and no charitable framing to maintain. This is the operator's own unguarded characterisation of the operation. This directly contradicts the repeated public claim that she takes no wage, that the operation is run for community benefit, and that it functions as a charitable enterprise rather than a personal commercial business. It is consistent with the "flog stuff and keep the money" equivalence statement (12 September 2025, Finding 17) and the Facebook monetisation "daily income" admission (Finding 24).

False claims of “Criminal Record Orders” against critics. Throughout early 2026, the operator repeatedly told followers that critics were being issued with "Criminal Record Orders" (CROs) and summoned for "voluntary interviews" by Torfaen and Gwent police. A "Criminal Record Order" is not a recognised category of enforcement action in English or Welsh law. No such instrument exists in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, or any other relevant statute. Despite repeated public claims of enforcement victories against critics — framed as vindication. The operator has not published a single verified court order, police outcome notice, or enforcement document to substantiate that any such action has been taken against any named individual. This claim is consistent with the documented pattern of using invented or misrepresented legal terminology to intimidate critics and project a false impression of official support. This misuse of legal terminology stands in contrast to the operator’s own reported historical outcome from the pre-JBB period: following the August 2014 defamation-card incident, she is reported to have received a criminal record and a non-molestation order protecting the victims of that campaign — documented outcomes that are distinct from the invented “Criminal Record Order” instrument she deploys against critics in 2026. See Finding 27.

Trademark infringement threat — £2,500 demand and public apology, Trade Marks Act 1994. The operation published a public post asserting: “A breach of our trademark can be settled out of court for £2,500 and a public apology on social media. I think that's fair.” A separate post stated: “Can I remind people that the Baby Bank is TRADEMARKED. Breach of Trademark Law is a CRIMINAL OFFENCE. No unauthorised photos/videos/usage with my permission.” Both statements misrepresent UK trademark law. Under the Trade Marks Act 1994, trademark owners cannot unilaterally impose settlement terms or financial demands without legal due process — courts, not individuals, determine infringement and appropriate remedies. The characterisation of trademark breach as a "criminal offence" in this context is also a misrepresentation: criminal trademark offences under s.92 TMA 1994 require deliberate fraudulent use of a registered mark on goods, not general reference to a business name. Furthermore, since the registered trademark (UK00003910000) is a figurative mark, protection applies to the full graphic and phrase "JAYNE'S BABY BANK & CHARITY SHOP", not to "Baby Bank" in isolation, which remains unregistered and publicly searchable. The use of legal-sounding demands to suppress public discussion of the operation is consistent with the documented pattern of misrepresenting official authority as a means of intimidation. Under s.21 TMA 1994, unjustified threats of trademark infringement proceedings may expose the claimant to counterclaims.

False claim that investigators accessed medical records. An archived post from the JBB account states: “And… they have tried to access my medical records. There has to be an investigation by the NHS into it.” No evidence of any attempt to access the operator's medical records by any investigator has been produced or documented anywhere in the investigation archive. Formally requesting an NHS investigation into a fabricated data breach is consistent with the documented pattern of using institutional complaints to deflect scrutiny, including the FCA, NMC, Charity Commission, and police complaint filings documented throughout this report.

“Bumped off" and murder allegation posts. Two archived JBB posts document the operator publicly claiming that critics were attempting to have her killed: “Are they arranging to have me killed now? I don't know I don't really bother checking in daily.” Followed by: “They can't even rustle up 10 grand between them to get me bumped off.” The posts were made in response to an online antagonist making escalating financial "offers" for a confrontation — provocative content that does not constitute any credible threat. Publishing murder allegations against named or identifiable critics as if they were credible is consistent with the documented pattern of making extreme public allegations to discredit and intimidate those who questioned the operation. The thread additionally shows the name "Jayne Ridsdale" in the replies. A further live identity confirmation in the same thread as the murder claims.

Grim Reaper post following the death of an HCT volunteer — May 2026. See Finding 21 for full documentation, archive link, and legal analysis. A separate menacing graphic — a weeping clown kneeling over a grave marked “R.I.P.” published on the official JBB CIC page on 2 June 2026 with veiled threat text — is documented in Finding 27 as part of the same pattern of ominous public warnings.

“Karma has struck another hater” post — 24 May 2026, cross-posted Facebook and TikTok. A post published from the Facebook profile "Jaynesbabybank Registered - cic" (profile ID 61567483332952, joined 21 April 2024 — see Finding 03) reads: “Looks like karma has struck another hater. Homeless. Business closing end of month. Relocating elsewhere. bye.” The post is paired with an image of a woman with feathers and a book, overlaid with the text “It's coming for you.” Approximately one hour after the Facebook publication, the same image and identical caption text were republished on the @communityshopone TikTok account (display name "Jayne's Baby Bank CIC TM" — a confirmed JBB alias), with comments disabled, archived at tiktok.com/@communityshopone/photo/7643487020416781590. The published text discloses specific personal information about an unnamed but evidently identifiable third party — housing status, business closure, planned relocation, and frames that hardship as deserved retribution against a critic of the operation. The individual referred to has not been identified in this report. The post is documented for the pattern it evidences: publication of an unnamed critic's personal circumstances across two operator-controlled platforms within hours, paired with menacing overlay text, while presenting the content as community commentary rather than targeted intimidation. Deliberate cross-platform deployment — Facebook reach plus TikTok reach, and the disabling of TikTok comments are consistent with the documented pattern previously observed on the Grim Reaper post (Finding 21), the 18–20 May 2026 Amazon-oxygen series (Finding 08), and the Jeffrey Dahmer “My Stalkers” imagery: targeted content amplified across operator accounts with engagement controls disabled to suppress public reply. Facebook follower metadata on the originating profile at observation: 21 followers / 124 following — a marked increase from 7 followers / 37 following recorded earlier in May 2026, consistent with a transition from low-activity reserve identity to active publication of harassment-adjacent content. The conduct engages the Malicious Communications Act 1988 and is consistent with the documented pattern of using operator-controlled accounts to publish targeted material about critics.

“We just report them to the police for harrassment. The more they post the more evidence we have”, 28 December 2022. A public post states: “We just report them to the police for harrassment. The more they post the more evidence we have.” This is an explicit policy statement: systematically filing police harassment reports against anyone posting negative comments. The framing “the more they post the more evidence we have” confirms the intent to weaponise police complaints as a deterrent against public scrutiny.

“The police are already speaking to one family this week about online harassment and comments” — 18 January 2026. A public post states: “Can I remind people we are trademarked and we have business insurance and I will take legal action against people bad mouthing us. The police are already speaking to one family this week about online harrassment and comments.” Publicly disclosing that police are actively contacting “one family” — without naming them, but ensuring their community knows they are under investigation; a documented use of police contact as a warning instrument to deter others from speaking out.

First dated use of “the paedophile” as a descriptor — 1 July 2023. A broadcast dated 1 July 2023 contains the statement: “Now, you know, we’ve had our signs stolen by the paedophile. So we’re dealing with that, but we are still there.” This is the earliest dated video in the corpus using “the paedophile” as a standard descriptor of an identifiable individual, establishing that the pattern begins in July 2023. At least eight further video instances have been identified across subsequent dates.

The pattern continued through the late summer — 20 August and 3 September 2026. On 20 August 2026 the page mocked a run of people and bodies said to be reporting or challenging the organisation: “Reporting us to the Bishop now! It was carpet right last week and CADW the week before!” On 3 September 2026 it described a critic as “Another fake page made by N####A W########… stalker… fixated”; the individual named in the original post is redacted here in the established style. Other posts in the same run refer to alleged “smear campaigns”, “stalkers” and people being “fixated” on the organisation. See Sherlock article, 5 September 2026.

The counter-group recorded above, now dated and described — created 13 February 2026. The same pattern escalated across 13 to 15 September 2026, and on 14 September the material ran in that group: “Jayne’s Baby Bank STALKERS & HATERS Exposed”, created on 13 February 2026, seven months earlier, and carrying 675 members when captured on 14 September 2026 — up from the 583 recorded above. The group is public and visible, so anything posted in it can be read by anyone, member or not. It lists two administrators: the Jaynesbabybank Registered - cic page and the operator’s son, D.R. — who is not the same person as the D. named on the first poster and in the fabricated message; that D. is unconnected to the Baby Bank. Its own description states what it is for: “exposing the haters and stalkers trying to bring down our Trademarked Registered CIC and Baby Bank - about time they had a bit back from the community”.

That is a statement of intent to retaliate against individuals, written in February and still in place in September. It bears directly on the account the page gave of the September material: that a message had been “sent to me”, that it was “nothing to do with us”, and that the naming of people was a response to the organisation itself being “called a peado” (spelling as published). Material published into a venue assembled seven months earlier, in the company’s name and with a director’s relative as co-administrator, does not sit with the repeated characterisation of September’s posts as something that happened to the organisation.

The group also allows anonymous posts. On Facebook an anonymous post in a group is submitted to the administrators and appears only once an administrator has approved it. On the afternoon of 14 September 2026 an anonymous post there, captioned “Scum of the earth” and carrying Facebook’s own “AI content” label, added an eighth person, L.J., beside the poster naming five others, with no text explaining why he was included. Because the post was anonymous, an administrator approved it before it appeared. Full account: Sherlock article, 14 September 2026. See Finding 29.

21Defamation Act 2013 / Protection from Harassment Act 1997Multi-year campaign of false allegations and digital harassment against helping caring team (HCT) — a verified, award-winning registered charity

Helping Caring Team (HCT), registered charity no. 1184631, based in Blackwood, has been the primary target of a sustained, multi-year campaign of false public allegations and documented harassment conducted via the JBB platform. HCT is a verified registered charity — its status is publicly confirmed on the Charity Commission register. In November 2025, HCT received a Civic Award from Blackwood Miners' Town Council in recognition of its community work. HCT has also successfully secured a £52,400 grant from the National Lottery Community Fund. The operator refers to HCT publicly as "the pink ladies" and, across 103 source documents in the investigation corpus, repeatedly describes HCT as "known scammers", a claim made without evidential basis and in direct contradiction of the organisation's registered charitable status and its regulatory clearance detailed below.

Charity Commission review — statutory investigation not opened. In late 2025, the Charity Commission reviewed information submitted regarding HCT and determined that no statutory investigation was warranted, instead providing only general regulatory advice. This directly contradicts the operator's repeated public claim that HCT is "under investigation", a claim made across multiple broadcasts to audiences of 70,000+ followers. No Charity Commission statutory investigation into HCT exists or has existed. The operator has simultaneously stated in the same broadcasts in which she calls HCT "scammers" that she has "never been arrested for scamming money". A direct self-contradiction that undermines the basis of the allegation.

The 2007 social services claim — weaponising a historic grievance. A central pillar of the operator's hostility toward H##### T###### is a claim that H##### reported the operator to social services in 2007. When the operator was a single mother and Daniel was a young child. The operator asserts that council officials "unofficially" told her H##### was the complainant, and that "two qualified members of staff" confirmed this. This claim is highly implausible on its face: public bodies are legally prohibited from disclosing the identities of complainants, and no official body operates in the manner described. If any such disclosure occurred, it would itself constitute a serious GDPR violation. Yet the operator presents it as fact without any documentary evidence. The sourcing for this claim is entirely the operator's own public statements. This historic grievance is deployed publicly to justify the sustained campaign against HCT as long-standing persecution rather than the operator's own conduct — a reframing inconsistent with the documented evidence.

False fraud allegation — £3,000 council grant. The operator publicly alleged that HCT committed fraud involving a £3,000 council grant for bus trips, claiming that a trustee or volunteer "directly benefited" from the funds via a personal connection to a bus company. No evidence supporting this allegation has been produced. The Charity Commission's decision not to open a statutory investigation. Despite reviewing information about HCT, inconsistent with an organisation engaged in the financial misconduct alleged. Publishing false allegations of charity fraud against a named registered organisation with no evidential basis engages the Defamation Act 2013.

Drug trafficking allegation — December 2025. In a broadcast in December 2025, the operator publicly alleged that HCT was linked to "drug trafficking" involving a church and a vicar. No evidence has been produced, no arrest or charge has been made, and no official body has confirmed any such investigation. This is among the most serious false allegations documented in the corpus — publicly broadcasting a drug trafficking claim about a named registered charity and its associated community institutions, without any evidential basis whatsoever, constitutes a serious defamatory allegation under the Defamation Act 2013.

Additional false allegations. Other unverified claims broadcast publicly against HCT and H##### T###### include: a claim that H##### T###### personally attended the operator's home and left out-of-date baby milk on the doorstep in direct sunlight — framed as a deliberate food hygiene violation; and a sustained "monopoly" narrative asserting that H##### T###### "wants a monopoly on everything" and bullies other organisations to suppress competition. No evidence for either claim has been produced. The monopoly narrative serves to reframe the operator's well-documented pattern of making false regulatory complaints against others as a defensive response to external persecution.

Use of a Subject Access Request as a harassment instrument. The operator has publicly stated that she used a Subject Access Request (SAR) submitted to Caerphilly Council as evidence that HCT was reporting her to authorities for health and safety, food hygiene, and Trading Standards violations. The SAR mechanism exists to enable individuals to access their own personal data, not to identify who has raised concerns about them to regulators. Using SAR results to publicly identify and target those she believes reported her constitutes a misuse of the data access process and represents a chilling effect on legitimate whistleblowing and community safeguarding. An archived deleted video documents the operator attending council offices specifically to collect SAR data for the purpose of filing malicious communications complaints against those making regulatory reports: “I've done the council offices this morning because we've got some information to pick up in regards to our subject access of who is who and why are they complaining about us. So that we can log some malicious communications complaints with the police.” The operator's framing presents regulatory reporting — a lawful and protected act, as a form of attack warranting retaliation.

Filing regulatory complaints against other CICs — H.O.P.E. Bus Community Interest Company. A letter dated 13 June 2023 from the Office of the Regulator of Community Interest Companies (Ref: 02/23), addressed to Jayne Price, confirms the operator had written to the CIC Regulator raising concerns about H.O.P.E. Bus Community Interest Company (co. no. 12552902). The Regulator's response notes: that bullying allegations had already been reported to police; that "the issue of trafficking vulnerable homeless people is being investigated by the modern day slavery unit"; and that "the issues of stalking, harassment and threatening behaviour have been reported to the police." This letter confirms the operator's documented pattern of filing serious allegations, including trafficking — against other community organisations with regulatory bodies. The Regulator's reference to a modern slavery investigation reflects information provided to it by the operator; it does not constitute confirmation that any such allegation was substantiated. The same letter is consistent with the documented use of official complaints processes as instruments of pressure against organisations the operator perceived as competitors or critics.

Pre-written complaint template distributed to members of the public — 17 March 2026. In a private Messenger exchange with F### M### (archived 17 March 2026, shared publicly by F### M### to the JBB Exposed group), the operator sent a pre-written block of text directing F### M### to report named individuals and organisations to Gwent Police and the Charity Commission. The template named: T##### W###### and O#### W###### (Caerphilly Bird Rescue, described as "not a registered anything"); T### H##### S#### and D### D###### (Community Volunteers Wales, charity no. 1191383); N####A W######## (charity no. 1194295, described as "convicted for harassment of I### S####"); and Alice## T##### H###. The template provided the contact address for Gwent Police (contact@gwent.police.uk or 101) and directed the recipient to state the complaint was against "Jayne's Baby Bank Registered CIC 16838920." It also directed the recipient to contact the Charity Commission. Distributing a pre-written police complaint template to a member of the public — naming specific individuals and directing them to file reports on the operator's behalf; a documented extension of the complaint-as-harassment instrument described throughout this finding. The named individuals and organisations have not been charged with any offence in connection with this investigation. Community Volunteers Wales (charity no. 1191383) is a registered charity with no regulatory findings against it.

False attribution of the investigation website. Across multiple broadcasts, the operator has publicly identified H##### T###### — HCT's founder and former trustee, as the individual responsible for the jaynesbabybank.co.uk investigation website, claiming she is "the one behind the website" and that she "manipulates" others into feeding it information. This claim is false. Publishing a false attribution of the investigation website to a named charity founder, to an audience of 70,000+ followers, constitutes a serious defamatory allegation without evidential basis.

Targeting of HCT personnel and family. The campaign extended beyond HCT as an organisation to its personnel and their families. Documented conduct includes: offering £1,000 cash rewards for screenshots from private group chats linked to HCT; encouraging 71,000 followers to mass-report H##### T######'s pages; making public allegations against H##### T######'s son, J##### T######, by name; and sharing images purporting to show gunshot damage to H##### T######'s mother's property. The sharing of images of alleged criminal damage to a private individual's family home, in the context of an ongoing harassment campaign, raising serious concerns under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. None of these allegations against HCT personnel have been substantiated by any official body.

Grim Reaper post following the death of an HCT volunteer — May 2026. Following the death of a named HCT volunteer, the @communityshopone TikTok account — operating under the name "Jayne's Baby Bank CIC TM". Published a post featuring an image of the Grim Reaper carrying a scythe, captioned: “Thats one of the haters down.” The post was set to "spooky, quiet, scary atmosphere piano songs" audio and comments were disabled, indicating awareness of the likely public reaction. Publishing content that directly associates the death of a real person with celebratory or mocking imagery, directed at a community of people who knew the deceased, in the context of a multi-year harassment campaign against the organisation the deceased was associated with, constitutes one of the most severe documented instances of conduct in this investigation corpus. The post has been archived at tiktok.com/@communityshopone/photo/7639066192455421206. A second post from the same account stated "Thats one of the haters down" explicitly. The operator subsequently attempted to reframe public reaction to this content by claiming that the JBB Exposed group had accused her of murder. A false characterisation designed to deflect from the nature of her own published post. Under the KnowledgeableEagle3954 alias, the operator later dismissed the public reaction with the statement: “What happened to the campaign about us killing a HCT staff member? That fell flat.” — publicly acknowledging awareness of the controversy while minimising it, under a confirmed alias account. The conduct engages the Malicious Communications Act 1988 and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.

Corpus scale. HCT is referenced across 103 unique source documents in the investigation corpus, with named references to H##### T###### appearing in 74 source files. The campaign spans from at least March 2023 to the date of publication — over two years of documented targeting of a single registered charity across a public platform, using alias accounts, reward offers, false regulatory allegations, drug trafficking claims, and the operator's own personal platform. The contrast between HCT's documented status — a Charity Commission-registered organisation that received both a civic award and a six-figure community grant, and the operator's repeated characterisation of it as a criminal enterprise is stark and evidentially significant.

CCBC internal correspondence — council confirms JBB targeting of community groups. Internal communications from Caerphilly County Borough Council's Food and Network Support Team, visible at timestamp 07:50 of the SAR broadcast, confirm that multiple community groups had been targeted by Jayne's Baby Bank — described internally as a growing concern within the local authority. This constitutes an independent official acknowledgement, within council correspondence, of the pattern of targeting that this finding documents across public broadcasts and social media. The same SAR broadcast also reveals, at timestamp 07:54, an internal email from Caerphilly Social Services Department explicitly stating that they have no direct affiliation with Jayne's Baby Bank and that the operator should not be claiming to act on their behalf, directly contradicting repeated public claims that social services had "acknowledged" JBB, asked JBB to make referrals, and were actively supporting the operation. These two pieces of internal council correspondence. Both inadvertently disclosed by the operator herself during a public broadcast of her own SAR — constitute official documentary evidence of both the targeting pattern and the false social services affiliation claim, sourced from the council's own files.

Voluntary police interview linked to H##### T###### and the “paedophile” label — 9 January 2025. A broadcast dated 9 January 2025 contains the statement: “It was a voluntary interview, and they told me it was [H#####] that was reporting me on a regular basis. Now, we know the paedophile reports me, but we also know the paedophile is an idiot, sort of the council, right?” This quote directly connects three elements not previously linked in a single quoted source: the voluntary police interview, the identification of H##### (consistent with H##### T######, HCT operator) as the reporting party, and the simultaneous deployment of the “paedophile” label in the same breath. The claim that police disclosed the complainant’s identity during a voluntary interview is inconsistent with standard police procedure and is presented without corroborating evidence.

Extended to two further individuals — 14 September 2026. On 14 September 2026 the campaign extended to two people who appear nowhere in the material published the previous day, and who were added because of their connection to this charity. A second AI-generated poster, in the same style as the one naming five people that afternoon, was posted to the Baby Bank’s TikTok account @communityshopone at 16:20, twenty minutes after the Jaynesbabybank Registered - cic Facebook page became inaccessible. That account carries the Jayne’s Baby Bank name and logo, TikTok attached its own “AI-generated content” label, and comments on the account are turned off. The same poster was published that evening in the public group “Jayne’s Baby Bank STALKERS & HATERS Exposed” by the Baby Bank page as an administrator.

The poster is headed “WARNING. SAFEGUARDING ALERT. THESE PEOPLE ARE LINKED TO [H.C.T.] CHARITY”, the charity being identified by initials in the source report. It carries two photographs: one of K.A., captioned “works for [H.C.T.] charity”, and one of J.J., captioned “[H.C.T.] supporter”. A text panel beside them reads: “K.A. ALLOWED A PEADOPHILE TO STAY IN HER HOUSE AND ABUSE HER CHILDREN. THEN LIED AND SAID WE HAVE A PEADOPHILE LIVING IN OUR BABY BANK” (spelling as published). Beneath the photographs it states “THESE PEOPLE WORK WITH VULNERABLE CHILDREN AND ADULTS” and instructs readers to “REPORT CONCERNS TO THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES”.

The allegation against K.A. is the Baby Bank’s own position turned around. The claim that a person with a conviction for child sexual offences was working and living at the Baby Bank’s premises rests on the public record set out in Finding 28 — the conviction on contemporaneous published court reporting, the occupancy on evidence this investigation has established and deliberately not published — and not on anything K.A. said. The poster accuses her of harbouring an offender and offers nothing in support. No conviction, court, date or offence is identified for either person named on it. See Sherlock article, 14 September 2026.

The version published in the group added two things to the one posted on TikTok: the words “Keep lying - see what happens”, addressed to the people already named, and the claim “Police and courts informed”. No court, reference number or officer is identified. Where a matter has in fact been put before the police and the courts, the course open to a complainant is to let them act. Full account: Sherlock article, 14 September 2026. See Finding 29.

The alias account, and a conviction used as a weapon against a third party. A backup of the “David Jones” account has been examined. The account is attributed to the operator on three independent grounds already set out in this dossier: an IP address match to her and her son’s devices, an accidental self-exposure on 8 February 2026 in which she shared a screenshot while visibly logged into the profile, and a Facebook account-recovery search against the contact number published on the CIC36 filing (Finding 03). Of its 45 archived posts, 44 carry no text at all: the content is in the images, which are screenshots.

What those screenshots assemble is a case against Community Volunteers Wales (registered charity no. 1191383) and its premises, The Pantri in Risca. That is the same charity whose doorstep received deposited waste in April and May 2023, with an on-camera admission recorded at Finding 15a, and the same charity later named in the pre-written police and Charity Commission reporting template supplied to a member of the public in March 2026 (Finding 16). The alias account, the fly-tipping and the reporting template converge on one target.

The mechanism. Alongside allegations about the charity’s food handling and its supermarket collections, the account published the claim that a person connected to that charity “work[s] with a convicted peadofile that runs Hope Bus CIC” (spelling as published), and asked whether HCT — a third organisation, itself the subject of the campaign documented in this finding — was aware of the association. Captured and republished alongside that claim were a search-engine results page, a 2021 news report of a conviction for sexual offences against children, a separate report of a magistrates’ court conviction for common assault, and the Companies House entry for H.O.P.E. Bus Community Interest Company (co. no. 12552902).

The account presented that material as relating to I### S####, already recorded in this dossier at Finding 16. It did not relate to him: the 2021 report of a conviction for sexual offences against children concerned a different man, and his own DBS check, published by this site in March 2025, shows no convictions. The operator’s own dealings with that company are separately documented above: a letter dated 13 June 2023 from the Office of the Regulator of Community Interest Companies, addressed to Jayne Price, confirms she had written to the Regulator raising concerns about it; and a public comment on the Jayne’s Baby Bank page states “We have shut down 3 other charities over this abuse. Cwtch up, Caerphilly bird rescue and hope bus cic.”

What this dossier does not do with that material. It does not reproduce the allegations made against the charity, and it makes no finding on any of them. It does not name the individual connected to the charity against whom the most serious allegation in those posts was directed; that allegation is excluded in full and is not characterised here. The conviction itself is a matter of public record reported at the time, and is referenced only because of the use made of it. What is recorded is the mechanism: a real conviction concerning one organisation, collected from public reporting and redeployed from a concealed account against a second organisation, with a third invited to act on it.

Period of use. The material in this backup spans at least June 2023 to mid-2025: a post from the account appears in the transcript corpus on 14 June 2023, and the food-handling screenshots reference a use-by date of 5 June 2025. That is a materially longer period than the range previously recorded for this account, which has been corrected at Finding 03.

23Computer Misuse Act 1990 s.1 / defamation act 2013 / Protection from Harassment Act 1997Fake "Peter mal" account used to infiltrate HCT Facebook group — captured in published Jarmani's boutique video, january 2026

The Jarmani’s Boutique identity was not solely an online alias. Photographic evidence confirms that a section of the Pontypool shop interior was permanently labelled “Jarmani’s Charity Boutique” in painted lettering applied to the shop wall — a physical installation present at the operational premises. This directly connects the Jarmani’s Boutique Facebook channel to the physical Pontypool operation. A pre-recorded video published to the Jarmani’s Boutique Facebook channel in January 2026 shows the operator screen-sharing the Helping Caring Team Charity (HCT, registered charity no. 1184631) Facebook group. During the video, public allegations are made against named HCT volunteers and trustees, including that a named individual had a criminal record and had been required to step down as trustee, and that a named trustee had directly benefited from a grant in a manner characterised on camera as illegal fraud. No evidence supporting either allegation has been produced, and no official body has confirmed any such findings against any named HCT individual.

The Peter Mal account. Confirmed in the published recording. Within the same published video, at 11 minutes 43 seconds into the recording, the comment input field NA_847088911441175 visible at the bottom left of screen displays the avatar and partial name of a “Peter Mal” Facebook account, confirming the operator was browsing and accessing the HCT group while logged into a false identity account at the time of recording. This is not an accidental live broadcast slip: the video was pre-recorded and published in its final edited form. The Peter Mal account identity is therefore visible in content that was reviewed and distributed to the channel's audience, representing an oversight in editing that permanently captures the false identity in the published record at a specific, independently verifiable point in the footage.

Legal and evidentiary significance. Accessing a Facebook group under a fabricated identity for the purpose of gathering content to use against the group's members engages the Computer Misuse Act 1990 s.1, unauthorised access to computer material, where access is obtained other than as authorised. The content gathered under the Peter Mal false identity was then broadcast publicly and used to make defamatory allegations against named individuals associated with HCT. Publishing false allegations of criminal conduct and fraud against named private individuals, including that a named person holds a criminal record and that another committed charity fraud — without any evidential basis, to the channel's full audience, engages the Defamation Act 2013. The conduct is consistent with the documented pattern across Finding 16 and Finding 21 of using fake or proxy accounts to surveil, infiltrate, and publicly attack organisations and individuals perceived as critics or rivals. This finding adds a further confirmed alias account — "Peter Mal" — to the documented list of false identities used in connection with this operation.

Two further accounts enter the documented record — September 2026. The first is the “Dank Drangon” page, which misspells the name of Dank Dragon, an established child-protection team, and whose profile picture copies that team’s dragon logo. On 13 September 2026 the Baby Bank page published a Messenger screenshot presented as a message from that page, naming five local people as “known paedofiles and sex offenders” and stating “It appears to be a child trafficking ring” (spelling as published); Facebook attached its own “AI content” label to the post. Dank Dragon, the genuine page, broadcast publicly that evening to disown the impersonating page, holding up the screenshot with the names blanked out. The Baby Bank page then said the message was “sent to me” and “nothing to do with us”, and “I have not set up a page ot threatened you at all” (spelling as published), while leaving its own post in place and extending it.

The second is “South Wales Peadofiles Hunters” (spelling as published). On the morning of 15 September 2026 the Baby Bank page published, as its own material and in a post written in the first person, three screenshots of a public Facebook comment thread. At the foot of each, in the box Facebook provides for writing a reply, are the words “Comment as South Wales Peadofiles Hunters”. Facebook displays that line only to the person holding the device, and it names the profile or page that person is then set to post as; it is not part of the conversation and is not visible to anybody else.

The caveat, carried in full. A screenshot alone does not establish who owns or operates an account, and this investigation does not assert it. A screenshot can be taken by one person and sent to another; that possibility has to be stated, and it is the same possibility the page relied on when it said the “Dank Drangon” message was “sent to me”. What can be said is that the account exists, that it is branded as a paedophile-hunting group, and that material published by a registered company’s official page was produced on a device signed in to it. Only Meta can confirm who operates a given account, and it can be required to do so by the police or by a court order.

Operating an additional account is not in itself an offence, and many people run pages separately from their personal profile. It becomes a different matter where an account is used to evade enforcement after a page has been restricted or removed, which breaches Meta’s policies, or where it is used to make an accusation appear to come from an independent source. Whether either of those applies to these two accounts is not something this record determines; it is a question with a specific starting point, capable of being resolved by Meta from its own records. Full account: Sherlock article, 14 September 2026. See Finding 03 and Finding 29.

17Fraud Act 2006 s.2 / Charities Act 1992 s.63PayPal fundraising — false charitable claims, multiple accounts, and identity concealment on live donation platforms

At least three distinct PayPal accounts have been used to solicit public donations for Jayne's Baby Bank: paypal.me/Jaynesbabybank, paypal.me/Jaynesbabybank100, and paypal.me/jaynesbabybankrisca. All three operated under charity-adjacent branding while no Charity Commission registration existed. PayPal's UK User Agreement generally limits individuals to one personal and one business account; operating multiple accounts under similar charity branding without clear disclosure as to which legal entity receives funds materially complicates financial accountability. In addition to the three PayPal accounts and SumUp instrument documented above, at least three JustGiving crowdfunding pages have been identified operating under JBB branding: jaynesbabybankrunningcostsappeal, jaynesbabybankstokennappiesappeal, and jaynesbabybankwashingmachines. Each solicits public donations under the JBB name for specific operational purposes. None of these campaigns appear in any CIC filing, annual return, or public financial disclosure. A fourth JustGiving page has additionally been identified: a campaign titled “Food Share Baby Bank”, organised by Jayne PRICE, with a target of £1,000 per month to “support the local communities with nappies and foodbanks.” The campaign branding incorporates a Green World Award logo and the JBB trademark symbol. At the time of capture, £20 had been raised from one supporter against the £1,000 target. This is a further public donation instrument operating under JBB branding not reflected in any CIC filing, annual return, or financial disclosure. Combined with the three PayPal accounts, the SumUp gift card, the rescue JustGiving page documented in Finding 05, and the three operational JustGiving pages noted above, this brings the total identified public donation instruments operating under JBB-related branding to at least nine — each operating under a different name or platform, with no consolidated disclosure of funds received or disbursed across any of them.

SumUp gift card — registered to residential address. A SumUp online gift card page has been identified registered under the name "Jayne's Baby Bank & Free Food Bank" at 7 Meadow Road, NP12 2AG, Blackwood — the operator's residential address. SumUp is a commercial card payment processing platform. Registering an active commercial payment instrument to a residential address is consistent with operating an unlicensed commercial activity from home. The registered business name — "Free Food Bank", which directly contradicts the documented policy of restricting items to paying customers and donators only, as evidenced across 105 unique source documents. The gift card instrument represents a further undisclosed donation and payment channel, operating under a name that misrepresents the access policy of the operation.

False charitable claims on live fundraising accounts. PayPal profile descriptions have explicitly stated: “Jayne's Mother and Baby, Food Bank and Charity shop. 100% of profit goes towards the charity” and “We run charity shops and foodbanks in Wales… 100% of the profits go back into helping and feeding families.” Both statements were made under a charity framing on a live fundraising instrument at a time when the Charity Commission had already confirmed — following two failed applications, that JBB does not meet the threshold of being a charity. Soliciting donations while representing an organisation as a charity when it is not may constitute an offence under Section 63 of the Charities Act 1992.

Identity concealment on the primary donation account. The primary account (@jaynesbabybank) is held under the name "Jayne R-Price" — a hybrid surname constructed from the Ridsdale surname appearing in court records and the Price surname used for public branding. This name appears on no formal legal record. It does not match the CCJ debtor names (Ceri-Ann Ridsdale; Miss Carrie-Anne Ridsdale), the commercial lease name (Jayne-Anne Carrie-Anne Ridsdale), the CIC filing name (Jayne Price), or any of the seven name variants documented in official records. A person donating via this link has no straightforward means of identifying the legal entity or individual who has received their money, or of connecting that recipient to outstanding liabilities including two unsatisfied County Court Judgments totalling £7,418.

“Friends and Family" payment instruction. The operator has publicly encouraged donors to use the PayPal "Friends and Family" option when making payments. While voluntary gifts via this mechanism are not inherently improper, directing payments for goods or services, including shop stock — through the Friends and Family route avoids commercial transaction fees and removes standard buyer protections. Where this instruction was applied to payments that were not genuine voluntary gifts, it would constitute a breach of PayPal's terms of service and potentially misrepresent the nature of the transaction.

The operator has stated publicly that using digital payment methods makes the operation transparent: “not a money launderer because it's traceable.” This claim is made in the context of operating multiple PayPal accounts under a name that appears on no formal record, linked to an organisation whose two Charity Commission applications both failed, and whose two CCJs remain unsatisfied. The traceability of individual transactions does not address the accountability questions raised by the identity and charitable status issues documented above.

Mother's personal email used on JBB PayPal accounts — Ridsdale1952@btinternet.com. The email address Ridsdale1952@btinternet.com. Confirmed as belonging to the operator's mother — was used as the registered contact address on PayPal donation accounts operated under the JBB name. Routing a public-facing charitable fundraising instrument through a third party's personal email account; specifically a family member's — adds a further layer of identity and financial accountability obscuration beyond the "Jayne R-Price" account name discrepancy already documented above. A donor making a payment to the JBB PayPal account would have no means of identifying that the registered contact email belonged to a separate individual entirely. The address additionally constitutes a further independent confirmation of the Ridsdale surname in connection with the operation's financial infrastructure.

Single phone number — multiple Facebook accounts confirmed, March 2026. A Facebook account recovery screen, captured March 2026, documents that a phone number search returns three Facebook accounts simultaneously: C… R…, J… B…, and D… J…, consistent with the Carrie Ridsdale identity, a Jarmani's Boutique or JBB-related account, and a third account whose attribution cannot be definitively confirmed from initials alone. The return of three distinct accounts against a single registered phone number is consistent with multi-account operation from one device or contact number. This directly contradicts repeated public claims that the operator runs only one account and has no connection to associated pages or alias identities. This evidence corroborates the multi-account pattern documented across Findings 03, 16, and 23 and adds a further independently captured data point — Facebook's own account recovery system — to the documented identity network.

“Flog stuff and keep the money“ — self-incriminating equivalence statement, 12 September 2025. In a public broadcast dated 12 September 2025, the operator stated, while responding to critics who sell items online: “It's all right for you guys to flog stuff then and keep the money for yourselves, but not for me.” The statement is framed as a grievance about a double standard, but the equivalence is the operator's own. By asserting that critics flog stock and keep the money in direct comparison to her own conduct, she implicitly confirms that she does the same — selling donated goods and retaining the proceeds. This is not an isolated remark: it is made in her own words, on a public platform, in direct response to scrutiny of the operation's financial conduct. The admission is consistent with the documented pay-to-access model (Finding 01), the £5 food bag sales (Finding 04), and the "80% free, 20% profit" CIC framing captured in corpus transcript evidence.

“See all the money we make from the charity pending. I spend it all on luxury goods.“ — December 2023. In a public broadcast dated December 2023, the operator stated while sorting stock: “See all the money we make from the charity pending. I spend it all on luxury goods.” The remark is delivered sarcastically — pre-empting criticism, but the framing is her own. It constitutes a public acknowledgement that the operation generates money and that personal spending follows from it, delivered in the same breath as the "charity pending" descriptor. The sarcastic register does not change the underlying admission: she is publicly connecting charity pending income to personal expenditure, in a broadcast to her full follower base, at a time when both Charity Commission applications had already been refused. The remark is consistent with the "flog stuff and keep the money" equivalence statement (12 September 2025) and the May 2024 self-allocation of £50 per month from takings documented below.

“I allocate myself up to 50 pound a month from the takings“ — self-directed spending authority, 9 May 2024. In a public broadcast dated 9 May 2024, the operator disclosed a personal spending policy applied to the operation's takings: “written into our policies that we haven't published yet because we're in the process of setting them up and we're doing it already to become a registered charity, that I've got in there that I allow myself to spend 50 pound on items that I think are going to benefit the charity.” She further stated: “I don't go over 50 pound because obviously, you know, these little five pound trades can add up.” This admission is significant on three grounds. First, she confirms policies had not been published as of May 2024. Despite the operation having been active for four years and having applied twice to the Charity Commission. Second, she confirms a personal monthly spending allocation drawn from operational takings — a financial arrangement with no CIC regulatory disclosure and no equivalent entry in any published policy or filing. Third, she references "becoming a registered charity" in May 2024, after both Charity Commission applications had already failed. The broadcast also confirms: “Our running costs are quite high with having four shops and a donation centre now” — corroborating the four-shop premises record in Section 07, and states: “Please remember, you need to be a customer or a donator to access any of our services. Because then you're helping another mother further down the line” — the pay-to-access policy stated verbatim on a public broadcast in May 2024.

PayPal charity listings confirmed still active — 22 August 2025. As of 22 August 2025, both PayPal accounts were confirmed still live and actively soliciting donations under charity-adjacent descriptions, seven weeks after the FCA formally denied the authorisation claim in writing (16 July 2025), and ten months after the Charity Commission's second refusal notification (20 October 2023). The continued operation of these accounts after both denials were on record materially undermines any claim that the charitable framing was inadvertent or historical. A further discrepancy is documented on the @jaynesbabybankrisca account: despite "risca" in the handle, the registered location is listed as Blackwood, GB, not Risca — inconsistent with the geographic identity implied by the account name and adding a further layer of ambiguity to the donation infrastructure.

“We designed the shops to be cheaper than charity shops and help us make a good hard earned revenue” — 10 September 2022. A public post states: “We designed the shops to be cheaper than charity shops and help us make a good hard earned revenue to support our charity journey so we don’t have to rely on grants and hand outs ourself.” This is an explicit admission that the shops were designed to generate revenue for the operator. The phrase “good hard earned revenue” directly contradicts the no-wage, all-profits-to-charity framing deployed across the same period.

“We are non-profit even though we are classed as a business until we register as a charity” — 20 July 2024. See Finding 02 for the verbatim admission and analysis.

“We pay the bills … and then whatever’s left goes into the food bank” — 14 September 2024. A broadcast dated 14 September 2024 contains two significant admissions in the same session. The operator first states the operation is “classed as a non-profit business until we get a charity number or CIC number or whatever” and separately admits: “we pay the bills we pay all of the bills the running costs and then whatever’s left goes into the food bank etc.” The latter directly contradicts the repeated public claim that 100% of profits go to beneficiaries, confirming that bills and running costs are extracted from takings first, with only the residual reaching the food bank.

18Fraud Act 2006 s.2 / Charities Act 1992Donation diversion, charity number misuse, and the ukraine appeal — whistleblower account

N####A W########, founder of the now-closed registered charity Cwtch-Up (no. 1194295), has provided documented evidence of a series of incidents spanning 2022–2023 in which the operator used Cwtch-Up’s name and charity registration number without consent in JBB fundraising material.

Fabricated correspondence on Cwtch-Up letterheaded paper. W######## alleges that the operator produced letters on Cwtch-Up headed paper to present to businesses as authorisation for donation collections — without W########'s knowledge or consent. These letters were used to solicit items from businesses under the false impression that Cwtch-Up was involved. W######## states: “She had made letter headed paper and written a letter to give to businesses to collect stuff for me to take to Ukraine. I told her countless times to stop because she was using my charity number and keeping the donations herself.”

Ukraine appeal — donations disputed, counter-narrative refuted by video evidence. JBB has repeatedly claimed, across multiple broadcasts from 2024 through September 2025, that W######## ran a "fake Ukraine appeal" and stole JBB donations. W######## categorically denies this and has provided video footage recorded at the refugee centre in Przemyśl, Poland — approximately 10km from the Ukrainian border — showing her delivering aid to a midwife operating a Polish Red Cross ambulance evacuating Ukrainians in urgent medical need. This footage, archived and published by the investigation in September 2025, directly contradicts JBB's repeated "fake Ukraine" claims. The investigation notes that JBB continued to repeat the fake Ukraine narrative in public broadcasts after this counter-evidence was published.

Uganda container claim. The operator publicly solicited sponsorship for a shipping container to support "Mothers in Uganda," claiming to have been doing this "unofficially for 5 years", a claim that predates the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. W######## alleges the Uganda appeal was introduced after the Ukraine appeal came under scrutiny, as a means of diverting attention from the destination of collected goods. She states: “I don't believe she had any contacts or sent anything to Uganda. She said it to one up Ukraine. She needed shipping containers to fill with the stuff she was hoarding.” The operator was at the relevant time in possession of a 7.5-tonne box lorry parked at her home address.

Police and social services reference — operator's own words. In a transcript of message exchanges, the operator herself wrote: “Police have referred me to social services. Do you think that's because they arrested me and fucked up big time?” This statement, made in private correspondence, not a public broadcast, inconsistent with the repeated public claim of no police involvement in connection with the operation.

Cwtch-Up (registered charity no. 1194295) closed in early 2023. W######## has attributed the closure to sustained harassment, reputational damage, and investigation pressure resulting from her association with JBB activity. During its period of operation, the charity documented delivery of over 200,000 meals locally. The investigation notes that the operator has publicly claimed credit for "shutting down" Cwtch-Up, a claim that is directly contested by W######## and is unsupported by any regulatory decision. However, in the 6 October 2025 broadcast the operator stated: “Kuchat was shut down because she used my name in a false Ukrainian appeal and didn't submit her financial records. And all of the abuse that she was giving people online. Because I sent it all myself.” The phrase "because I sent it all myself", made in the context of explaining why Cwtch-Up was shut down. Separately, across multiple broadcasts and posts spanning 2022 to 2026, the operator made repeated public allegations that N####A W######## ran a “fake Ukraine appeal” using JBB’s name without permission, and that the appeal bus “never left the parking lot.” Representative statements include: “You using our name without permission to get donations for a fake Ukraine appeal that never took place on a bus that never even left the parking lot”; “N####A W######## had a charity shutdown because she failed to submit finances and she used her name in a fake Ukraine appeal on a double-decker bus that was never ever going to leave the UK.” These claims are directly contradicted by the documented record: N####A W######## physically travelled to Poland to deliver aid, as documented in Finding 22. The Charity Commission removed Cwtch-Up from the register for failure to submit annual returns, not for any conduct relating to JBB or Ukraine. The operator’s framing inverts the documented facts entirely. The statement that “shut down” Cwtch-Up, constituting a public admission that the operator personally submitted the complaints and evidence to regulators that contributed to the closure of a registered charity. Whether that evidence was accurate is a separate question; the admission of having "sent it all" is documented as a primary source statement. A separate public comment on the JBB page states verbatim: “We have shut down 3 other charities over this abuse. Cwtch up, Caerphilly bird rescue and hope bus cic.” This is the most comprehensive public admission of the shutdown campaign in the documented corpus — naming three specific organisations and framing all three closures as deliberate outcomes of the operator’s own actions. Cwtch-Up (registered charity no. 1194295) is documented above. Caerphilly Bird Rescue and Hope Bus CIC are the two further organisations claimed. No official regulatory decision attributing the closure of any of these three organisations to conduct by JBB has been produced, but the claim of having shut them down, made publicly and repeatedly, is documented as a primary source admission of intent and attributed outcome.

19Fraud Act 2006 s.2 / Companies Act 2006Second unsatisfied CCJ confirms Carrie-Anne Ridsdale identity, directly contradicting public denials

A County Court Judgment registered on 27 January 2026 (case ref. M3DP9X7A, Civil National Business Centre) appears on the TrustOnline Register of Judgments, Orders and Fines under the name MISS CARRIE-ANNE RIDSDALE, address: 7 Meadow Road, Pontllanfraith, Blackwood, NP12 2AG. The same residential address was the CIC's registered office on incorporation (changed by AD01 on 14 November 2025). The judgment amount is £277 and remains unsatisfied as of the date of publication.

Why this matters. This is not a variant spelling such as "Ceri-Ann." The court record uses the exact identity — Carrie-Anne Ridsdale, that has been publicly challenged, denied, and minimised across multiple broadcasts. The first CCJ (case ref. 521MC287, £7,141, registered 23 May 2024) was registered under "Ceri-Ann Ridsdale T/A Jayne's Baby Bank" and publicly dismissed with claims the name was "not even my name" and that there were "no legal documents" connected to the operation. The January 2026 judgment materially undermines that position: it places Miss Carrie-Anne Ridsdale on the formal court register, at the same address, through the same judicial system.

Identity continuity — now confirmed across seven formal records and one self-identified platform record. The same TrustOnline report references both judgments, establishing that Ceri-Ann Ridsdale (T/A Jayne's Baby Bank) and Miss Carrie-Anne Ridsdale are recorded on the same official court registry document at the same address. Combined with the commercial lease (Jayne-Anne Carrie-Anne Ridsdale), CIC filing (Jayne Price), PayPal account (Jayne R-Price), electoral records, enforcement notices, and the operator's own use of #carrieanneridsdale on the official JBB TikTok account in December 2020, the court register now anchors the Carrie-Anne Ridsdale identity within official legal record independently of any investigative assertion. There are no fewer than seven formally documented name variants for one individual across court, regulatory, fundraising, and tenancy records — all connected to the same residential address and the same operation. An Electoral Register search confirms Carrie A Ridsdale registered at a Blackwood, Gwent, NP12 address for the period 2013–2016 — providing independent official confirmation of both the Carrie A Ridsdale name variant and the Blackwood NP12 address connection prior to the formation of JBB.

Daniel Ridsdale — Facebook URL provides independent Ridsdale surname confirmation. The Facebook profile operated by Daniel James — the operator's son and CIC subscriber at 7 Meadow Road, Blackwood (Companies House ref. 16838920) — carries the public profile URL facebook.com/daniel.ridsdale.96. Facebook profile URL slugs are assigned at account registration and reflect the name under which the account was created. The surname in the URL is therefore Ridsdale, not James, confirming that "Daniel James" is itself an informal or alias presentation of an individual registered on Facebook as Daniel Ridsdale. This URL constitutes an independently verifiable public record: it requires no document request, no FOI, and no investigative assertion. It is accessible to any member of the public. In the context of repeated public denials that "Ridsdale" is the operator's name or has any connection to the operation, the Facebook URL of her son — the second named individual on the CIC incorporation document at the same address — provides a further independent data point anchoring the Ridsdale surname to this household and this operation.

The significance for donors and regulators is set out in Finding 17: a person donating, contracting, or engaging with this operation has no straightforward means of connecting the public-facing identity ("Jayne Price") to the legal identities under which court liabilities, tenancy agreements, and enforcement notices are held. The January 2026 judgment closes the most publicly repeated gap in that identity chain. The full analysis is published at jaynesbabybank.co.uk.

Criminal damage proceedings — RIDSDALE, CARRIE-ANNE and RIDSDALE, DANIEL (Case No. 61CY0283624). A Magistrates Court listing published via CourtServe confirms that both RIDSDALE, CARRIE-ANNE and RIDSDALE, DANIEL appear on the same court record under case number 61CY0283624, listed for a first hearing under CPS-CYSE. Carrie-Anne faces three counts: criminal damage to property valued under £5,000, attempt criminal damage to property valued under £5,000, and a further count of criminal damage to property valued under £5,000. Daniel faces two counts of criminal damage to property valued under £5,000. This is the first confirmed court record placing both individuals on the same criminal proceedings simultaneously, and the second court document using the exact RIDSDALE, CARRIE-ANNE name form that has been publicly denied. The listing also confirms both use the Ridsdale surname in formal criminal proceedings — further undermining the public position that this is not the operator's legal name. The investigation notes these are charges at first hearing stage; no finding of guilt is asserted or implied.

Landlord’s Formal Notice names Carrie-Anne Ridsdale as former tenant — 6 Commercial Street, 15 September 2026. On the landlord’s account as relayed to the investigation, he attended 6 Commercial Street, Pontypool in the early hours of 15 September 2026 and took possession of the unit; by that morning a two-page Formal Notice was taped inside the shop window, where it was photographed. It is headed “FORMAL NOTICE” and “EXPIRED COMMERCIAL TENANCY — NO UNAUTHORISED ACCESS”, and its header block records “Former Tenant: Carrie-Anne Ridsdale” and “Landlord: Nasrat Shoaib”. It opens “Dear Ms Ridsdale,” and sets out that under Clause 1 of the Lease the contractual term ran for one year from and including 27 October 2024, and therefore expired on 26 October 2025. It is signed by the landlord and dated 15 September 2026.

Why a private lease carries more evidential weight than the court register. Both judgments set out above were met with the same position — that it is “not even my name”, and that there were no legal documents connected to the operation at all. A credit file is capable of being characterised as an error, and a court register as somebody else’s record. A lease is not capable of that characterisation. It is a private contract between two parties, signed on 27 October 2024, and the landlord’s notice does not guess at a name and does not lift one off a database — it names the counterparty to his own contract, quotes the clauses of that contract, and addresses her directly as its recipient. The seven-variant name record is set out at Finding 03.

The notice was taped to the window of the shop the operator has been running under the name Jayne Price. Both positions cannot be held at once: either Carrie-Anne Ridsdale signed the lease of 27 October 2024 and has been trading from 6 Commercial Street, or Jayne’s Baby Bank traded for 324 days from premises let to a woman it says it has nothing to do with. The occupation of the unit after the term expired is dealt with separately at Finding 31. Full account: Sherlock article, 15 September 2026.

What this finding does not assert. People may lawfully use more than one name, and a preferred name, alias or rebrand is not by itself misconduct. What is recorded here is the names under which leases were signed and judgments entered, and the public denials made about them.

Update, 5 October 2026 — the first judgment’s name is on a deed she signed. The lease of Unit 35, Bowen Industrial Estate, Aberbargoed, dated 22 June 2022 and published in full on 5 October 2026, reads “SIGNED as a deed by CERI-ANN RIDSDALE”. The tenant is one person, at 7 Meadow Road, and the rent side letter signed the same day is addressed to “Ms Ceri-Ann Ridsdale”. The £7,141 judgment (521MC287) followed the enforcement agents’ re-entry of 30 November 2023 and is entered against “Ceri-Ann Ridsdale T/A Jayne’s Baby Bank”. On 31 January 2026 she said of it: “if you look at the CCJ it’s not even under my name. And there’s nobody in that name registered in our company.” The name on the judgment is the name on the deed. Around the one unit the paperwork uses “Jayne Price”, “Ceri-Ann Ridsdale” and “Ceri-Anne Ridsdale”, and the Acuitus auction catalogue of 13 December 2023 adds a further variant, “J. RIDSALE”, as the tenant of 5 Crane Street. The investigation does not say why the name Ceri-Ann was used, or that anyone was misled by it. Sherlock article, 5 October 2026.

7 October 2026 — why the names matter to a landlord. The register of judgments is searched by name and address, and a credit check is only as good as the name it is run on: a search for Jayne Price, the name she trades under and the name Companies House lists for one of the CIC’s two directors, would not find a judgment against Ceri-Ann Ridsdale. A company formed in November 2025 has no trading record to check either; its first accounts are not due until August 2027. Sherlock article, 7 October 2026.

20Theft Act 1968 s.1 / computer misuse act 1990 s.1 / CJA 1988 s.39Shop confrontation, on-camera identity denial, card pickup, and SumUp access alert — 12 june 2025

On 12 June 2025, N#####E. A local business owner and critic of JBB — attended a JBB shop premises and confronted the operator on video. During the exchange, N#####E addressed the operator by the name "Carrie" and stated publicly that her real name was Carrie. The operator denied this on camera: “No it's not, it's Jayne.” This denial, made in the operator's own shop and publicly archived (youtube.com/shorts/690cpSTuMbs), is the most direct documented instance of the operator verbally denying the Carrie-Anne Ridsdale identity in real time, on a date when both CCJs, the commercial lease, the enforcement notices, the birth index entry, the electoral register, and the operator's own TikTok hashtag all confirmed that identity.

Confrontation transcript, archived deleted broadcast. A separate archived deleted broadcast captures the following verbatim exchange, consistent in location and date with the 12 June 2025 incident. The voice of a member of the public — identified as consistent with N#####E — is heard addressing the operator directly at the 5 Crane Street premises: “Hiya, you Carrie? You keep posting things on Facebook about me. I'm live on Facebook, by the way. Let's just, this is going to the HMRC. Who's Jayne? She's dead, isn't she? Jayne Price? You Carrie? Out. Can I have the police please? Jayne's baby bank on 5 Crane Street. Out please.” This transcript is significant on three grounds. First, the question “Who's Jayne? She's dead, isn't she?” — asked directly to the operator at her own premises — references a claim that the name "Jayne Price" belongs to a deceased individual, consistent with investigative findings documented in Finding 03 regarding the origin of the alias. Second, the public address of the operator as "Carrie" — to her face, at her shop, on video, and the immediate denial that followed is now corroborated by audio from the confronting party's perspective, independently of the video footage already archived. Third, the caller explicitly states she is calling police and referencing the HMRC — placing on the public record that both bodies were being contacted in connection with the Crane Street premises on this date.

Physical removal. The operator has stated in a subsequent public voice-over broadcast that N#####E was "put outside the shop on her arse" during the incident. N#####E alleged she was assaulted during the confrontation, that the operator knocked her phone out of her hand and used physical force against her. The operator denied this account, claiming N#####E was the aggressor and that she had CCTV footage supporting her position. Police were called and attended the premises. The operator stated she provided police statements, as did her staff. Physical removal of a person from premises by force, regardless of the level of force used — may constitute common assault under Section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The operator's own public account confirms physical contact occurred.

Bank card, documented pickup, subsequent denial, and SumUp access alert. Video footage archived by the Sherlock investigation (youtube.com/shorts/DtYQ1Fh5ejQ) documents N#####E dropping her bank card at the shop entrance, and the operator bending down to retrieve it. In the subsequent public voice-over broadcast (15 June 2025), the operator denied having picked up the card, claiming N#####E had simply dropped it. This denial is directly contradicted by the archived video footage. At 00:26 on 12 June 2025. The same date as the incident — N#####E received a SumUp security notification stating that a new device had logged into her SumUp account. The notification records the login location as Chelmsley Wood, GB (IP 86.2.38.98), device type: iPhone, iOS, Chrome. N#####E did not recognise the device and was advised by SumUp to reset her password. The operator is the only documented person with physical possession of the card at the relevant time. The geographic location recorded in the SumUp notification is inconsistent with South Wales and may reflect VPN use, mobile data routing, or a third party. No definitive attribution to any individual is possible from IP data alone. What is documented is: the card was picked up on video; the operator denied it; the card's associated payment account received an unrecognised login attempt on the same date. These facts raise questions under the Theft Act 1968 s.1 (appropriation of another's property) and Computer Misuse Act 1990 s.1 (unauthorised access to a computer system). The matter was reported to police.

False identification of N#####E as the JBB investigation website creator. In the subsequent broadcast and across multiple public posts, the operator identified N#####E — by name, to an audience of approximately 72,000 followers, as the individual "behind the website" at jaynesbabybank.co.uk. This claim is false. N#####E publicly denied it, stating she was "not tech savvy enough" to run such a site and that she was being publicly slandered. The investigation website was not created by or connected to N#####E. Publishing a false identification of a named private individual as the author of an investigative website to 72,000 followers — in a context where the operator had already demonstrated willingness to encourage mass reporting of that individual's business, constituting a serious reputational allegation without evidential basis, engaging the Defamation Act 2013.

Campaign against N#####E's business — S#### 4 H####. Following the incident the operator used her public platform to target N#####E's wax melt business directly. Documented conduct includes: publicly alleging the business was "not a registered business or registered with HMRC" (an unverified claim); threatening to report N#####E to Trading Standards for "running a business from your council house"; encouraging 72,000 followers to report the business page; and boasting of maintaining a named complaint file on N#####E. These actions collectively constitute a coordinated attempt to damage a private individual's business and livelihood using a disproportionate public platform — engaging the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and potentially the Defamation Act 2013.

24Fraud Act 2006 s.2 / Companies Act 2006Undisclosed Facebook monetisation income, and public contempt directed at a low-income member of the public

A publicly posted screenshot from the JBB Facebook page analytics dashboard confirms the page is enrolled in Meta's monetisation programme, displaying the following figures: 2 million views, approximate earnings of $83.34 listed under a "Today" header, engagement of 95,125 (up 82%), and net followers of +6,210. The screenshot confirms the page is generating direct dollar revenue through Meta's monetisation programme, an income stream that has not been referenced in any publicly available CIC filing, annual return, or financial disclosure. The CIC36 declaration submitted to the CIC Regulator left the surplus use and asset-locked body fields blank. A CIC is legally required under the Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 to demonstrate that its activities serve community benefit — undisclosed commercial revenue generated from a platform presented as a charitable welfare resource raises a direct question for the CIC Regulator as to whether this income has been accounted for and whether it has been applied to community benefit or retained personally.

“Contribute to your daily income" — public admission of personal monetisation. The post accompanying the analytics screenshot states: “When someone who works in the Foresters Blackwood or a chip shop puts a laughing emoji on one of your posts while they earn minimum wage, and I'm on 2 million views, 2 cics, funding pending, 5 shops and a donation centre but they are delusional that the laughing emoji is going to have such a negative effect on you when all they did was contribute to your daily income.” The phrase “contribute to your daily income” is the operator's own characterisation of engagement from her follower base — explicitly framing public interaction with her content as a source of personal daily income. This directly contradicts the repeated public presentation of the JBB platform as a charitable resource operated entirely without personal financial benefit.

Public contempt directed at a low-income member of the public. The same post specifically names two local working-class employers — The Foresters Blackwood and a chip shop — to mock an unnamed member of the public for their occupation and minimum wage earnings. This contempt for low-income workers is published from the platform of an organisation that publicly presents itself as existing to help families in financial hardship. The juxtaposition is the operator's own: she presents her own 2 million views and commercial income as evidence of superiority over a member of the public whose wage she derides. The individuals JBB claims to serve — mothers in financial need — are, by definition, the same demographic being mocked in this post. This conduct is inconsistent with any genuine charitable or community interest purpose and is directly relevant to the CIC Regulator's assessment of whether the operation serves community benefit.

“2 CICs" — second Community Interest Company undisclosed. The post text states: “I'm on 2 million views, 2 cics, funding pending, 5 shops and a donation centre.” Only one CIC — Jayne's Baby Bank C.I.C. (no. 16838920), incorporated 7 November 2025 — is publicly identified in this investigation. The reference to two CICs in a public post is the operator's own statement. No second CIC has been identified at Companies House under any of the documented name variants. If a second CIC exists or is in formation, it would represent an undisclosed parallel entity, consistent with the "decoy" admissions documented in Finding 05 and the broader pattern of operating multiple structures simultaneously to complicate regulatory and financial accountability.

DWP contact regarding influencer income — 8 October 2025. In a public broadcast dated 8 October 2025, the operator disclosed that the Department for Work and Pensions had contacted her regarding influencer income: “Benefit people rang me this morning. They said, oh, Jane, your fan club's been on the phone again. Where is the influencer money being paid? I said, oh, right, I can send you that now, not a problem.” She continued: “the influencer, I am entitled to the money because I am the influencer. Yep. However, I don't want the money. I'd rather it go towards the baby bank. And last month we had quite a bit from the haters, didn't we? And it was used to pay K###### rent.” She further stated: “It's always cashed out straight into the baby bank account. Only one baby bank account we got.” This broadcast is significant across three dimensions. First, it confirms DWP was already making enquiries about influencer income in October 2025, establishing that a government benefits agency had identified the monetisation income as a potential issue against her benefit claims. Second, she confirms influencer earnings were used to pay shop rent. A direct commercial application of platform revenue. Third, the claim that there is “only one baby bank account” directly contradicts the three documented PayPal accounts (@Jaynesbabybank, @Jaynesbabybank100, @jaynesbabybankrisca) and the SumUp gift card account documented in Finding 17 — all of which are separate donation instruments operating under JBB branding. The broadcast was made publicly to tens of thousands of followers and is independently archived at the reference above.

Monetisation listed to the public as a way of contributing. A post published from the account of the operator’s son — the individual listed as a subscriber on the CIC incorporation documents — sets out the donation channels and ends by naming the revenue stream directly.

The significance is not that monetisation existed — the dashboard screenshot above establishes that. It is that engagement with the content is presented to followers as one of the “ways to contribute”, in the same list as card donations, the sealed donation pots and direct debit. A person interacting with a video in response to that post is, on the operation’s own description, contributing to it. Revenue arising that way has not been referenced in any CIC filing, and no accounts have been filed (Finding 24a).

24aFraud Act 2006 s.2Companies Act 2006CIC RegulatorFinancial governance asserted to the public — annual audited accounts, no wages, and registration with three councils — tested against the register

Finding 24 records undisclosed monetisation income and the blank surplus-use and asset-lock fields on the CIC36 declaration. This finding takes the positive assertions — the things the public was told were in place — and sets each against the public register.

“Submitted annually to Companies House for a review”. A company incorporated on 7 November 2025 has no annual cycle to have completed. On 3 May 2026 it had existed for just under six months, had filed three administrative forms and no accounts, and its first accounts were fifteen months from being due. The statement describes a recurring process of external audit and annual filing which the register shows has never occurred once.

Two further points are recorded for accuracy, because they cut against overstating this. First, “audited” may be loose speech for an accountant preparing figures; a company of this size would in any event file unaudited small-company or micro-entity accounts, statutory audit applying only above thresholds the operation has never claimed to meet. Second, no filing was overdue on 3 May 2026 and none is overdue now. The finding is not that a filing deadline was missed. It is that a state of affairs was asserted to the public — annual audited accounts on the public record — which did not exist, at a moment when the assertion was being used to rebut criticism and to reassure donors.

“Registered baby bank and foodbank with 3 councils”. No council register of baby banks or food banks exists in Wales. The three councils in whose areas the operation traded are Caerphilly, Torfaen and Blaenau Gwent. Caerphilly County Borough Council’s Leader has stated in writing that “Jayne’s Baby Bank isn’t regulated by CCBC, and we have not funded the organisation” (§02). The claim of being “registered… with 3 councils” is made in the same sentence as the CIC claim, which borrows the register’s authority for a status no register confers.

“No one at the baby bank takes a wage… including me”. Read with Finding 24, where the operator’s own statement is that social media income “technically should be my wage”, and with the documented Meta monetisation revenue; and with Finding 12 on the volunteer store-credit rate card and Finding 33 on stock offered in lieu of wages. On 20 June 2026 the same account posted a graphic reading “Jayne’s Baby Bank Ceo / Director £0.00 — Choose wisely”. The titles are notable: no company existed in which any directorship could be held before 7 November 2025, and the landlord’s tenant application form for 48 Worcester Street records the same self-described position, “Director”, against a lease dated 7 December 2023 (premises schedule).

“100% of the profits go back into the baby bank”. A community interest company does not generate “profits” for return in that sense; it is subject to an asset lock, and the CIC36 fields describing how surplus would be applied and to which asset-locked body were submitted blank (Finding 02). Whether surplus has in fact been applied to community benefit is a question the first accounts and the first CIC34 report would begin to answer. Neither has been filed.

A detail worth recording: the wrong company number. On 26 June 2026 a post warning others that fundraising for third parties would be “fraud and deception” and could cost them their charity number and leave them with “criminal convictions” cited the operation’s own authority as “a Trademarked Registered CIC 16837920”. The company number is 16838920. Two digits are transposed. It is most likely a typing error and is recorded as such; it is noted only because the number was being deployed as the basis of a legal warning to other organisations.

What this finding does not assert. It does not assert that any accounting obligation has been breached — none has fallen due. It does not assert that no accountant has been engaged, that no surplus has reached the operation’s stated purposes, or that any particular sum is unaccounted for. It makes no finding on whether the misstated company number was deliberate. What is recorded is the gap between what the public was told was already in place and what the public register shows, on a date, in the operator’s own words.

25Defamation Act 2013 / Fraud Act 2006 s.2 / Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 / Animal Welfare Act 2006The Caerphilly Bird Rescue brand hijack — stolen identity, stolen imagery, weaponised trademark, and a documented donor warning from the original co-founder

The original Caerphilly Bird Rescue — a 33-year community legacy. The historic Caerphilly Bird Rescue was founded and operated by Carol Gravenor and her late husband Ray Gravenor over approximately 33 years (established around 1991). The rescue operated from physical premises including market units and retail shops; handled wildlife cases from Cardiff, Penarth, Newport and surrounding areas; worked with veterinarians, vet nurses and police officers; and relied on fundraising to cover rent, utilities, fuel, medication and animal care. Ray Gravenor was publicly known as "The Bird Man." The rescue remained operational until Carol Gravenor’s serious illness and hospitalisation, with a scaled-down continuation still being run by a family member as documented by Carol Gravenor in her own public statements.

January 2024 — Carol Gravenor lifetime animal-keeping ban (welfare offences). In January 2024, Carol Gravenor received a lifetime ban on keeping animals following animal-welfare offences. The ban is an animal-welfare regulatory outcome — a distinct legal classification from "animal cruelty," which has a separate criminal definition under UK law. The ban’s existence is the factual background that the operator later exploited and mischaracterised in her 20 January 2026 launch post.

Long-running rescue-brand pre-history — "The Forever Home Rescue and Sanctuary" (2016-2021). A now-deleted Facebook page for "The Forever Home Rescue and Sanctuary" described itself as "self funded animal rescue established since 2016" and was active at least as recently as May 2021. The page was categorised as a Cause and carried the Amazon wishlist URL amazon.co.uk/hz/wishlist/ls/2487T22KX3TJC in its about section. The same wishlist linked to the same Amazon customer account also hosting "Jayne’s Baby Bank Wish List." This establishes that a rescue-branded public donation operation was being run under this name from at least 2016 through 2021, using a shared Amazon account simultaneously linked to JBB, and that the page was subsequently deleted — likely following investigative identification. No registration, charity number, or legal entity for "The Forever Home Rescue and Sanctuary" has ever been identified. The shared Amazon account and wishlist URL constitute direct documentary evidence connecting the unregistered rescue brand to the JBB operator. The "rescuing animals since 2016" claim later deployed on JustGiving (see below) broadly aligns with this earlier unregistered manifestation.

26 December 2025 — trademark UK00004316067 filed. A UK trademark application UK00004316067 in the name "The New Caerphilly Bird and Small Animal Rescue Sanctuary" was filed in the name "Jayne price" under Class 36 — fundraising. The Intellectual Property Office register records the following full status history: 26 December 2025 — Application Received, then Examination; 9 January 2026 — Pre-Publication; 15 January 2026 — Application Published; 1 May 2026 — Registered. The mark is a figurative mark depicting a castle silhouette and the rescue name.

20 January 2026 — public launch of "The New Caerphilly Bird and Small Animal Rescue Sanctuary TM". The operator publicly launched the rescue brand and claimed to have "taken over Caerphilly Bird Rescue." The launch post stated that the original Caerphilly Bird Rescue "fell into disrepute and the owner received a lifetime ban due to animal cruelty" — a misrepresentation of the underlying animal-welfare regulatory record (welfare offences, not a finding of cruelty). The post simultaneously announced "a separate payment link and accounts for this CIC" for fundraising purposes. A new donation instrument for an unregistered rescue entity, launched alongside the misleading characterisation of the founders’ regulatory history and the false takeover claim. At the date of launch, the trademark application was still in its pre-publication stage.

The "criminal offence not civil" trademark threat — legally incorrect at both stages of the application. Across multiple public broadcasts from January 2026 onwards, the operator publicly stated, verbatim: "It is Trademarked and breach of Trademarked law is a criminal offence not civil." This statement is legally incorrect at every stage of the application history. During the pending period (26 December 2025 through 30 April 2026), no enforceable trademark rights existed at all — a pending application confers no exclusive rights and creates no criminal liability for third parties. After registration on 1 May 2026, trademark infringement under the Trade Marks Act 1994 remains primarily a civil cause of action under sections 14-19; criminal offences under section 92 are narrowly drawn (typically requiring counterfeiting of goods, made or applied with intent to gain or cause loss in the course of trade) and do not apply to factual reporting, journalism, criticism, or ordinary references to a name in the course of public-interest documentation. The "criminal offence not civil" framing was used to threaten members of the public who referenced the name in the course of legitimate scrutiny. A documented misuse of intellectual-property language to suppress public criticism.

What a trademark is not. A trademark registration — even after the 1 May 2026 confirmation — is solely a brand registration. It is not a charity registration; it is not a CIC or company registration for a rescue venture; it does not authorise animal-welfare activity; it does not demonstrate safeguarding, governance, or veterinary compliance; and it does not create criminal offences for third-party references made in the public interest. No rescue CIC, charity, or company registration has ever been identified for "The New Caerphilly Bird and Small Animal Rescue Sanctuary" at Companies House or the Charity Commission as of the date of writing.

24 January 2026 — first stolen fox image posted publicly from the verified JBB profile. On 24 January 2026, the official Jayne’s Baby Bank Facebook profile published a fox image captioned "Look who snook in through the cat flap! Pontypool and Caerphilly fundraising shops open today" with on-image overlay text reading "Pontypool and Caerphilly fundraising shops open today." The post was published alongside fundraising promotion for the rescue venture and created a false impression that the fox had entered a sanctuary or JBB property and that physical rescue premises existed. The image originated from the private TikTok account of D##### L#####, who posted directly to the JBB South Wales Free Page group: "Hi, Just inquiring as to why you would be screen capturing pictures of a fox in my house off my tiktok page, and claiming it to be wandering in through your catflap and trying to beg money off the internet with it." The post was deleted following the challenge. No correction or apology was issued.

"Fake page" deflection — demonstrably false on the documentary record. The operator subsequently claimed the fox image had been posted by a "fake page" or impersonation account, not by the official JBB profile. An independent recorded screen video disproves the claim. From the 1-minute mark onwards, the screen recording shows: the official JBB profile being viewed in real time; the fox image post appearing live on that profile; visible engagement from followers (the post had accrued 22 reactions at the time of capture); and the same post later visible in the profile gallery. Third-party impersonation pages cannot insert content into an official Facebook profile feed, generate engagement from that account’s followers, or appear in the verified profile’s gallery. The "fake page" claim is therefore demonstrably false on the documentary record.

"Selling foxes" counter-narrative + mass-report instruction issued the same day. Within hours of the original image-owner challenge, the operator broadcast a same-day video reframing the documented IP-theft incident as a hostile "cyber attack." Verbatim from the broadcast: "We’ve had another cyber attack tonight… they’ve put up a post saying that we are selling foxes… So if you see stuff report it and can you report it as animal sales because Facebook will take it down quicker." No critic had made any "selling foxes" allegation; the narrative was manufactured to displace the actual issue (stolen imagery and false-premises framing). The mass-report instruction is explicit: report content under a specific category chosen for takedown speed rather than accuracy. The same broadcast continues: "I expect the RSPCA now will turn up… Anybody is welcome to come in and view what we do." The deployment of a false counter-narrative plus a mass-reporting instruction targeting unrelated reporting categories is consistent with the platform-suppression mechanisms documented across Findings 12, 16 and 21.

Concurrent commission-based monetisation admission — same day as the fox incident broadcasts. In the same batch of recordings made on or about 24-25 January 2026, the operator separately stated on camera, verbatim: "TikTok shop purchase. We get commission on it… We got sent one for free… This was sent to us for free to product test and to gain commission from the sales." The admission documents concurrent commission-based commercial promotion through an account branded as a community-interest entity, made in the same news cycle as the stolen-imagery incident and rescue fundraising claims. The juxtaposition raises transparency questions about the separation between charitable messaging and affiliate-style commerce, and is directly relevant to the undisclosed Facebook monetisation income documented in Finding 24.

25 January 2026 — Carol Gravenor’s first public refutation. On 25 January 2026, original co-founder Carol Gravenor issued a public statement directly refuting the takeover claim. Verbatim quotes from the statement include: "PLEASE BE AWARE THIS WOMAN IS NOTHING TO DO WITH CAERPHILLY BIRD RESCUE." and "CAERPHILLY BIRD RESCUE IS RAY’S LEGACY — he was known as ‘The Bird Man’." Carol Gravenor described the operator’s actions as "unscrupulous" and "a way to make money," and confirmed that "Jayne Price" had no lawful connection to Caerphilly Bird Rescue, no transfer of assets, and no legitimate continuity of operation. The statement is the first documented public refutation by a named original founder of the takeover narrative.

25 January 2026 — false review left by the operator on the original Caerphilly Bird Rescue page, falsely attributing the page to a named whistleblower. On the same day as Carol Gravenor’s first public refutation, the operator posted a public review on the "Caerphilly Bird and Small Animal Rescue Sanctuary" page falsely attributing the original rescue’s page to a third party. The review reads verbatim: "this is a fake page created by N####A W######## of Cardiff Ely, currently living in Rhymney. she is a known fraudster and stalker of women and men. do noyT give any money to this women she had her charity cwtch up shut down because of fraud, DO NOT GIVE N####A MONEY FOR ANYTHING." The factual record contradicts the review on each material point: N####A W######## did not create, operate, or control the page; N####A W######## previously founded the registered charity Cwtch-Up (Charity No. 1194295), which closed in early 2023; and no regulatory finding of fraud against Cwtch-Up has been produced. The review re-deploys the same harassment-deflection mechanism documented in Finding 21 against the same named individual. This time deployed in the rescue-hijack context to redirect public scrutiny away from the operator and toward a third party. The review functions simultaneously as defamation against N####A W######## (Defamation Act 2013), donor manipulation through a false direction to withhold support, and platform-level interference with the original rescue brand’s page.

30 January 2026 — JustGiving £1,000 appeal launched under unregistered entity name with false historical claim. A JustGiving crowdfunding page was launched on 30 January 2026 in the name "Jayne PRICE," raising funds specifically for "The New Caerphilly Bird and Small Animal Rescue Sanctuary based in Caerphilly," with a target of £1,000 for "animal food, bedding and vet bills." The appeal description includes the verbatim historical claim: "we have been rescuing animals since 2016." No registered entity, charity, or CIC for any rescue operation linked to the operator has ever existed in that timeframe. The 2016 reference broadly coincides with the unregistered "Forever Home Rescue and Sanctuary" Facebook page documented above. JustGiving’s platform terms require fundraisers to confirm funds will be used for the stated purpose and that the fundraiser is authorised to act on behalf of the named entity. Operating an unregistered rescue brand on a major fundraising platform under a name publicly refuted by the original founders, with a documented false historical claim, engages the Fraud Act 2006 s.2 (fraud by false representation).

6 February 2026 — Carol Gravenor’s second public statement: explicit donor warning, solicitor instructed. Twelve days after her first public refutation, Carol Gravenor posted a second public Facebook statement — sharper, shorter, and addressed directly to the donor public. Verbatim from the post: "DO NOT DONATE / JUST TO CLARIFY CAERPHILLY BIRD RESCUE HAS NOT RE-OPENED. / THE NAME IS BEING USED TO FUNDRAISE ONLY! by Carrie Anne Ridsdale/Jane Price/Janes baby Bank." In a comment reply on the same post, Carol Gravenor added: "She is so disgusting.the history is unbelievable.Ive left it to a solicitor." The post is the most explicit public donor warning issued by the original co-founder against the operator’s use of the Caerphilly Bird Rescue name to solicit donations, and confirms that legal instruction has been given. It also explicitly identifies all three name variants — Carrie Anne Ridsdale, Jane Price, Jayne’s Baby Bank, as a single operating identity behind the unauthorised name use.

April 2026 — second stolen image identified and presented as "Our Venue". A second stolen image was published on JBB-branded platforms labelled "Our Venue" with the caption "Foxy loxy — left on bypass for dead." The image was traced to a January 2026 video published by "The Forest of Dean Picture Book." The original content creator publicly confirmed they did not know the operator and had given no permission for the image to be used. The "Our Venue" framing implied the existence of a physical rescue premises that has never been demonstrated to exist; the underlying material is video footage by an unconnected creator in a different region of the UK.

Wider pattern of appropriated retail imagery used to promote unregistered shop and rescue ventures. Beyond the two stolen fox images, multiple photographs of unconnected legitimate UK charity shops and re-use venues have been documented as being republished on the operator’s platforms to promote the JBB shop and rescue brand. Documented appropriated images include photographs from Llanfoist Re-Use shop, Age UK Leicestershire, Moray Waste Busters, and Age UK Lower House Farm. In each case the photographs depict the interior, shelving, or signage of unrelated charity or re-use operations — repurposed to suggest the JBB-branded venues had stock, premises infrastructure, or community partnerships they did not in fact have. The pattern is consistent with the fox-image conduct: appropriation of another organisation’s visual identity to lend false credibility to JBB / Jarmani’s / rescue-branded fundraising, with no permission, attribution, or correction issued when the original sources have been identified. Engages copyright (Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988) and the Fraud Act 2006 s.2 where appropriated imagery is used in donation-soliciting contexts.

1 May 2026 — trademark UK00004316067 formally registered. The IPO register confirms the trademark status changed from "Application Published" to "Registered" on 1 May 2026. The registered status does not retroactively cure any of the underlying conduct documented in this finding: the false takeover narrative refuted twice by the original co-founder; the welfare-offence mischaracterisation as "animal cruelty"; the unregistered rescue CIC/charity status; the documented stolen imagery; the false JustGiving historical claim; the false review against N####A W########; or the legally incorrect "criminal offence not civil" threats made during the pending phase. Registration is a brand-protection mechanism for the trademark holder, not a regulatory licence to conduct animal rescue activity, and not retrospective validation of public statements made between 26 December 2025 and 30 April 2026.

Active animal solicitation without any rescue regulatory framework. Throughout the period covered by this finding, the operator’s account has continued to solicit live animals for rehoming through the unregistered rescue brand. A documented example: a public post seeking two rescue rabbits ("bonded, from the same household") for rehoming via the operation. No home-visit process, no veterinary oversight, no adoption contract, no rescue registration, and no compliance with the framework required to lawfully operate a UK wildlife or small-animal rescue has been demonstrated. The premises from which animals are notionally being received are subject to active fire prohibition notices and remain unregistered as rescue facilities. Soliciting and receiving live animals in those conditions engages concerns under the Animal Welfare Act 2006 (s.4 unnecessary suffering; s.9 duty of care).

26CIC Regulator — community benefit test / DWP benefit-claim integrityPublic articulation of financial-extraction intent — with explicit reference to the Captain Tom Foundation scandal as an aspirational benchmark

The post — verbatim. On 26 May 2026, a public post was made to the Jaynesbabybank Registered - cic Facebook page. The post was framed as a defensive response to critics (“Haters: I’m phoning dwp!”) and reads in full as follows:

Why the framing matters. The post is rhetorically structured as sarcasm directed at critics. That framing does not neutralise its evidential value — the specificity of the figures, the explicit benchmark to a publicly documented charity-misappropriation case, and the deliberate enumeration of a multi-instrument extraction structure (CIC director remuneration + Equality Act disability framing + £150k equipment grant + PIP + Motability car with fuel expenses) demonstrate detailed knowledge of, and aspirational reference to, the precise mechanisms by which a CIC can be used as a personal financial vehicle. The defensive framing “haters can ring DWP” does not change the fact that the operator publicly articulated, to her own follower base, the financial structure she would deploy if she were free to do so. The post is properly read as a statement of intent presented under cover of mockery.

The Captain Tom Foundation comparison — figures match almost exactly. The numbers cited by the operator are not arbitrary. They map directly onto figures documented in the Charity Commission’s statutory inquiry into the Captain Tom Foundation (published 21 November 2024), and onto the publicly reported scandal that resulted in the Ingram-Moores’ disqualification:

Why a CIC is structurally different from a charity, and why this still matters. The operator’s post is framed around a Community Interest Company structure rather than a registered charity. CICs do permit director remuneration, and the legal framework that constrained the Ingram-Moores (Charity Commission oversight, charity-trustee disqualification) does not apply in identical form to a CIC. However, the Office of the Regulator of Community Interest Companies operates a statutory community-benefit test under the Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004: a CIC must demonstrate that its activities serve community benefit, and director remuneration must be reasonable and consistent with that test. Annual CIC36 filings require disclosure of director remuneration. A publicly articulated intent to pay a single director £100,000 per year while soliciting public donations under welfare framing, simultaneously claiming a £150,000 “equipment” grant, claiming PIP, and obtaining a Motability vehicle. From an operation with five shops and the documented monetisation income recorded in Finding 24. This is the precise pattern the community-benefit test exists to scrutinise. The CIC Regulator has the statutory authority to investigate, to issue cease-and-correct notices, and ultimately to dissolve a CIC whose activities are found not to be for community benefit.

DWP benefit-claim integrity. Finding 24 already documents that DWP contacted the operator regarding influencer income in October 2025. The 26 May 2026 post explicitly invites DWP scrutiny (“Haters: I’m phoning dwp! Ring them!”) while simultaneously articulating a financial arrangement that would be material to any benefit-entitlement assessment. The combination of an active commercial operation (five shops, donation centre, monetised social-media presence, documented daily commercial activity including the racking and sorting work documented in broadcasts on the same date), CIC directorship, and concurrent claims to disability benefits, Motability, and PIP raises specific factual questions that fall within the jurisdiction of the DWP and HMRC. The operator’s own public articulation of the intended financial structure is itself evidence in any such review.

The same-day broadcast context. The 26 May 2026 post was not made in isolation. On the same date, the operator broadcast at least three livestream segments which collectively show: continued physical operational activity across the donation centre (“I’m over here today… I’ve got to shrink wrap the top… I’m off, guys”); active retail pricing of donated stock including high-value collectibles (“I got that one up for 70”, “75% off”); commercial-scale stock management with claimed verbal contracts with named charity shops (relevant to Finding 25); and a self-disclosure of donations being moved to an undisclosed storage location (“That’s gone to another storage location which we haven’t… disclosed… to anybody yet”). The same-day pattern, an operator broadcasting active physical work across multiple commercial premises while simultaneously publishing aspirational financial-extraction content framed around disability status — is itself a documentary record relevant to any review of disability-benefit entitlement and CIC community-benefit compliance.

The Ingram-Moore precedent is publicly documented and binding context. The Charity Commission’s findings against the Ingram-Moores are not contested by this finding — they are a matter of public record, repeatedly reported by the BBC, the Charity Commission itself, and the wider charity-sector press (Civil Society, UK Fundraising, AOL/PA, The Conversation, and others). The published statutory inquiry report establishes the regulatory architecture of personal-benefit findings, conflict-of-interest failings, and trustee-disqualification outcomes in a comparable case. The operator’s voluntary, public, and specific reference to the scandal as a positive aspirational benchmark, including the most embarrassing single element of the case, the demolished spa; a documentary record that connects the JBB CIC financial-conduct picture to that established regulatory precedent in the operator’s own words.

External references.

Cross-references within this dossier. Finding 09 (decoy admissions and operational intent); Finding 17 (PayPal accounts and donation routing); Finding 22 (charitable framing deployed from launch); Finding 24 (undisclosed Facebook monetisation income and prior DWP contact); §03 (CIC structure and the C.I.C.36 declaration); §04 (CCJs and personal financial conduct).

33Fraud Act 2006 s.2National Minimum Wage Act 1998Safeguarding / UK GDPRPaid apprenticeships advertised to young people and funded children’s-club posts advertised to qualified staff — CVs and enhanced DBS copies collected, applicants routed into unpaid trials, funding never confirmed

Apprenticeships in Wales are devolved. Funded apprenticeship training is delivered through a procured network of training providers under contract to the Welsh Government, whose contact details are published on gov.wales; an employer engages one of those providers, and pays the apprentice’s wage itself. There is no route by which an employer applies for and receives apprenticeship money directly. An apprentice must be employed and paid at least the apprentice rate of the National Minimum Wage — £7.55 an hour from April 2025 and £8.00 an hour from April 2026. Nothing in the record indicates that any contracted provider was ever engaged.

11 and 22 November 2025 — the idea, and the admission. Apprenticeships first appear alongside grants and wages on 11 November: “we’ll be able to get grants and stuff for wages and then different funding and different training… and apprenticeships”. Eleven days later the operator said plainly that she did not know whether the operation could have them or who they could be offered to.

28 November and 14 December 2025 — offered anyway. Six days after that broadcast: “Apprenticeships: retail availabile with us :)” (spelling as published). On 14 December employment and apprenticeships were promised in the same post that set the volunteer rate: “Volunteers get £20 stock allowance per 8 hour shift tax free /doesn’t affect benefits… In the new year we are looking to employ some of the Mothers who help us to run the shops and pay a wage as an employer Also we can take on apprenticeships… we a sustainable registered CIC” (spelling as published). A £20 stock allowance for an eight-hour shift is £2.50 an hour, paid in goods.

3 and 4 January 2026 — “paid apprenticeships”, young people, CVs and enhanced DBS. The offer was then directed at young people by name, with an explicit expectation that applicants would still be at college.

The 3 January companion post states “Donation centre will probably require over 18s” and “the good news is we open Saturday and Sundays so you can still go to college part time… while completing an apprenticeship with us” — the shops, by implication, were open to under-18s. On 2 February the operator described managing “a problem with an under 18… their first job, it’s their first volunteering experience”.

Three features of the 4 January terms are recorded. First, no pay figure appears anywhere in any of the apprenticeship posts; the only remuneration described is a daily stock allowance. Second, the paid role is preceded by one to two weeks of unpaid working. Third, Home Office guidance on the handling of DBS certificate information is that an employer must see the original certificate rather than a copy, that certificate information should not normally be retained beyond six months, and that any organisation handling it should have a written policy governing its storage, use and destruction. The request here inverts that: a copy up front by attachment, the original only later at interview. An enhanced check is also available only for eligible positions and cannot be obtained by an individual at will, so the request presupposes a certificate issued for some other employer’s role.

7, 10, 17 and 19 January 2026 — funding sought after the offer, and the offer converted to unpaid work. On 7 January: “Dan’s working on the funding for the apprenticeships today. Start dropping off CVs to us :)” — funding still being worked on while CVs were being collected. On 10 January the requirements were waived for existing unpaid workers.

“You got the job” is an unconditional statement of appointment. It was made to people already working unpaid, to a post which seven days later was “waiting on funding”, and for which no employer had at any point engaged a contracted apprenticeship provider.

2 February 2026 — the scale. “we had about 20, 25 messages about apprenticeships. Only one of them have dropped in a CV, and only one of them have said they’re doing the videos online.” Between twenty and twenty-five people, on the operator’s own count, responded to an advertisement for paid apprenticeships.

2 April 2026 — four months on, nothing. “Our grants are only just starting to trickle in… we need paid roles and things like that now… I still haven’t heard anything about funding for the apprenticeships.” No apprenticeship is recorded as having started, and no apprentice is recorded as having been paid.

The parallel strand — 3 March 2026 to 17 September 2026: £13-an-hour posts said to be funded. On 3 March qualified childcare staff were sought for children’s clubs, described as work already funded, at a stated hourly rate — with goods offered as an alternative to money.

“That we have had funding for” is stated in the past tense, as money already secured; “additional SEND funding submitted” in the same post is an application not yet determined. Thirty days later the operator said grants were “only just starting to trickle in”. On 17 September 2026 — six and a half months after the posts were advertised as funded — the same two posts were still being advertised, still unfilled, and the payment was now framed the other way round.

Payment in goods. Across this whole sequence the consideration actually described is stock: £20 per eight-hour shift, a “daily stock allowance”, “£20 per hour store allowance/credit”, “£13 hour in stock allowance”, and — on 25 January 2025 — the proposition in terms, “We can pay you minimum wage in stock”. Under the National Minimum Wage Regulations 2015 payments in kind do not count towards minimum wage pay at all; the only permitted offset is for accommodation. A worker paid entirely in goods is, for minimum wage purposes, not paid. Where an apprenticeship is advertised, the apprentice rate applies from the first hour. The tax and benefits characterisation attached to these payments — “tax free /doesn’t affect benefits” — is examined at Finding 12 and Finding 26.

Update, 4 October 2026 — 51 announcements, no start date. On 29 September 2026 a further poster offered “Paid Positions Available” at “£13 per hour*”, the first for an “NNEB or qualified Teaching Assistant Level 3” for “2–3 hours per evening running children’s club”, with “Enhanced DBS” first among the requirements and pay “via payroll”; it names no venue and no funder. Counted from her own posts and videos, the children’s club has been announced 51 times since 3 April 2024, in six waves and with 20 staff appeals, without a start date, and no record of a session has been found. Of 27 programmes announced since 2022, two are shown by her own record to have happened as announced. The level 3 standard those posts set is one she did not meet herself on the information at Finding 06: a level 1 care assistant who applied for a level 3 post and was not appointed. Sherlock article, 4 October 2026.

What this finding does not assert. It does not assert that any young person was in fact paid nothing for work done, that any particular applicant was harmed, or that CVs and DBS copies actually supplied were mishandled — what became of them is not known from the public record, and that is itself part of the question. It does not assert that no grant application was ever made. It makes no finding that any offence was committed. What is recorded is the sequence and its dates: an admission of not knowing whether apprenticeships could be had, followed six days later by an offer of them; paid roles advertised to young people; CVs and enhanced DBS copies solicited; an unconditional “you got the job”; conversion of the paid offer into unpaid volunteering; twenty to twenty-five enquiries; and, four months and then six months later, funding still absent.

That sequence is capable of engaging three provisions, each for the relevant authority rather than this dossier to assess. Advertising employment as paid and funded when it is neither, so as to obtain unpaid labour, is capable of engaging section 2 of the Fraud Act 2006 — false representation — if the representation was made knowing it was or might be untrue. Remunerating workers in goods rather than money engages the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 and its 2015 Regulations, which HMRC enforces. Soliciting and retaining copies of enhanced DBS certificates, which are criminal-offence data, from applicants including people under eighteen, without an evidenced lawful basis or handling policy, engages the UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018 and the Home Office code of practice on DBS certificate information.

27Protection from Harassment Act 1997 / Defamation Act 2013Malicious Communications Act 1988 / Firearms Act 1968Pre-JBB harassment campaign — fraudulent profiles, firearm threats, printed defamation, and reported 2014 arrest

The material below is compiled from archived historical screenshots, photographic evidence, and reported police and court outcomes documented in the Sherlock investigation article published 3 June 2026 (jaynesbabybank.co.uk). The couple are referred to as Alice and Lewis throughout — the same investigative aliases used in that article, not their legal names. This is a record of allegations and documented conduct from the pre-JBB period, not a finding of guilt.

Pre-2013 — catalyst and early stalking. The campaign is reported to have begun with a residential dispute: Lewis had been contracted to perform an attic conversion at Carrie-Anne Ridsdale’s residence. During the work, Lewis discovered Ridsdale did not legally own the property and reported the unauthorised building work to the local council. Separately, Ridsdale had developed an unreciprocated fixation on Lewis; upon learning he was engaged to Alice, she is documented as launching a sustained harassment campaign against the couple. Early tactics included maintaining a Facebook profile under her real name, fabricating a friend request to access Alice’s private account, and physical stalking — including following the couple out of a B&Q store in Pontypridd, an incident reported to have resulted in the immediate termination of her employment there (see Finding 06 and tl-pre2013-bq). Ridsdale subsequently published Alice’s home address and personal phone number on adult websites; the resulting targeted attention forced Alice and Lewis to relocate for their safety.

Targeting the family — fraudulent profiles and weaponised authorities. Following the birth of Alice and Lewis’s son, the campaign intensified. Ridsdale created additional fraudulent Facebook profiles — including accounts under the names “Lewis Carroll” and “Alice Liddell” — used solely to contact the couple’s friends and family with false claims of an affair with Lewis. These profiles were confined to this campaign against Alice and Lewis; they are not documented as part of the later JBB-era alias network in Finding 03. Investigative records confirm the messages originated from Ridsdale herself, not from third parties. She additionally contacted Social Services to report Alice, citing a photograph of Alice’s infant son in a baby bouncer near a sleeping kitten; she later used her own profile to taunt Alice publicly about the visit. Representative archived posts include:

Ridsdale posted side-by-side photographic comparisons mocking Alice’s appearance and targeted Alice’s employment, claiming her childhood sweetheart was Alice’s employer and suggesting professional ruin was imminent. The conduct engages the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and the Defamation Act 2013.

December 2013 — firearm threats and admission of fake profiles. The campaign escalated to overt threats of lethal violence. Ridsdale flooded social media with references to weapons, pairing them with a photograph of herself holding a handgun to her face. The photograph, a mirror selfie in which she holds a handgun to her mouth, is held in this investigation’s published archive (image) and reproduced in its report of 3 June 2026 (article). Using her business page “Carrie-Annes Christmas Crafts” and associated fake profiles, she uploaded copy-pasted sections of UK statutory law regarding air weapons, firearms certificates, and shotgun storage — paired with hostile direct warnings:

When privately confronted over her “lock and load” statements, Ridsdale explicitly admitted to operating an engineered network of fraudulent profiles:

The “Lewis Carroll” persona — direct physical threats. Ridsdale heavily utilised a fraudulent “Lewis Carroll” profile — masquerading as Lewis — to issue terrifying physical threats while insulating herself from accountability. This profile was used only in the campaign against Alice and Lewis. The fake account posted:

The same persona claimed the family was under active surveillance and, when firearm threats were reported, downplayed UK gun control: “She’s already been reported it was 4 years ago. Anyone can buy a gun.” Ridsdale used her business page to dox Lewis’s physical address and openly call for a crowd-sourced physical assault: “Finish him boys. I’m bored to death with him. Lewis Carroll.”

Mocking the legal system — early 2014. As Alice and Lewis compiled evidence for legal protection, Ridsdale openly mocked the prospect of judicial intervention, posting that a non-molestation order would require Lewis to admit to a relationship with her in court — framing the application as “farcical.” While Alice was pregnant with her daughter, Ridsdale weaponised a real-world tragedy — the local death of a pregnant woman in Tredegar — to express a malicious death wish; Alice publicly warned her network that her stalker had stated the Tredegar victim “should have been me.”

13 August 2014 — printed defamation, CCTV, and arrest. While Alice was heavily pregnant, Ridsdale printed physical cards containing severe falsehoods and distributed them across local pubs in Cardiff and an Asda Supermarket in Caerphilly and Cardiff. The cards featured a photograph of Alice alongside her name, carrying a fabricated narrative:

Carrie-Anne Ridsdale did not have a daughter — the suicide narrative was entirely fabricated. This connects directly to the documented pattern of inventing family members: the later “Cerri” fabricated-daughter scheme (Finding 04a) and the 2014 cards’ false daughter both deploy non-existent children as harassment instruments. Staff at an unnamed location identified Ridsdale on CCTV actively distributing the cards. The physical evidence, combined with the documented history of firearm threats and systemic stalking, resulted in her reported arrest by South Wales Police and subsequent criminal proceedings. The reported outcome was a criminal record and a strict non-molestation order enacted to protect Alice, Lewis, and their children. This historical court outcome — criminal record and non-molestation order — must not be conflated with the operator’s later misuse in 2026 of the invented term “Criminal Record Order” against critics; see Finding 16.

Present-day continuity — grave/R.I.P. graphic (2 June 2026). Although the 2014 outcomes date back over a decade, evidence suggests a continuing pattern of ominous public warnings. On 2 June 2026, operating under the official organisation page “Jaynesbabybank Registered - cic,” Ridsdale published a graphic depicting a weeping clown kneeling over a freshly dug grave marked with an “R.I.P.” tombstone, accompanied by the text:

This update mirrors the historical tactics documented above and is consistent with the menacing-post pattern recorded across Finding 16 — including the Grim Reaper post (Finding 21), the “karma has struck another hater” cross-platform series (24 May 2026), and Jeffrey Dahmer imagery targeting critics.

Pattern bridge — pre-JBB to JBB era. The August 2014 printed defamation cards — physical distribution of false narratives to damage a named individual’s reputation in public spaces — foreshadow the documented 2026 defamatory publications against landlords and local business owners in Finding 12. The admission of fake profiles in December 2013 (“that’s my fake profile with fake friends”) — made in the context of the Alice / Lewis campaign — is structurally similar to the 2025 admission of “decoy pages” (Finding 05) and the 2026 accidental self-exposure of the KnowledgeableEagle3954 counter-group identity (Finding 03), though the 2013 fraudulent profiles were isolated to that campaign and are not counted among the JBB-era aliases in Finding 03.

28Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 / Sexual Offences Act 2003Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014Keys, a job title and residence at premises presented as a children’s and families’ service, given to a man with 2013 convictions for child sexual offences

What this finding is, and what it is not. The 2013 offences did not occur at Jayne’s Baby Bank, and nothing here suggests that they did. The conviction detail set out below is a matter of contemporaneous published court reporting of the March 2013 proceedings and is not an allegation made by this investigation. What this finding concerns is the subsequent association between that individual and an operation which has presented itself publicly as a children’s, families’ and vulnerable-persons service, and the role he was understood to perform around it. Safeguarding failures of this kind are recorded elsewhere in this dossier at Finding 12; the organisation’s own deployment of child-sexual-offence allegations against private critics is recorded at Finding 29.

The 2013 proceedings — Cardiff Crown Court, March 2013. According to contemporaneous published court reporting, Watkins — then 35 and of Madeline Street, Tylorstown, also referred to as Pontygwaith, in the Rhondda — was sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment. He admitted six offences of accessing, making and possessing indecent images of children of the most serious category, including material showing children being sexually abused which he had downloaded from the internet; the reporting records that he had also collected similar material in magazines. Police discovered that material when they attended his home to question him about a separate allegation that he had touched a 15-year-old girl. He initially denied that assault and later pleaded guilty to it on the day his trial was due to begin. Officers additionally recovered from his digital camera photographs of unknown local children playing in the street and in a park; the reporting records that the photographs were not themselves illegal, that the court heard they were believed to have been taken from the back of a vehicle, and that the judge described them as “disturbing.”

Sentencing him, Judge John Curran was reported as telling Watkins that he had “an unhealthy obsession with young girls and young children” and that people who collect such images help support “a filthy industry.” The same reporting records that the court imposed a Sexual Offences Prevention Order barring Watkins from being alone with any child under 16, from contacting the teenager he admitted assaulting, and from working with children, and that he was placed on the sex offenders’ register for ten years. An earlier court appearance had seen him, then listed at an address in Pontnewydd, Cwmbran, charged with making and possessing indecent images of children. These are matters of historical court record. This dossier does not assert the current status of any order or notification requirement arising from them; the ten-year period recorded in the reporting ran from March 2013, and an anonymous account relayed to the investigation (set out below) states that he was subsequently removed from the register.

The association begins — 5 Crane Street, July to August 2026. Watkins first became known to the investigation during the earlier environmental health closure of the 5 Crane Street store, where he was given full access to reside at the premises in order to prevent the landlords from regaining possession, until environmental health ultimately forced the issue. During that period he was witnessed wearing a red T-shirt and backpack and being let in through the front of the store. In the final days of the store’s operation he was also witnessed helping load the operator’s disability car to transport items to the Newbridge unit in Blackwood. Photographic material places him at the connected 6 Commercial Street premises during the clearance period. The investigation has separately stated that it independently established his occupancy of, and access to, 6 Commercial Street, and that the underlying evidence is deliberately not published because publication could disclose investigative methods, identify sources or expose private information.

“Security” — the operator’s own August references. The subject of security recurs throughout the operator’s public posts. In August she stated “I’ve got somebody from security there” and, describing shop-floor duties being performed, “Security has just put the sanitary pad box back out. We have 2 new deliveries due and a council have asked us to distribute old stock so take 2 or 3 items from the pad box outside p1. Leave my box please”. The clearest of the August references is this one:

The post is an acknowledgement, in the operator’s own words, that a person described as “security” had been at the Crane Street premises, that his presence had been the subject of public objection, and that his departure would have left the operation with “no help”.

The announced role — rolling out September/October 2026. Notwithstanding that the group documenting the operation had by then become aware of Watkins through local information passed on to it, the operator proceeded to announce a new service role. The post read:

The role as described is not peripheral. It is a gatekeeping function: requests from homeless and vulnerable individuals would be “dealt with by” the co-ordinator, who would “verify a genuine need situation”, through a recorded request process operating away from the shop floor. The qualification stated for the post was that the holder “has been homeless themselves”. The 13 September report records that the venture was launched under Watkins’ own guidance.

Inside 6 Commercial Street — 12 September 2026. Watkins was recorded inside the premises at 3pm. A member of the documenting group captured footage in which he can be seen in the background, dressed in the red T-shirt described by earlier witnesses, and in which he quickly attempts to hide from the camera before the operator shouts at the man recording, telling him to notify the council about falling over items outside the store rather than her. The property also has CCTV; footage from the same day was recovered with audio restored, in which both Watkins and the operator can be heard discussing the incident and the group. He had further been seen entering the store with a key late at night on multiple occasions, and witnessed entering and leaving with a key and assisting in the moving of items via the store front. The combination recorded by the investigation is therefore keyed access, out-of-hours access, residence, an announced service role and access to the premises CCTV.

Still inside — 15 September 2026. When the landlord of 6 Commercial Street took the building back in the early hours of 15 September 2026, the premises were not empty. Inside the premises was Watkins — two days after publication of the 13 September report, still in the building overnight. On the landlord’s account as relayed to the investigation, he offered the man £40 to leave; the man accepted and walked out. The investigation’s summary of the position is that Jayne’s Baby Bank “gave him a key, a job title, and somewhere to sleep”. Witnesses further reported seeing the operator at 6 Commercial Street at around 11pm on the night of 15 September, in a blue Nissan Leaf, in the company of Watkins; that is recorded as a witness account, and the investigation has stated that it has viewed but withheld CCTV of the premises from that night for data protection reasons. No arrest or charge arising from that night is known to the investigation and nothing here should be read as suggesting otherwise.

His own public output — the Non Profit Solutions Foundation. Watkins operates a website under the name Non Profit Solutions Foundation, hosted at e-voice.org.uk. The site presents itself as being run by a single person, stating that it is “just myself on zero-budget at start-up”, and almost all of its content is written in the first person, giving the impression of a personal project rather than an organisation with multiple officers or staff. It publishes a contact telephone number and carries religious messaging alongside its stated charitable objectives.

A job advertisement on the site offered both volunteer and paid fundraising roles, the paid positions remunerated as a percentage of funds raised. Applicants were told they would receive free access to a members’ area normally valued at £10 per month, and were instructed to submit a CV to a stated email address and to read the organisation’s guidance before applying. The advertisement also stated that applicants aged 13 to 16 could apply with parental or guardian permission. Separately, on Facebook and under the name Ray Ipac, Watkins publicly advertised for a volunteer to undertake charity work, describing the role as involving fundraising and working with people, children and animals, stating that no previous experience was required, that training would be provided, and that interested applicants should apply for an interview. Applicants were directed to the Non Profit Solutions Foundation website. The 2013 order recorded in the court reporting barred Watkins from working with children. What is documented here is a publicly advertised volunteer role expressly described as involving children, and, in the advertisement on the Foundation’s own site to which applicants were directed, an invitation to applicants aged 13 to 16 with parental or guardian permission.

Tier 3 — witness material, hedged as received. The following is an anonymous account disclosed to the documenting group via a third party. It is recorded here as a relayed account and not as an established finding of this investigation. Neither the originating individual nor the organisation referred to has been identified to this dossier.

The organisation’s answer — 13 to 14 September 2026. The response published by Jayne’s Baby Bank did not address the court record. At 22:25 on 13 September the page edited its existing post to add, among other material, the assertion “There are no peados living at the baby bank”. In a comment placed under the Facebook Live broadcast of Dank Dragon — the genuine child-protection page, not the impersonating “Dank Drangon” page discussed at Finding 29 — over 13 to 14 September, the page stated: “We all have rolling enhanced dbs checks”, alongside an open invitation to come and investigate the baby bank and its staff. Both quotations are reproduced with spelling as published.

How she met him, and what he publishes. The 13 September report records that she met Watkins while he was busking at Pontypool Market. In a video of him busking she told followers: “So just be aware now guys, there’s lots of people doing things in the community and Patrick have said to me before in the past, further down the line, he’d like to do something from a charity point of domestic violence.” On 30 July 2026 she posted: “Holly yes knock door security is there tonight I can’t message on fb – yes please to shopping bags”, one of her remarks about “security” at the Pontypool premises between 30 July and 15 August. The same report records that his personal TikTok account shows a persistent pattern of long, aggressive posts containing threats, conspiracy claims and public “cease and desist” notices aimed at individuals, organisations and the police. Sherlock article, 13 September 2026.

Update, 4 October 2026 — the guarantee, and continued contact. On 19 August 2026, eleven days after describing a man critics were then naming as “somebody else now who’s volunteering for us”, the page stated: “No one is employed or volunteers with us who hasn’t had an enhanced DBS check.” The way in that she has described has no DBS step (“Just turn up and volunteer”, 19 September 2023), and the only check she has described is a copy, which GOV.UK guidance says employers must reject. At 08:31 on 1 October 2026, two weeks after he left the building, she posted on the Jayne’s Baby Bank page a private chat in which Raymond Derek Watkins had forwarded her, shortly after 1am, a message the investigation had sent to his TikTok account. The investigation does not say that he had any contact with any club or any child. Sherlock article, 4 October 2026.

6 October 2026 — back in the building. On the morning police were called to 6 Commercial Street for the second time, officers told the operator and her son to leave or face arrest. About 20 minutes after they had gone, Raymond Derek Watkins was seen going back into the shop; he was arrested there on 11 October. The landlord took the shop back on 15 September, and nothing in his account to the investigation suggests anyone has his permission to be inside. Sherlock article, 6 October 2026 (updated that evening).

11 October 2026 — arrested at the shop. Five days after he was seen going back into 6 Commercial Street, police arrested Raymond Derek Watkins there; a member of the investigation’s public group reported him led away in handcuffs by three officers. He has since been released. The next day the page listed “Putting a vulnerable homeless person on the street” among its complaints against the landlord; on 15 September it had written: “There is no one living in the baby bank. Sometimes we work really late.” After his release his TikTok account posted that “constabularies such as yet non-limited too @Gwent Police will eventually catch up to you all”. Nothing here suggests that anyone has been charged with any offence. Sherlock article, 6 October 2026 (updated 12 October).

Why this engages the provisions badged above. An operation that presents itself publicly as a baby bank, food bank and family service, that announced a co-ordinator role to receive and verify requests from homeless and vulnerable individuals, and that operated public shop premises presented as a service for families with young children, is operating in a setting to which safeguarding duties attach. The conduct documented here — the grant of keyed and out-of-hours access, residence at the premises, access to the premises CCTV, the announcement of a service-facing role, and the continuation of that arrangement after the court record had been published — is capable of engaging the safeguarding framework under the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 and the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and the duties owed in relation to children and adults at risk under the Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014. Whether any offence has been committed is a matter for the police and the relevant statutory authorities, not for this dossier. The investigation has recorded that, since publication on 13 September 2026, it has notified several authorities of these safeguarding concerns as well as those closer to the matter.

29Online Safety Act 2023 s.179 / s.181Protection from Harassment Act 1997 ss.1-4Serious Crime Act 2007 ss.44-46Fabricated child-sex-offence allegations published from the company’s official accounts against eight members of the public

The material recorded in this finding was published publicly by the Jaynesbabybank Registered - cic Facebook page, by the Baby Bank’s TikTok account @communityshopone, by the public Facebook group “Jayne’s Baby Bank STALKERS & HATERS Exposed”, and by the genuine Dank Dragon page’s own public Facebook Live. Post wording and timing are taken from Facebook’s own edit-history view; screenshot timings are read from the phone status bar visible in each image as published by the Baby Bank page; group post times are approximate, read from the relative age labels on the captures, and are given as parts of the day rather than clock times. Quotations are verbatim, spelling included. The eight people accused are referred to by initials only, they have not been contacted for comment by the investigation, and nothing in this finding is a statement about them. This is a record of what was published and which provisions that conduct engages; it is not a criminal allegation or a finding of guilt against any person.

13 September 2026, 12:49 to 13:06 — six images taken on one phone in twelve minutes. Each image in the Baby Bank’s post is a phone screenshot with the status bar visible, and the clock times and battery levels run in sequence. The post itself went up at 13:06. Whoever took these screenshots did so on a single device in the twelve minutes immediately before the Baby Bank page published them.

13 September 2026, 13:01 — the fabricated message. The central image is a Messenger conversation. The header shows the other party as “Dank Drangon”, with a profile picture copying Dank Dragon’s dragon logo. Dank Dragon is a long-established child-protection team with around 200,000 followers.

Parts of the image are unreadable. The inset profile screenshot inside the chat carries a header of garbled, non-alphabetic characters where a page name should be, and other small text is smeared in the way generative image tools render lettering. The second Messenger screenshot ends with a blue bubble reading “Hi Jane”; the first is addressed “Hi Dane”. Ms Ridsdale posts as Jayne Price. Two different spellings of the same greeting, one of them not a name, is the kind of error generative tools produce when asked to render text. Facebook’s own “AI content” label on the post is consistent with this. It is the same label Facebook applied to the run of certificate images the page posted the same day (see Finding 30).

The words “even the professions can see it” present the message as an independent finding by a recognised child-protection team. The word “projecting” ties it directly to the allegation published against the Baby Bank the previous day.

13 September 2026, evening — the real Dank Dragon disowns the page. Members of the Jayne’s Baby Bank Exposed group reported the post to Dank Dragon. That evening Dank Dragon, the genuine page, broadcast a fourteen-minute Facebook Live from its own account, holding up the fabricated screenshot with the names blanked out as a safeguarding measure. At the time of capture the broadcast carried 232 reactions, 292 comments and 53 shares. The quotations below are from a transcript of that broadcast.

On what the messages contained, Dank Dragon said the impersonating account was “replying or sending messages to people threatening to come to their door and outing innocent people’s names as part of some form of hate campaign or suggesting that these innocent people or people of the, in the content are part of a pedophile [ring].”, adding: “It’s just not our, it’s not what we do. We definitely, definitely wouldn’t be writing to people about this and pages actually aren’t able to start a conversation.” On the volume, they described “probably 20, 30 messages in today and last night” concerning someone in Pontypool.

Dank Dragon then addressed the Baby Bank by name: “Dank Dragon and associated people, Page, Jayne, Jayne’s baby boutique or whatever it is, and Pontypool or whatever it is, who’s put a post out threatening us saying that they contacted us and we’ve not done anything about it. And then got the ump that we didn’t reply, whatever, and then have set up a page or whatever it is and pretended to be us.” And: “you just can’t go around pretending to be other people and giving people, making people’s lives a misery.” That is Dank Dragon’s account, attributed to it; the page’s reply under the broadcast was “I have not set up a page ot threatened you at all”.

Dank Dragon also said they had been contacted by a man from South Wales who “plays his part with child safety around the UK as well”, whom the source article identifies as the person named as “D. – Cardiff” in the fabricated message.

13 September 2026, 22:25 — the post is edited, not removed. Nine hours after the original post, and after Dank Dragon’s live had gone out, the Baby Bank page edited the post. Facebook’s edit history shows “Added 1 media to this post” and an extended caption. The image added was a screenshot of N.W.’s profile taken at 21:36, showing that she had changed her profile picture seven hours earlier. The post was not taken down; it was expanded.

The line “Not nice being called a peado is it” is, in the investigation’s reading, the clearest statement in the whole sequence of what the post was for.

13 to 14 September 2026 — the comments under Dank Dragon’s live. The Baby Bank page commented under the genuine team’s broadcast three times. The first comment simultaneously asserted that the material had arrived from elsewhere and that the page held its own case against those named, spelling as published:

The two further comments from the page under the same live read “D.C. has falsely called us peado so I don’t know what his game is . But he’s never met us or done any research and threatened to turn up at our premises” and “I have not set up a page ot threatened you at all”. No documentation or evidence against any of those named has been produced, then or since.

14 September 2026, afternoon — a poster with their faces on it. With the original post still up, the Baby Bank page published a single image captioned “Scum”. Facebook again attached its “AI content” label. The image is styled as a public safety poster: red and yellow hazard stripes, a red handprint, warning triangles.

Two further panels read: “THESE INDIVIDUALS ARE KNOWN TO HANG AROUND BABY OUTLETS, CHILDREN’S GROUPS, DONATION CENTRES AND FAMILY SERVICES. BE AWARE. STAY ALERT. REPORT ANY SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIOUR.” and “LET’S KEEP OUR CHILDREN SAFE. IF YOU SEE THEM, PLEASE REPORT TO THE POLICE AND INFORM SHOP / GROUP STAFF IMMEDIATELY. See Something Say Something. SAFE CHILDREN. STRONGER COMMUNITIES. A BRIGHTER TOMORROW.”

Beneath the headline are seven framed photographs of five people, each with a name and a town: two of N.W., labelled Rhymney; two of L.E., labelled Pontypool; one of D., labelled Cardiff; one of K.R., labelled Pontypool / Newport; and one of J.G., labelled Pontypool. Every photograph is lifted from the profile screenshots taken on 13 September, and the J.G. and D. photographs are the same ones that appeared in the Messenger images the day before. Three things distinguish this from the previous day’s post. It is no longer presented as somebody else’s message — there is no “Dank Drangon”, no “this was sent to me”, and the poster carries no attribution at all. It is built to be shared: a poster with faces, names, towns and the instruction to report the people pictured to the police and to shop or group staff is a call for members of the public to act against them. And it states as fact that their children have been removed, printing “THEIR OWN CHILDREN HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THEIR OWN CUSTODY FOR SAFETY” beneath all five names. No evidence of any kind accompanies the poster; nothing in it identifies a conviction, a court, a date, or an offence.

14 September 2026, about half an hour later — the motive, in the page’s own words. Shortly after the poster, the Baby Bank page posted a text update with commenting restricted, which Facebook displays as “limited who can comment on this post”.

This is the page’s own account of why the poster exists. The five people were named, in the page’s words, as a response to the Baby Bank being “called a peado”. That is a statement of retaliation, not of safeguarding, and it converts the conduct from the passive forwarding asserted the previous day into a deliberate act of reprisal. It is also the third time in two days that the page published a claim about the removal of these people’s children. The poster is the act; the follow-up is the explanation.

14 September 2026, about 16:00 to 16:20 — the page goes down, the material moves platform. By about 16:00 the Jaynesbabybank Registered - cic Facebook page was no longer accessible. Whether it was removed by Meta following reports, or deactivated by its administrator, is not visible from outside. Every post described above went with it. Disabling a page does not delete the evidence: Meta retains content from disabled and deactivated pages, and the police can obtain it; the captures relied on here were made while the page was live. Twenty minutes later, at 16:20, the Baby Bank’s TikTok account @communityshopone, which carries the Jayne’s Baby Bank logo and name, posted the “Safeguarding Alert” poster and, alongside it, a second poster in the same style naming two further people, K.A. and J.J., connected to a second local charity. TikTok attached its own label, “AI-generated content”, and the account has comments turned off. The second poster is headed “WARNING. SAFEGUARDING ALERT. THESE PEOPLE ARE LINKED TO [H.C.T.] CHARITY” and prints, of K.A., “ALLOWED A PEADOPHILE TO STAY IN HER HOUSE AND ABUSE HER CHILDREN. THEN LIED AND SAID WE HAVE A PEADOPHILE LIVING IN OUR BABY BANK” (spelling as published). Neither K.A. nor J.J. appears anywhere in the 13 September material; they were added because of their connection to a different charity. The allegation against K.A. is the Baby Bank’s own position turned around: the claim that a person with a conviction for child sexual offences was working and living at the premises rests on the public record set out in Finding 28, not on anything K.A. said. The source article renders the charity as [H.C.T.] and does not expand it; those initials correspond to those of the registered charity whose treatment by this operation is recorded at Finding 21 and Finding 23. As with the first poster, no conviction, court, date or offence is identified for either person. The platform changed; the method did not.

Standing venue — the “STALKERS & HATERS” group, created 13 February 2026. The posts above did not appear in a vacuum, and the group that carried them was not created for them. “Jayne’s Baby Bank STALKERS & HATERS Exposed” was created on 13 February 2026, seven months earlier, and had 675 members at the time of capture. It is public and visible, so anything posted in it can be read by anyone, member or not. Its two listed administrators are the Jaynesbabybank Registered - cic page and the operator’s son, D.R. — who is not the same person as the D. named on the poster and in the fabricated message; that D. is unconnected to the Baby Bank. The group also allows anonymous posts; on Facebook, anonymous posts in a group are submitted to the administrators and appear only once an administrator approves them.

Three posts of 14 September are material. Mid-afternoon, an anonymous post labelled AI content, captioned “Scum of the earth”, carried the poster of the five people together with a photograph of an eighth person, L.J., taken from his own profile; no text explains why he is included, and because the post is anonymous an administrator approved it. Early that evening, posted by the Baby Bank page as administrator and labelled “AI content”, the second poster naming K.A. and J.J. appeared with text adding two things absent from the TikTok version: “We can play this peado bingo all night! Truth is you are the scum bags that support nonce not me. Keep lying – see what happens” and “Police and courts informed.” No court, reference number or officer is identified. Also that evening, with commenting turned off, a text-on-background image reading “Hmmmm who else lied and said we had a peado living in our baby bank???” Read with the second poster, that is an open question about who else will be added; “Keep lying – see what happens” is addressed to the people already named. The main page had come back online by about 18:00 and the posting resumed. The outage changed nothing. The group is the answer to the “sent to me” account: a dedicated public venue for exposing critics, with an audience of 675 already assembled, in the company’s name and with a director’s relative as co-administrator, pre-dates the message it supposedly received by seven months. This is the same counter-group pattern recorded at Finding 16.

15 September 2026, about 06:00 — the gravest item: publishing a woman’s fear and laughing at it. With the poster still circulating, the Baby Bank page published three screenshots of a public Facebook comment thread above the following text, spelling as published: “Hahhahhhahhahahah – arguing with the very person who you tried to get to stage a protest outside the shop… Not nice being branded a peado is it [N.]. Especially when everyone knows you had your 3 kids removed from your custody. They don’t take children without a valid reason. Sort your life out you crack head and stop obsessing over me.” The post does three things the earlier ones did not: it names one of the accused directly rather than through a poster, it states as fact that her three children were removed from her custody, and it calls her a “crack head”.

The thread the page selected, screenshotted and published is N.W. describing what the poster had done to her. The comments are timestamped six to seven hours before the screenshots were taken. They were published by the Baby Bank page itself and are reproduced as it published them, spelling included.

That is the material the Baby Bank page published under the word “Hahhahhhahhahahah”, adding an allegation about her children and one about her drug use. Everything in the earlier entries describes a risk; this entry records the risk being felt, stated by the person it is happening to and not by this investigation. Section 4 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 requires that the person feared violence on at least two occasions and that the defendant knew or ought to have known that the conduct would have that effect. Where a publisher has read and republished a person’s own account of her fear, knowledge of effect would not readily be in issue. Publishing a list of names and towns under the heading “known paedofiles and sex offenders” to a local audience, with the words “will be tackling them”, and then a poster instructing readers to report the people pictured if seen, is also capable of encouraging others to commit offences against them for the purposes of sections 44 to 46 of the Serious Crime Act 2007. In the same thread N.W. describes a separate harm: she says a supporter, D., reshared the poster in order to criticise it without redacting the faces and names, and tagged a news outlet, which she says widened the audience and increased her risk. Anyone circulating this material to condemn it should redact the faces and names first.

15 September 2026 — the reply box at the foot of those screenshots. All three screenshots in that post include the bottom of the Facebook screen. Across that strip, in the box Facebook provides for writing a reply, are the words “Comment as South Wales Peadofiles Hunters”. That line is not part of the conversation and is not visible to anybody else: Facebook displays it only to the person holding the device, and it names the profile or page that person is currently set to post as. It is, in effect, a signature on the screenshot. The Baby Bank page published these images as its own material, in a post written in the first person, about a person it had spent two days accusing.

What this does not establish. The investigation does not assert from a screenshot alone who owns or operates that account. A screenshot can be taken by one person and sent to another. That possibility has to be stated, and it is the same possibility the page relied on when it said the “Dank Drangon” message was “sent to me”. What can be said is narrower: the account exists, it is branded as a paedophile-hunting group, and material published by a registered company’s official page was produced on a device signed in to it. Only Meta can confirm who operates a given account, and it can be required to do so by the police or by a court order. Whether the “Dank Drangon” page and this account are connected is not something the source material can determine; it is a specific question with a specific starting point. Operating an additional account is not in itself an offence, and many people run pages separately from their personal profile; it becomes a different matter where an account is used to evade enforcement after a page has been restricted or removed, or to make an accusation appear to come from an independent source. The alias and secondary-account pattern is recorded at Finding 03. As a separate observation, not proof: the account name is spelled “Peadofiles”, and the same transposition runs through the page’s own posts — “peado”, “peadophile” and “known paedofiles and sex offenders” in the fabricated message of 13 September, each of which is easily checked against the quotations above, and “peodofiles” in the description of the second poster (14 September, 16:20).

Eight people, three outlets, one method. Five people were accused on 13 September on the strength of a fabricated message. Two more were added on 14 September because of a charity they are connected to, and an eighth through an anonymous post that an administrator approved. In each case the accusation is a child sexual offence, the format is an AI-generated poster or a screenshot carrying Facebook’s “AI content” label, the evidence is nothing, and the stated reason is that the Baby Bank had itself been accused. The original post, the 22:25 edit, the three comments under Dank Dragon’s live, the 14 September poster, the “name and shame” follow-up, the 16:20 TikTok repost and the group posts are separate acts within about 28 hours, and the 15 September post is a further act the following morning — all published from accounts carrying a registered company’s name and logo. On the material recorded here that conduct is capable of engaging section 179 (false communications) and section 181 (threatening communications) of the Online Safety Act 2023, sections 1 to 4 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, and sections 44 to 46 of the Serious Crime Act 2007. Each is a matter for the police, the regulators or the courts, not for this record.

Update, 21 September 2026 — the account named in the reply box publishes the posters. On 20 September 2026 a Facebook page called “South Wales Peadofiles Hunters” (spelling as published), the name in the reply box at the foot of the Baby Bank’s own screenshots of 15 September, published both “Safeguarding Alert” posters side by side, under Facebook’s “AI content” label. The page has no followers, follows nobody, is categorised as a “Personal blog” and has published nothing else. Until then the posters had appeared only on the Baby Bank’s own Facebook page, its TikTok account and its group. As with “Dank Drangon”, the accusation is carried by a misspelled, paedophile-hunter-branded name with no history and no evidence. The investigation does not assert from a page name who operates it; the matter is with the police. Sherlock article, 14 September 2026 (update of 21 September).

Update, 13 October 2026 — the page posts the second poster again and now follows the Baby Bank. On the morning of 13 October 2026 the “South Wales Peadofiles Hunters” page published a new post, labelled one hour old by Facebook, carrying the second poster alone — the one naming K.A. and J.J. and the charity they are connected to — with comments limited. The image is a phone screenshot of the TikTok post (status bar 17:53, battery 73%, no date), not the poster file, and shows no “AI content” label in the capture. The page still has no followers, but its following list, which was empty on 21 September, now shows one account: “Jaynesbabybank Registered - cic”, the Baby Bank’s own page. The investigation does not assert from a page name, or from a follow, who operates the page; Meta holds the records that would answer it and the police can require them. Sherlock article, 14 September 2026 (update of 13 October).

30Fraud Act 2006 s.2Qualification documents published under scrutiny, carrying platform AI labels and a generation watermark

This finding covers only the document run of 13 to 17 September 2026, published in the days following this site’s dated review of the operator’s academic record on 12 September 2026. The credential claims those documents were produced to support — and the distinction between study, training, qualification and registration — are recorded at Finding 06 and are not restated here. The dated name record against which the documents sit is at Finding 03. What is recorded below is narrower: what was posted, on what date, and what markers the files carry.

The 13 and 17 September posts were published by the Jaynesbabybank Registered - cic page, and the 13 September images were added to its “Courses & Training” album, opened two days before the review went live; the GCSE image was posted late on 14 September 2026. On the platform label, the source reporting hedges and so does this record: Meta applies its “AI content” label when it detects industry-standard AI signals in an image’s metadata or when the uploader discloses that AI was used, and which of those applies to any given post is not visible from the post. The label is recorded here as a fact about the post, not as a conclusion about how a file was made.

The four-panel CPD composite — 13 September 2026, morning. The day after the review was published, the page added a four-panel composite of CPD certificates to the album. Facebook attached its “AI content” label to the post. The panels are: Journal of Health Visiting Study Days 2019, “Development of the Child Aged 2”, Thursday 28 November, Village Hotel Cardiff, Ref A15423; and three Current Issues in Midwifery certificates, all Ref A009996 — “Perinatal mental health”, Friday 17 May 2019, “Safer Maternity Services”, Friday 29 November 2019, and “Newborn Care”, Friday 25 May, from the 2018 study days. Every panel is made out to “Jayne Price, Cardiff University Student” in the same script, above the same signature “for and on behalf of MA Healthcare Ltd”.

A photograph of the same certificates was published in July 2025. It showed three paper certificates overlapping on a desk, the name area on the visible certificate covered with a white mark, and the Health Visiting title cut off after “Development of the”. It carried no platform label. The September 2026 image shows four certificates in plastic sleeves, each fully visible, each bearing the name, with the 2018 “Newborn Care” certificate appearing for the first time. The 2018 certificate is dated sixteen months before the last post under the name “Carrie Anne”, and the name “Jayne” does not appear in the public record until September 2020.

Taken at face value either way, these four documents record attendance at free study days with open registration run by a publisher. They are not qualifications, and the operator said so herself on 7 February 2026, reacting to this site: “So yeah that’s not my nursing degree. That’s additional CPD courses.” The question raised by the 13 September image is therefore not whether CPD attendance amounts to a qualification. It is why the same certificates now carry a name and a label they did not carry before.

Two RSA certificates that are one photograph — 13 September 2026, later that morning. Within hours, two further image posts were added to the album, each carrying Facebook’s “AI content” label. The first was captioned “Years old these ones” and comprised two photographs. Each shows an RSA Examinations Board certificate in a plastic sleeve in a red folder on a carpet, made out to “Jayne-Anne Price”, “June Series, 1996 – Centre Number: 68369”, signed Martin Cross, Chief Executive. One reads “Initial Text Processing – Distinction”. The other reads “Word Processing 1, 2 & 3 – Distinction”. Both files were converted to greyscale and subtracted pixel by pixel.

Two different certificates photographed one after the other produce two different photographs: the folder shifts, the sleeve catches the light differently, the page curls differently, the carpet moves. Here the carpet, the folder, the sleeve reflections, the page curl and the signature are identical, and only the line naming the award differs. On the source reporting, one of these images was made from the other by changing the award text, and the file was then posted as a separate certificate. This is a measurement, not an opinion about a name field. Facebook’s label appeared on the post independently of the comparison.

The 1999 BTEC Advanced GNVQ — 13 September 2026. The second image post was a single photograph of a BTEC Advanced General National Vocational Qualification in Health & Social Care, “with distinction”, awarded to “Jayne-Anne Price” by Gwent Tertiary College, July 1999, signed Dr Christina Townsend, Edexcel Foundation. Facebook attached its “AI content” label. A BTEC Advanced GNVQ is a Level 3 qualification: if genuine, this would be the first Level 3 document ever produced. The caption reads “I forgot I did an extra year in college because I was unwell. Started in 1996 – 1999 finished”. The post of 5 January 2026 said “1996 I went to Crosskeys college – why would I be in college in 2016 when I was at Cardiff University studying a nursing degree?” — the two Pearson documents she later published are dated March and May 2016 — and the 1996-to-1999 period now described overlaps the claim of 17 July 2026 to have been “employed from the age of 18-30” as a full-time classroom assistant from 1998. It was posted alongside the demonstrably altered RSA pair.

The WJEC/CBAC 1996 GCSE certificate — 14 September 2026. Posted late that night: a WJEC/CBAC General Certificate of Secondary Education for the “Arholiad Haf 1996 Summer Examination”, certifying eight subjects, two at A* and the rest at B. Facebook attached no label to this one. Submitted to OpenAI’s own verification tool at openai.com/research/verify, it returned: “SynthID detected. We found a SynthID watermark that originated from OpenAI.” A SynthID watermark is placed in an image when it is generated; it is invisible, and it survives re-compression, which is why it is still present after the file has been through Facebook. The certificate names Blackwood Comprehensive School, the school named on her own Facebook profile; she was a pupil at Oakdale Comprehensive School, and this site holds her school photographs. A school is printed on a certificate by the awarding body, not chosen afterwards. The surname is covered over with green highlighter and the forename left visible as “JAYNE – ANNE”, the same form as on the RSA certificates posted the day before. The point to take from this post is the general one: the absence of a platform label is not evidence of authenticity. Facebook missed this image; the watermark left by the generator was still in it.

The email said to be from Cardiff University — 17 September 2026. The page posted a screenshot of an email, captioned “Awkward for the haters”, alongside four photographs in clinical uniforms. Facebook attached its “AI content” label to the post. The email is headed “Your Replacement Certificate is on its way”, dated 17 September 2026, and opens “Dear Jayne -Anne”. It reads: “I am pleased to confirm that your replacement hard copy certificates are on the way to you. Your award of Certificate of Higher Education in Care Studies and Certificate of BSc (Hons) Nursing (Adult) may take up to 10 weeks.”

Cardiff’s award for that programme is the BN (Hons). The Nursing and Midwifery Council’s monitoring review report on Cardiff University, monitoring event 14-15 January 2015, published July 2015, names the programme “BN (Hons) Nursing (Cardiff Nursing Futures)”, records that it commenced in September 2012 with adult a field of practice within it, and the words “BSc” appear nowhere in its fifty-one pages. The Student Portfolio cover the operator photographed herself reads “Bachelor of Nursing (Hons) / Adult Nursing Field of Practice”. Two features of the screenshot are visible without any tool: in the Cardiff University logo the Welsh form “PRIFYSGOL CAERDYDD” is malformed, the final letters running into one another, and the Android status bar across the top of the screen is distorted. Finally, and on the document’s own terms: an email about a certificate is not a certificate. It says the documents are still to be printed and posted and may take ten weeks, which is to say that the certificate is not yet in her possession.

On file metadata. Facebook strips camera and editing metadata from every upload and writes its own marker block, which includes the text “Photoshop 3.0”, into every image it re-encodes. That string appears on these files and on every other Facebook image, so it shows nothing about how they were made. None of the analysis above relies on metadata.

Opinion, stated as such. It is this site’s opinion, from the sequence of names and the timing of publication, that the name field on the September 2026 certificate images has been altered, and that image-editing tools capable of doing so cleanly are now freely available. That is an inference, not a finding. The same opinion, published in relation to the March 2016 Pearson documents, is recorded at Finding 06. It would be settled in either direction by the awarding bodies’ own records of what was issued under the certificate and reference numbers, or by production of the originals. The pixel comparison of the two RSA images is in a different category: it is a measurement, and it is recorded as one.

Publishing a document in support of a claim to be qualified is capable of engaging section 2 of the Fraud Act 2006 (fraud by false representation), which requires a representation that is false, made dishonestly, and made with the intention of making a gain for oneself or another, or of causing loss to another or exposing another to a risk of loss. Whether any of those elements is made out is a matter for an investigating body with power to obtain the originals and the awarding bodies’ records. Nothing in this finding is a criminal allegation or a finding of guilt.

31Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 s.22 — legal position stated in rebuttalOccupation of premises without contractual right, and the loss of the entire trading estate in four months

This finding concerns the contractual basis on which Jayne’s Baby Bank occupied its premises, and what happened to that estate between May and September 2026. It does not determine whether rent was in fact unpaid, does not assign liability for the condition of any building, and does not determine the precise legal mechanism by which possession of any premises was obtained. The contractual position is documented for the two Pontypool premises, by the 6 Commercial Street notice and the 2023 Crane Street lease; no lease terms have been published for the Caerphilly or Risca units, and nothing here establishes the contractual position at either. Those reservations are carried from the source reporting and are repeated below where they bite.

6 Commercial Street, Pontypool — Formal Notice, 15 September 2026. In the early hours of 15 September 2026 the landlord of 6 Commercial Street attended the premises and took the building back. Two sheets of A4 were taped inside the shop window, facing out over stock that was still tagged and priced. The notice was photographed in the window that morning and is transcribed from those photographs.

The notice’s second paragraph, headed No unauthorised access, prohibits the former tenant from entering, attempting to enter, or arranging for any other person to enter the premises without the landlord’s prior express permission. The prohibition is set out in itemised form. It extends, without limitation, to forcing or attempting to force entry; interfering with, bypassing or damaging the locks or security arrangements; using or obtaining keys or other means of access without authorisation; entering through or with the assistance of a third party; and instructing, encouraging or permitting another person to enter on her behalf. The landlord reserves the right, where appropriate, to notify the police and/or take appropriate legal action. Paragraph 5, headed No continuing right to trade, records that as the contractual term has expired she is not authorised to continue operating her business from the premises, and must not attend for the purpose of trading, serving customers, accessing stock or equipment, or conducting business activities without the landlord’s prior express authorisation.

5 Crane Street, Pontypool — the 2023 lease and the renewal sequence. The 2023 lease for 5 Crane Street commenced on 17 January 2023 and ran for a fixed term of three years to 16 January 2026. The rent was £4,800 per annum, equivalent to £400 per calendar month. Clause 14 records an exclusion of security of tenure. Occupation continued after the fixed term expired. No new executed lease has been produced in the material examined for the source reporting; what can be established from the 2023 lease is that the fixed term ended on 16 January 2026. The operator herself acknowledged this on 27 July 2026: “Our lease ended 16/1/26.”

The rent position, in three moves — 15 June to 16 September 2026. The explanation given for rent changed three times in four months. The third position is an admission that payment stopped.

This finding does not determine whether rent was in fact unpaid. That would require the relevant financial records and, if disputed, the appropriate legal process. What the public record establishes is that the explanation changed.

The unsourced legal assertions — July to September 2026. Across the Risca clearance in July 2026 and the Pontypool closures in August and September 2026, a series of legal propositions was asserted publicly. None was accompanied by a citation. The source reporting sets each against the applicable position, and records that it is not legal advice.

Conduct after service of the notice — 15 to 16 September 2026. The day after the Formal Notice went up, photographs of the interior of the premises — collapsed ceilings, black mould, holes in a roof — were published with the caption “P2 images from today so we think the council will say the same to p2 landlord now. Waiting on the council to let us know if they are condemning the stock before we remove it…” Either the images are not from that day and the caption is wrong, or the premises were entered after service of a notice which states in terms that she must not enter, attempt to enter, or arrange for any other person to enter without the landlord’s prior express permission, including by using or obtaining keys without authorisation or entering through or with the assistance of a third party. A separate post answers the point: “…that’s why we have been in there packing it up and taking my time to make sure it’s all packed tidy. Only the front room to pack up.” No arrest or charge arising from any of these events is known to this investigation, and nothing here should be read as suggesting that any criminal finding has been made against anyone. The Formal Notice reserved the landlord’s right to notify the police; whether he has done so is not known.

The “word document” names her as Former Tenant, addresses her directly as “Dear Ms Ridsdale”, quotes Clauses 1, 8, 14 and 15 of the lease, and is signed and dated. In a WhatsApp exchange she published herself, the reply from the other end of the thread reads: “What shop parts? The whole building is served with notice.” The number at the top of that thread is consistent with the collection contact printed on the Formal Notice itself.

Two further posts from the evening of 16 September, both with comments restricted, describe a return to the premises and a delivery to them: “We will be back over the weekend or next week so don’t leave any donations outside the shops please. Still waiting on council update”, and “We are waiting for a pad delivery at Pontypool shops can you keep you eyes open for us please as we don’t want them to get wet” (spelling as published). Donations were still being solicited and a delivery was still being arranged, both directed at buildings that had been taken back, with members of the public asked to keep watch over the delivery.

Four closures in four months — 6 May to 15 September 2026. Three towns, four buildings, and in every case the person who owned the building recovered it.

Not one of those four was a decision made by the operator. Each was the owner of the building, or a property company, recovering it. At 6 Commercial Street the notice records that the contractual term expired on 26 October 2025 and that there was no continuing contractual right to occupy; at 5 Crane Street the fixed term ended on 16 January 2026 and no executed renewal has been produced; no lease terms have been published for the Caerphilly or Risca premises. Every enforcement action alongside them came from a third party: SSE, the fire service, or environmental health. In Caerphilly and in Risca the donated stock was ultimately dealt with by others rather than by the operator, and in Risca the Torts notice period expired with nothing collected; at Crane Street the stock was removed between 1 and 14 August, on the operator’s own account with the landlord’s assistance. On the description of the events themselves, the public position was different each time: Caerphilly was a landlord who would not let her collect her things; Risca was not a repossession, and when the Torts notice ran out the line was that “the landlord stopped us from collecting in the designated time period” — an assertion for which no document has been produced; Crane Street was not an eviction, it was “given back”; and Commercial Street was presented as the landlord’s fire safety problem.

Reservations carried from the source reporting. The 15 August 2026 notice at 5 Crane Street is treated as evidence that MMB Property Development Ltd stated that it had taken possession, rather than as proof of any particular court or enforcement procedure. The precise legal mechanism by which possession was obtained remains unestablished, and the source reporting does not describe the event as a court eviction. The Risca Torts notice is reported on anonymous-source information. It also remains a claim, rather than an established fact, whether all rent was paid throughout the period of occupation and whether any post-expiry private arrangement existed with either property owner.

What is left — 15 September 2026. One unit, at Newbridge. It is under a fire service prohibition and members of the public are not permitted to enter it. It is full to the doors, and has been for several weeks, with stock stacked outside the unit, in the open air against a wall. On the day the last shop front was lost, the page announced a further building: “Donation centre 2 sneak peak ??? Maybe! Maybe! its got double doors to offload donations off the back of a truck!” (spelling as published). That post, made the same day the Formal Notice went up in the window, also stated “Fire prohibition up for the landlords today” and “The owness [sic] has been passed back to the landlords”. The notice in the window is not a fire prohibition, does not mention fire, and was issued by the landlord rather than by Torfaen County Borough Council or South Wales Fire & Rescue Service. What was passed back was the building.

After possession — 18 September to 6 October 2026. Three days after the notice she wrote that “the landlords have resumed possession of Pontypool Shops” (18 September); then that she had been “evacuated”, “NOT EVICTED” (20 September), that the landlords were “being obstructive” (24 September), and, on video, “If I want to get back in, I’m going to go through the bloody holes in the roof, for Christ’s sake” (26 September). The notice allowed 21 days, to 6 October, to arrange collection by appointment, and stated: “You must not attend the premises independently or attempt to gain access for the purpose of collecting property.” On the morning of 6 October, the last of the 21 days, police were called to the shop for the second time; a witness reported “Wood missing from the bottom of the door and police entered. She came out immediately.” A witness heard her say the landlord was letting her in and out. The landlord says officers phoned him from the scene and he told them no permission had been given, and that his understanding is that the secured door was forced. Officers told her and her son to leave or face arrest, and they left; afterwards Raymond Derek Watkins was seen going back into the shop, and the investigation understands he is still there. At 11:53 the page posted: “We have not broken into the shop the entrance was open” and “We are the legal tenants of 6 commercial street temporarily”. Nothing here suggests that anyone has been charged with any offence. Sherlock article, 6 October 2026.

7 October 2026 — a new building, not confirmed. Three weeks after the last shop front was lost, her son was photographed outside Principality House, Rogerstone, beside a car with its boot open (“Looks like they are moving in”): a 6,200 sq ft former factory advertised at £30,000 a year plus VAT on a full repairing and insuring lease. She had not confirmed taking it (Finding 34 records what has happened since); the agents would not say, and on 7 October said they are “looking into the matter”. The asking rent is more than four times the highest on any lease of hers the investigation has seen (£6,600 at 6 Commercial Street); in February she had called “30 to 40 thousand a year” for warehouses “astronomical out of fundraising”. On 3 October she wrote “Aberbargoed £400? paid in full”; the £7,141 judgment for that unit is unpaid. Nothing here suggests that the agents or the owner have done anything wrong. Sherlock article, 7 October 2026.

6–12 October 2026 — “We have control of the shop”. After getting in on 6 October, the operator told the landlord: “We have control of the shop as the police can not illegal evict us. You can go to court to get an eviction order. However we don’t want you to do that.” She had been told in writing before the deadline: “No extension beyond 6 October 2026 can be agreed.” On 8 October the page called it “the shop we legally occupy for the next 28 days please minimum” and put free school uniform on a rail outside, and the landlord’s notice was removed from the window. After Raymond Derek Watkins’ arrest there on 11 October, the page told the landlord on 12 October: “Get off your backsides, pack up the baby bank stuff and deliver it to me”, and listed “Breach of tenancy” among its complaints. The lease ended on 26 October 2025. Nothing here suggests that anyone has been charged with any offence. Sherlock article, 6 October 2026 (updated 12 October).

27 October 2026 — “make some complaints for us”. The page asked its followers to report “5 Crane Street and 6 Commercial street Pontypool” to “Health and Saftey, Trading standards and South Wales fire this week”, and supplied the wording: “State that the shops are still on prohibitions and the landlords are responsible and refusing to give Jayne her equiptment and belongings despite trying to arrange collection multiple times over the last few months. Therefore the landlords are in breach of the prohibitions. They are only stalling to delay the work they have been ordered to do blaming us.” (spelling as published). The same post says “we are no longer the tenants”, which matches the lease record above (6 Commercial Street ended on 26 October 2025; the 5 Crane Street fixed term on 16 January 2026) and differs from “We are the legal tenants of 6 commercial street temporarily” (6 October) and “the shop we legally occupy for the next 28 days” (8 October). It names 5 Crane Street (P1) as still refusing to hand things back. On 11 October she had thanked the “P1 landlord and his family” for helping “remove and transport the rest of P1 stock to our new warehouse”, and on 24 October she wrote “We have sorted everything now from p1”. For 6 Commercial Street (P2) her wording had already moved to “p2 landlords are holding the others to ransom” (22 October) and “at least 20 still being held hostage in Pontypool shops” (25 October). The post gives no prohibition notice, reference or regulator statement for the landlords being “in breach”. This dossier does not determine who is responsible for any prohibition, or what was or was not offered to her about collection; the 21-day collection window and what happened on 6 October are set out above. Asking followers to report is a method recorded earlier in this dossier: Finding 12 and Finding 16.

31aIdentity — executed deedCharities Act 1992 s.63Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 ss.24–28 excludedThe deed: a nine-page lease, signed by hand in the name publicly denied, letting the premises as a charity shop to an operation that was neither a charity nor a company

Finding 31 establishes that the contractual term expired on 26 October 2025 and that trading continued for a further 324 days. This finding sets out what the document itself says, clause by clause, because each of the public positions taken between 16 and 18 September 2026 is answered by a term agreed in writing on 27 October 2024.

Whose name is on it. Page one names two parties. The landlord is Nasrat Shoaib — the name printed on the Formal Notice taped inside the shop window on 15 September 2026. The tenant is not Jayne’s Baby Bank and is not a company. It is an individual, at a house in Blackwood.

The address beside that name is 7 Meadow Road, Blackwood, NP12 2AG. That is the address on the County Court Judgment entered at the Civil National Business Centre on 27 January 2026 in case M3DP9X7A, for £277, unsatisfied, against MISS CARRIE-ANNE RIDSDALE. Same name, same house — on a public court record and a private lease created fifteen months apart, by different people, for unrelated purposes. The lease is also executed as a deed: signed by hand in the presence of an attesting witness who recorded his own name, address and occupation. The signature itself begins, legibly, Jayne.

The significance is narrow and it is decisive. The documented public position has been that Carrie-Anne Ridsdale is somebody else: when the £7,141 judgment surfaced the response was that it was “not even my name”, and that there were no legal documents connected to the operation at all (Finding 19, Finding 03). A credit file can be called an error and a court register somebody else’s paperwork. A deed signed by hand before a witness is a different class of object. Either that signature is hers, or the operation traded for nearly two years from a building leased to a woman it says it has never heard of.

“A shop for the sale of Charity shop” — and there was no charity. The drafting is clumsy; the effect is not. The building was let for use as a charity shop, and clause 5(i) binds the tenant to that use and no other. Jayne’s Baby Bank has never appeared on the register of the Charity Commission for England and Wales. An application to register was formally refused in August 2023 — fourteen months before this lease was signed — and no further application to register Jayne’s Baby Bank is known; a separate attempt to register “Jayne’s FREE Pet Cafe” at this address is recorded in §01, beside clause 6(e), which bars keeping animals at the property. Jaynesbabybank Registered CIC, company number 16838920, was not incorporated until 7 November 2025: more than a year after the lease was signed, and twelve days after the term had already expired. A community interest company is a limited company undertaking to use its assets for community benefit; it is not a charity, has no trustees, no Charity Commission oversight and no charitable tax reliefs. On 27 October 2024 there was no charity, no company and no registration of any kind — one individual signing a deed for a charity shop. See Finding 01 and Finding 22.

The rent, and seven reasons for not paying it. £6,600 a year is £550 a month. Set against that, the public post of 16 September 2026: “P2/3 landlord wanted £550 for down stairs and £900 upstairs. How much would you pay to rent these buildings.” The landlord did not want £550. It was the contractual rent under a deed she had signed, payable monthly in advance by standing order. The same post concedes the premise: “we would state why we stopped paying…” That the rent stopped is not in dispute. What has moved is the reason.

The building did not change in July 2026. The roof did not change. The reason given for withholding rent was that the landlord was said to have joined a group on the internet, and that this made non-payment a matter of principle. No lease suspends rent on that ground, and it is not consistent with the account given two months later. That the operation was reported to be at least four months in arrears — at £550 a month, at least £2,200 — rests on sources the reporting site considers reliable rather than on a document seen by this dossier, and is recorded on that basis; the monthly figure and the interest provision come from the lease itself.

The roof: clause 5(g) against “it’s not my job”. The public position was categorical: “It’s not my job or the baby banks responsibility to fix a roof unless we own a building.” This is an ordinary full repairing and insuring lease. Clause 9 imposes no repairing obligation on the landlord at all; clause 5(g) puts the Property — defined as the land and buildings, not the interior or the non-structural parts — in good repair and condition at the tenant’s expense, together with decorating inside and out, replacing floor coverings before the end of the Term, and keeping the drains clear.

One genuine qualification should be stated, and this dossier states it. Clause 5(g) excepts damage by an Insured Risk, which is the landlord’s to reinstate under clause 9(b). Whether any particular defect at 6 Commercial Street fell inside that exception cannot be determined from the lease alone, and is not determined here. But that narrow exception is not the position that was taken publicly. The position taken publicly was that repairs are never a tenant’s responsibility, and on this lease they were hers. The answer to “we didn’t rent these buildings in these conditions to start with” is clause 20: both parties acknowledged that neither relied on any representation or warranty by the other, and no schedule of condition is attached.

Clause 10 — the argument that cannot succeed. The central public claim of 16 September 2026 was that “we do not have to pay any rent for p1/p2/p3 or any shop/space once a Health and Safety Prohibition is in place as the shops have been deemed unfit for rent/use… legally they have been told it is a criminal offence for them to charge any tenant rent once the prohibition is in place.” No statute was cited and none exists. A Prohibition Notice under section 22 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 directs that a specified activity must not be carried on until remedied; it is served on the person controlling that activity, it does not terminate a lease, it does not suspend a contractual rent obligation, and it creates no offence of charging rent. The offence under the Act is contravening the notice.

Three further answers follow from the document. First, every prohibition relied on post-dates the end of the term by months — the fire prohibition in March 2026, the environmental health prohibition in July 2026, against a term that expired in October 2025. Second, on 18 September 2026 the same page volunteered whose notices they were: “any fire prohibition on Pontypool shop or Health and safety prohibitions in our name are now void to us…” — the argument depends on the notices evidencing the landlord’s default, and they were served on the operation. Third, and decisively, clause 10 makes unfitness a termination trigger, not a rent holiday. If the premises were unfit for occupation and use, the lease ended on the day they became so and the operation was trading from a building it had no tenancy in at all. If they were not unfit, the rent fell due. The one outcome the contract does not produce is a shop occupied for free.

“I’m now leaseless and footloose and fancy free” — 17 September 2026. She did not become leaseless on 17 September 2026. Clause 11 records that sections 24 to 28 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 — the provisions that would otherwise give a business tenant the right to remain after the term and to demand a new lease — were excluded, with the statutory warning notice served and a declaration made before she became contractually bound. That is a formal two-step process which cannot happen inadvertently. From one minute past midnight on 27 October 2025 there was no contractual right and no statutory right to the building. Clause 8 set out the single obligation that arose: yield up the premises, and remove the tenant’s items. Eleven months later the building was, on the landlord’s account, “effectively… filled to capacity and there was very little usable space remaining”.

“Option 1. Leave everything in Pontypool for the landlords to dispose of.” Posted on 17 September 2026 under the heading “Options we have”, as the first of two, between a line about being footloose and a request for cardboard boxes. Under clause 8(b) it is not an option: the duty to vacate and remove the tenant’s items is not discharged by leaving them for the landlord to pay to remove. The goods in question were donated by the public for families in Pontypool. It was posted as an option, and this dossier records no removal of stock from 6 Commercial Street: the landlord holds the building, has stated in writing that nobody may enter without his express authorisation, and the stock remains inside it, collectable by appointment only until 6 October 2026. What becomes of it is still open. The three earlier premises are why the option is recorded at all — at Caerphilly the operator was reported as not permitted to collect the items inside; at Risca a clearance firm emptied the building on 1 July 2026 after the Torts notice period expired with nothing collected; at Crane Street the stock was moved into storage with the landlord during August 2026. See Finding 31 and Finding 15.

Clauses 6 and 7 — four covenants and what happened in the building. Clause 6(b) barred any alteration to the structure; on camera on 30 October 2025: “Oh yeah, we’ve knocked through. I don’t mess around” — two units of a Grade II listed building, without Listed Building Consent (Finding 09). Clause 6(e) barred keeping animals; a pet cafe was announced for this unit under four months after signing — “PONTYPOOL SUPERSTORE CAFE AND PET CAFE PENDING” (16 February 2025) and “phase two which is the pet cafe” (17 June 2025) — and a cafe is in any event not a shop for the sale of goods under clause 5(i). Clause 6(g) barred residential use; on 15 September 2026 a man was living in the premises (Finding 28). Clause 7(d) barred sharing or parting with possession.

Clause 5(s) required the premises to be kept open for trading. By her own account they were not: “I want to get P2 open next week” and “we need an actual warehouse now” (2 August 2025); “we’re currently excavating P2 of all the donations” (28 July 2025). A warehouse is precisely what clause 5(i) did not permit the building to become.

P3 — the floors that were never leased. P1 is 5 Crane Street; P2 is the ground-floor shop this lease covers; P3 is the upper part of the same building, treated by both parties as a separate letting. Across sixteen months of public discussion the operation never once claimed to have signed for it, and repeatedly said the opposite: “PONTYPOOL PHASE 3… SHALL WE SIGN A LEASE ?!” (14 May 2025); “I know we got 50 in P3 that we haven’t even signed the lease for yet” (28 July 2025); “we’re looking to sign for P3” (7 April 2026). The stated reason for not signing was cost, not condition: “I just haven’t signed it because I don’t want to commit to another £400 a month without having some sort of funding behind us.” By 16 September 2026 the position was “we do not have to pay any rent for p1/p2/p3” — rent cannot be withheld on a tenancy that was never taken.

The space was nonetheless used throughout: stock stored in it, a poundshop room and a Christmas room planned for it, painting and renovation “for shoppers”, and “we are in p2/p3 most of the day” (25 July 2026). On 8 June 2026 the claim was “We have permission to use all areas of p1, p2 and p3”; no document has been produced for that permission, and two months later the position was still that she was looking to sign. Whichever way the demise is read, neither reading assists: if the upper floors fell inside the Property as defined, the repairing covenant in clause 5(g) covered the whole building including its roof; if they fell outside it, they were occupied with no tenancy at all — on the landlord’s written account, for seventeen months. Clause 7(d) barred sharing or parting with possession of the unit she did hold, and clause 6(b) barred the knock-through to P3 planned in April 2026.

On who owned what, the accounts diverge. In February 2026: “we’ve spoke to landlords, P2 landlords this week about P3, because P2 landlords own P3”, together with a description of the terrace as interconnected by doors and shared attics in one Grade II listed structure. In September 2026 the rent post refers throughout to a single “P2/3 landlord” quoting two floor prices. Between them, on 30 July 2026: “P1, P2, P3 are all separate landlords, separate buildings.” The February and September accounts agree with each other; the July one stands alone, and it arrived at the point when the reach of enforcement notices across the structure had become a live question.

What this finding does not assert. It does not determine what sum is owed, by whom, or whether any particular defect fell within the Insured Risk exception — those are matters for the parties and, if it comes to it, a court. It does not assert that the arrears figure has been documented to this dossier; it has not, and the basis for it is stated above. It makes no finding on which physical space “P3” denoted at any given date. Readings of the lease are readings of its plain wording, offered as comment and not as legal advice. What is recorded is that a nine-page deed exists, that it was signed in a name publicly denied, and that its terms answer each of the positions taken publicly in September 2026.

“We have not received any legal eviction notices from anywhere” — 8 and 29 June 2026. Three months before possession was taken, and set against a landlord whose written account is that, after a breach of the lease terms he dates to January 2025, he served notice of eviction “multiple times”, the position was stated twice in four weeks.

Four things in those two posts are answered by the deed. The roof was the tenant’s obligation under clause 5(g), not the landlord’s and not the council’s; listed-building status imposes duties on an owner in respect of the fabric, but it does not transfer a repairing covenant the tenant has signed. “Permission to use all areas of p1, p2 and p3” has never been evidenced by any document, and clause 7(d) barred sharing or parting with possession of the unit she did hold. The claim to have received no eviction paperwork “from anyone- anywhere” stands against the landlord’s account and against the Formal Notice taped inside the window eleven weeks later. And item D — “we haven’t knocked down any walls (yet)” — was posted eight months after “Oh yeah, we’ve knocked through. I don’t mess around” (30 October 2025), with the parenthesis doing a great deal of work.

The £2,000 stock-damage figure and £450 disposal cost are recorded because they are the operation’s own quantification of loss at P1, offered as a reason the rent was not being paid. On this lease the loss is attributable to a repairing obligation the tenant had accepted, subject only to the Insured Risk exception set out above.

32CPUTR 2008Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974Prohibition for damp and mould, a respiratory warning to volunteers, and free goods put out for the public in the same period

Environmental health prohibition documentation was served on 24 July 2026 in relation to 5b Crane Street. The covering letter records a serious risk of personal injury caused by water penetration, dampness and mould growth, and states that the premises were required to be vacated and not reoccupied until remedial work had addressed the risk. A second prohibition notice was served on MMB Property Development Ltd in relation to matters contained in the same documentation. The environmental health prohibition — referred to on the property company’s 15 August window notice as Prohibition Notice 004244 — is a separate instrument under separate powers from the fire Prohibition Notice PNO1/0151 served on the Pontypool premises in March 2026.

25 July 2026 — the operator’s own respiratory warning. Immediately after the prohibition, the operator published a notice advising people who had been in the shop since November 2025, particularly volunteers, to contact their GP for a respiratory baseline.

The same period — the free trolley. While that advice was in circulation, the operator was advertising goods for removal and inviting members of the public, including children, to take items from a free trolley: “Free trolley at p2 door way has loads in there please take what you want. Children please only take items you want home with you do not fly tip them.” (spelling and punctuation as published).

1 July 2026 — the condition of the building already linked to giving stock away. Three weeks before the prohibition, the operator had already tied free goods directly to the state of the premises: “These are all free because I can’t hang them up, see guys, because of the leak.” Her own posts record leaks, damp and mould being discussed at the premises for years, including mould filmed inside on 19 June 2026.

August 2026 — progressive removal, and distribution elsewhere. Stock was progressively removed from the premises during August, by the van-load, into storage: “2 vans full shifted to storage today – thank you to the landlord” (2 August) and “Thank you to the landlord and his brother and our volunteers today! 3 vans full shifted and sorted!” (9 August). Jayne’s Baby Bank also publicly discussed taking or dropping items to other locations, including local leisure centres and hospitals, and later distributed baby goods and nappies in other settings including hospitals. On 16 August Jayne’s Baby Bank characterised the closure in these terms: “No eviction. The council closed it for the landlord to fix the problem because it breached health and saftey at work for us as tenants” (spelling as published) — its own account that the premises breached health and safety at work for it as tenant.

20 September 2026 — the notice republished as an “Evacuation Notice” for a different building. Under the caption “Just for clarity we have been evacuated from both Pontypool shops due to landlords breach of Health and Safety. NOT EVICTED.”, the page published the 5b Crane Street Prohibition Notice with a retyped panel laid over it, headed “EVACUATION NOTICE” and naming 6 Commercial Street without a postcode. Set against the notice as served it differs in nine places, and every change runs one way: “present a serious risk of personal injury” becomes “present a risk of personal injury”; dampness and mould that “has caused and will continue to cause” becomes dampness and mould it “has the potential to continue to cause”; “acute and chronic respiratory illness” becomes “acute respiratory illness”. The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 provides for improvement notices and prohibition notices; it provides for no “evacuation notice”. The investigation makes no finding about who produced the retyped document or how. Sherlock article, 15 September 2026 (update of 20 September).

What this finding does not assert. The free trolley was at the P2 doorway. The P1 and P2 addresses are distinct and that distinction matters: nothing here establishes that stock from the prohibited unit was the stock distributed, and it is expressly not claimed that contaminated goods were distributed to anybody. Neither article determines that proposition and neither does this dossier. What is recorded is the sequence and its dates.

That sequence engages two provisions rather than establishing a breach of either. Where a trading operation makes goods available to members of the public, the diligence exercised over what is handed out and the information given to those taking it are matters capable of engaging the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008. Where volunteers were working in premises prohibited on the ground of serious risk of personal injury from dampness and mould, the duties owed to those volunteers are matters capable of engaging the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. Both are for the relevant authorities to assess, not for this dossier to determine.

The public-interest question that follows is narrow and legitimate: what assessment was carried out on stock from premises affected by damp and mould before it was moved, stored or distributed elsewhere? That question is reasonable precisely because the operator herself recognised enough potential respiratory concern to advise people who had been in the premises to seek a medical baseline.